NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation:

Exploring Change in Counter-Insurgency, Collective Defence, and Cyber-Security

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ABSTRACT

In 2019 NATO enjoyed its 70th anniversary. During its existence it has had a number of challenges to overcome, none more so than what its function and role would be in the post-Cold War era. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO has embraced former adversaries as members, developed roles beyond collective defence, and engaged in active military operations outside of the Euro-Atlantic area. The thesis posits, utilising third wave institutionalism, that explanation can be given to the transformation of the Alliance, incorporating functions beyond collective defence, by considering the relationship between endogenous and exogenous drivers of change in relation to three case studies. First, the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan undertaken by the NATO ISAF mission, provides evidence of how the Alliance has changed in response to a clear exogenous shock. Second, the return of collective defence after Russia's annexation of Crimea develops a case study where the exogenous shock occurs after a process of endogenous change had been enacted. Third, the role of the Alliance as a provider of cyber-security, where no clear exogenous shock is present, is examined.

Theoretically, the thesis develops a transformational model, whereby adaptation, institutionalisation, and effectiveness, are considered indicative of a self-reinforcing transformational process that demonstrates, not only that NATO is an actor its own right, but also that the Alliance is a purposive institution. The argument not only provides rich empirical data in relation to each of the three case studies, but provides explanatory power to the existence, and nature of evolution, in NATO after the end of the Cold War.

For Tessibel Mary Hall,
10th December 1916 to 8th February 2018

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Just like the rest of the thesis writing these acknowledgments is proving harder than expected at first thought, mainly due to who gets mentioned first. On balance, I decided it would be impossible not start with my grandmother who moved onto a different place last year. Without her enduring support the idea of being able to do a PhD is unlikely to have taken shape and my ever-lasting love and gratitude are there, hence the dedication. One of the interesting aspects of teaching Problems of World History from 1918 to the Present Day, is that it was essentially the story around her life. I often wonder just how much the world has changed over the past one hundred years, and how much of it is positive change for the better. Social media being a likely candidate for the biggest ill on society.

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My thanks extend to my supervisors, Prof Mark Webber and Dr Jamie Gaskarth, your support and comments throughout the process have been invaluable. Furthermore, commendable patience has been demonstrated, without which I am sure that this thesis

would not have reached its conclusion. Hopefully, our paths will cross in the future without the need for supervision.

Finally, and by no means lastly. He was pipped to the opening show and, therefore, has been tasked with bringing the show home. My son, my first born, who duly arrived some 7 months ago, 7 weeks early – patience is a virtue. The surprise factor is perhaps best highlighted by the fact that the only thing that was brought with us to the hospital was an earlier version of this thesis – a fresh copy had been printed earlier that morning and I planned to read some of it whilst awaiting the various routine appointments to take place. No nappies, no clothes, no overnight bag, nothing. It is without doubt one of the hardest experiences to rely to others, who are not parents, just what it means and the feelings that you have inside. Special mention has to go to the staff at the Birmingham Women's Hospital, the Birmingham Children's Hospital, and the West Midlands Ambulance service. All provided a role, at different times – it's been an interesting few months - in ensuring that we will be able to enjoy many fruitful years together as a family.

To anyone else who happens to read this, you truly are enlightened, and remember it's better to burn out than to fade away.

Gavin Eric Lindsay Hall
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract **2**
Acknowledgments **4**
Figures **8**
Glossary of Abbreviations **10**

Introduction **13**
Case Selection 16
Methodology 17
Thesis Outline 19

Chapter 1: The NATO and the Post-Cold War Security Environment **20**
Strategy 40
Doctrine 52
Policy 58
Summary 80

Chapter 2: Theoretical Approach **82**
What is an Institution? 83
NATO as an Actor 88
Why Institutionalism? 90
Theory of Change 97
Third Wave Institutionalism 105
Summary 113

Chapter 3: ISAF – The Transformation from Stabilisation to COIN **115**
Background 116
Clarification of Terms and Concepts 118
Adaptation 123
Institutionalisation 137
Effectiveness 154
Summary 176

Chapter 4: The Return of Collective Defence **178**
Background 178
Clarification of Terms and Concepts 180
Adaptation 186
Institutionalisation 197
Effectiveness 212
Summary 231

Chapter 5: NATO and Cyber Security **232**
Background 233
Clarification of Terms and Concepts 238
Adaptation 244
Institutionalisation 251
Effectiveness 261
Summary 273

Chapter 6: Conclusion **275**
Reflections on Research 275
Contribution to Knowledge 280

Bibliography **284**

FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Allied Joint Doctrine Hierarchy – Levels 1 & 2, 2002. 54
Figure 1.2 Allied Joint Doctrine Hierarchy - Level 3, 2002. 54
Figure 1.3 Allied Joint Doctrine Architecture. 2012. 55
Figure 1.4 Allied Joint Doctrine Architecture. 29 April 2014. 56
Figure 1.5 Allied Joint Doctrine Development Process. 57
Figure 1.6 Ratification process for a Level 2 AJP. 57
Figure 1.7 % GDP Defence Spending 1949-1960 63
Figure 1.8 North Atlantic Cooperation Council. 71
Figure 1.9 NATO's Civil and Military Structure 1992. 78

Figure 2.1 Inter-relationship between components of transformation. 113

Figure 3.1 Model of Counter-Insurgency. 121
Figure 3.2 The COIN Operational Environment. 122
Figure 3.3 ISAF Area of Operations – August 2003. 126
Figure 3.4 ISAF Expansion 2003-2006. 128
Figure 3.5 ISAF Regional Commands and PRT Locations - 29th January 2007. 129
Figure 3.6 Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics. 136
Figure 3.7 Anaconda Strategy vs Insurgents in Afghanistan. 149
Figure 3.8 ISAF Organizational Structure 2008. 154
Figure 3.9 Afghan Army Unites Partnered with NATO Units. 159
Figure 3.10 Assessment Levels of Afghan National Security Forces. 159
Figure 3.11 ANA and ANP Fatalities, January 2007-2015. 160
Figure 3.12 ISAF Troop Numbers 2003-2014. 162
Figure 3.13 US Troop Commitments to Afghanistan. 163
Figure 3.14 Troop Commitment to ISAF expressed as a % of total ISAF Troop Number. 164
Figure 3.15 NATO Operations: Participation and Risk, 1996-2014. 164
Figure 3.16 American Troops Deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan 2008-2013. 167
Figure 3.17 Department of Defense Obligations in Iraq & Afghanistan 2007-2016. 168
Figure 3.18 Net costs of UK Military Operations in Afghanistan 2001-2013. 168
Figure 3.19 COIN Stakeholders. 173
Figure 3.20 Campaign Assessment. 174
Figure 3.21 ISAF Audience for Strategic Communications. 175

Figure 4.1 The Russian System. 195
Figure 4.2 Russian Military Expenditure from 1993 to 2010. 196
Figure 4.3 NATO European Members Separated into Western, Eastern and Southern. 199
Figure 4.4 Defence Expenditure as a share of GDP (%) in 2014 and estimated in 2017. 206
Figure 4.5 Defence Expenditure (Million US dollar) from 2010 to 2017. 206
Figure 4.6 Avg Annual Change in GDP (%) Defence Expenditures from 2014 to 2017. 207
Figure 4.7 Enhanced Forward Presence 2017. 211
Figure 4.8 Joint ISR Process. 215
Figure 4.9 Baltic Air Policing Contributors. 222

Figure 4.10 Number of Deployments to Baltic Air Policing Mission, 2003 to 2014. 222
Figure 4.11 Number of Deployments to Baltic Air Policing Mission, 2014 to 2017. 223
Figure 4.12 Enhanced Forward Presence. 224
Figure 4.13 European Natural Gas Imports. 225
Figure 4.14 NATO Exercise Process: Stages and Phases. 229
Figure 4.15 NATO Lessons Learned Process. 230

Figure 5.1. How the Internet Works. 235
Figure 5.2. Internet Routing. 236
Figure 5.3 Layered Conception of Cyberspace. 242
Figure 5.4. Classification of Cyber-Attacks. 254
Figure 5.5 Positing National Cyber Security Strategies 255
Figure 5.6 NATO Cyber Organisation – Hierarchical. 260

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD - Anti-Area/Access Denial
AAP - Allied Administrative Publication
ACCHAN - Allied Command Channel
ACE - Allied Command Europe
ACLANT - Allied Command Atlantic
ACO - Allied Command Operations
ACT - Allied Command Transformation
AFNORTH - Allied Forces North Europe
AGS - Alliance Ground Surveillance
AfPak - Afghanistan and Pakistan Strategy
AJP - Allied Joint Publication
AJDA - Allied Joint Doctrine Architecture
AJDH - Allied Joint Doctrine Hierarchy
AJOD WG - Allied Joint Doctrine Working Group
ANA - Afghan National Army
ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces
AOR - Area of Responsibility
ARRC - Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
ATP - Allied Tactical Publication
CA - Comprehensive Approach
CAAT - COIN Advisory & Assistance Team
CDMA - Cyber Defense Management Authority
CDMB - Cyber Defense Management Board
CERP - Commanders Emergency Response Plan
CIDNE - Combined Information Data Network Exchange
CMCCOE - Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence
COIN - Counter-Insurgency
CSCE - Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CT - Counter-terrorism
DCB - Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative
EAPC - Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
eNRF - Enhanced NATO Response Force
GIRoA - Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IA - Interim Authority
IFOR - Implementation Force
IJC - ISAF Joint Command

ISAF - International Security Assistance Force
JFC - Joint Forces Command
JISR - Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
KFOR - Kosovo Force
LRTNF - Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces
M+30 - 30 days after mobilisation
MAP - Membership Action Plan
MARCOM - Maritime Command
MBFR - Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
MC - Military Committee
MCJSB - Military Committee Joint Standardization Board
MSA - Military Standardisation Agency
MTA - Military Technical Agreement
NAC - North Atlantic Council
NACC - North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NA5CRO - Non-Article V Crisis Response Operations
NDPP - NATO Defence Planning Process
NPG - Nuclear Planning Group
NRF - NATO Response Force
NTM-A - NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan
OEF - Operation Enduring Freedom
OOTW - Operations Other Than War
OSCE - Organisation on Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCC - Prague Capabilities Commitment
PfP - Partnership For Peace
PII - Partnership Interoperability Initiative
PRT - Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSO - Peace Support Operations
RAP - Readiness Action Plan
RC - Regional Command
RMA - Revolution in Military Affairs
SACEUR - Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT - Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SALT - Strategic Arms Limitation Talks / Treaty
SFOR - Stabilisation Force
SG - Standing Group
SHAPE - Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe
START - Strategic Arms Reduction Talks / Treaty
TA - Transitional Authority
UFR - Unilateral Force Reduction

UN - United Nations
UNSCR - United Nations Security Council Resolution
VJTF - Very-High Readiness Joint Task Force

Introduction

> *Leading NATO is more like conducting an orchestra when no one has the same sheet music and all the instruments are from different cultures and musical traditions*.
>
> Admiral James Stavridis, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (2014, 650).

On the 4th April 1949 *The North Atlantic Treaty*[1] was signed and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) came into existence. The treaty formalised the indivisibility of the security of the allies within the Euro-Atlantic area. As Admiral Stavridis[2] notes, the rational objectives of each of the, now, twenty-nine allies, has led to constant issues of concern for the Alliance. Each of NATO's sovereign nations has objectives based on different national security priorities, different military capabilities and traditions, and different political pressures. The objectives of the allies, furthermore, are not fixed but dynamic and subject to change as the security environment, or perception of the security environment, alters over time.

NATO, approaching its seventieth anniversary, continues to operate at the heart of Euro-Atlantic security. The threat of communism spreading throughout Europe, and the existential threat, from the Soviet Union, to the allies continued independence has long since evaporated. NATO, therefore, is unique among military alliances, not just due to its longevity, but to the fact that it has outlived its initial purpose and taken on new challenges as the security environment has evolved. This thesis investigates how NATO has transformed in the post-Cold War era and ascertains whether the nature, and level, of transformation has varied across different security issue areas and, if so, why this has occurred. Given the renewed attention on why NATO matters in its anniversary 70th year

[1] Also referred to as The Washington Treaty, due to the location of the signing of the treaty.
[2] Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) from 2nd July 2009 to 13th May 2013.

this thesis will demonstrate the continued validity of NATO as a vital part of the Euro-Atlantic security infrastructure.[3]

NATO has endured a series of challenges since the end of the Cold War. The challenges arose both in terms of the overall purpose of the Alliance, and the tasks undertaken in the post-Cold War security environment.[4] NATO, this thesis argues, has been able to survive and tackle these challenges, albeit some more effectively than others, due to its high degree of institutionalisation. As such, although different theories can be used to offer explanations of specific issues at a specific time, the thesis posits that NATO is an actor in its own right and that institutionalist theory offers explanatory purchase across the full range of issues. A third wave institutionalist position, with a preference for rational choice institutionalism, is adopted, as it allows for sufficient flexibility to consider the drivers of change within NATO.[5]

NATO has transformed markedly since the end of the Cold War and the nature of the transformation has been explored throughout this chapter. Conventional thinking on alliances expected NATO to dissolve with the end of the Cold War. NATO's survival beyond the removal of the Soviet threat illustrates the ability of the Alliance to adapt and this institutional trait is what warrants enquiry. Furthermore, NATO has been able to adapt in relation to the changing security environment, an exogenous factor over which the Alliance has had no direct control. NATO, via strategy, doctrine, and policy exercises endogenous control over the choices that it makes. How the relationship between these exogenous and

[3] For example, see House Committee on Foreign Affairs (2019) NATO at 70: An Indispensable Alliance, 13th March. The Economist (2019) 'How NATO is Shaping Up at 70', 14th March. The Editorial Board (2018) 'Why NATO Matters', *The New York Times*, 8th July. Fallon, M. & Robertson, G. (2018) 'The Case for NATO is as Strong as Ever', *The Times*, 9th July. Sevastopulo, D. & Peel, M (2018) 'Trump hits out at Germany ahead of NATO Summit', *The Financial Times*, 9th July.

[4] The post-Cold War security environment is examined in Chapter 1 of this thesis. It should be noted that at the time the term new security environment was used to distinguish between the pre and post-Cold War period.

[5] Explored in greater detail in Chapter 2.

endogenous drivers of change can be analysed is developed in Chapter 2, with the theoretical basis that underpins the thesis.

The traditional view of institutions is that they are static and only able to change in response to an external shock (Hay, 2002, Ch 4). When combined with the debate surrounding why the Alliance exists in the post-Cold War era, it may even be 'brain-dead',[6] it is conceivable that a potential explanation for NATO's longevity could be an ability to implement change as an endogenous process. Such a view would consider NATO to be a dynamic and flexible organisation that is able to swiftly adapt to challenges as they arise (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Olsen, 2009). Not only would this be unusual for an institution, but the fact that NATO operates on the basis of consensus strongly implies that there is an institutional function beyond the individual member states interests. The thesis, thereby, argues that NATO is not just able to change, but is transformative in its approach and that once established the process becomes self-reinforcing. Accordingly, a transformation model[7] is developed based, on institutionalist theory, and utilised to explore the case studies. The case studies are indicative of NATO's transformational process.

The end of the Cold War generated a substantive range of analysis of what NATO's future role should be. The core arguments focussed on whether the Alliance; had served its purpose and should be disbanded (Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 1993; Weber, 1992), should be limited to a collective defence role (M. E. Brown, 1998; 1999; Glaser, 1993; Walt, 1998), whether collective security was the future for NATO (Brenner, 1998; Joffe, 1992; Yost, 1998), and whether, or if, the Alliance should be enlarged (Asmus et al., 1995; 1996; Eyal,

[6] Comments by President Macron in the run up to the 2019 London Heads of Government NATO meeting, see Wintour, P. and McKernan, B. (2019) Macron defends 'brain-dead NATO' Remarks as Summit Approaches, *The Guardian*, 28th November.

[7] Developed during Chapter 2 – Theoretical Approach and illustrated in Figure 2.1, the transformational model identifies adaptation, institutionalisation, and effectiveness as three pillars.

1997; Rühle and Williams, 1996). The nature of these debates is expanded upon analysed in Chapter 1. These core arguments from the 1990s are still prevalent today, though arguments as to whether the Alliance should exist have declined, there remains debate; regarding its future role (Kamp, 2014; Mearsheimer, 2014; Sakwa, 2015), whether this role should include providing security by engaging in out-of-area operations (D. Brown, 2019; Daadler and Stavridis, 2012; Petersson, 2015; Rynning, 2012), and the role of NATO enlargement in the current international security environment (Czulda and Madej, 2015; German, 2017; Marten, 2017; Wolff, 2015). Identifying how the Alliance is able to incorporate new security tasks into its role, thereby, is of both theoretical and empirical interest.

The thesis, therefore, provides an original contribution to the literature in two main areas. First, by developing a third wave institutionalist argument that incorporates a theoretical model for assessing endogenous change in an institution. Second, through presenting empirical data in each of three case studies. The principal goal of this thesis is to enhance our understanding of change in NATO and to identify the extent of endogeneity in that process.

Case Study Selection

The cases studies examined in this thesis relate to emergent security challenges NATO has faced in the twenty-first century; counter-insurgency (COIN) in Afghanistan, the return of collective defence in Europe following Russia's annexation of Crimea, and cyber-security. Not only does each case align with a geographic area of threat for NATO - the South, the East, and at home – but each also provides a functional analysis due to the different level of endogenous change enacted by the Alliance in each case. COIN is primarily a response to exogenous factors, with the return to collective defence a mixture of exogenous and

endogenous drivers, whilst cyber-security lacks a clear exogenous shock. Further, the differences between the three cases enables conclusions to be drawn that are generalizable to the Alliance's tasks as a whole rather than specific to the individual cases in question.

COIN and collective defence both have clear exogenous origins - 9/11 and Crimea - that led to the Alliance undertaking action, whilst cyber-security does not. Although, both COIN and collective defence have substantive scope for endogenous institutional responses. Furthermore, collective defence is an area which NATO has substantive 'muscle memory', whilst COIN was a military operation in which a coalition undertook a counter-insurgency task for the first time in history. Cyber-security remains a developing field, both theoretically and in practice, and the amorphous nature of the security implications for a military alliance evidences a different level of challenge for NATO. The overall effect of applying the same theoretical approach to each of the distinct case studies, is to provide a more systematic analysis, enhancing the merits of the validity of a conclusion in favour of the primacy of either an exogenous or endogenous driver of change (Dark, 2016, Ch 2; King et al., 1994, Ch 5).

Methodology

The thesis is reliant on a variety of primary documents, mainly NATO official documentation and speeches. It also utilizes the considerable secondary literature, including newspaper articles and reports, on NATO's change in the post-Cold War era and the specific cases studied. In the case of cyber-security, where there is only a limited secondary literature in relation to NATO, use of third-party reports of variable quality, is unavoidable, in order to complement primary documentation.

It should also be noted that use has been made of the Wayback Machine, the internet archive, in order to view websites and garner primary documents, which have slipped into the void of history. This is particularly useful when studying NATO, as when a new policy or doctrine is enacted it supplants the previous iteration making availability troublesome. A prime example of this is the NATO Summit websites and the associated speeches and information, which although still active, are no longer actively published or linked to from the main NATO webpage. The other side is illustrated by the ISAF website, which as non-longer an operational mission, is completely inaccessible, with continual redirects to the Resolute Support website. The NATO archive, which is available online, has a time lag due to the security classification of the documents involved, and as such has not yet released any substantive documentation from the post-Cold War era, although some documents would be available via the NATO Library service with appropriate NATO login information.

The thesis, therefore, utilises information in the public realm, even if some of the sources used are not widely known to be in existence still. Thereby, the information contained within this thesis is replicable (Dowding, 2016, 181-3). Official documents offer a formal account of the mechanisms of NATO by providing the clearest expression of institutional self-identity and a rationalisation of change. Statements and speeches of serving officials have been privileged during this thesis as they represent the Alliance's views at the time, rather than a retrospective reflection, thereby offer a more intuitive construction of meaning (Burnham et al., 2008, Ch 9).

Finally, a word on referencing. Birmingham Harvard has been used as the default referencing system throughout this thesis. However, in order to maintain clarity and readability the primary sources have been referenced using footnotes, with direct quotations and titles maintaining the original spelling utilised. All sources referred to in the

text are listed in the Bibliography at the end of the thesis, with primary sources listed first categorised by the origin of the source.

Thesis Outline

In order to explore NATO transformation this thesis begins, in the following chapter, by establishing how NATO envisages transformation, and identifying the changes that occurred within the post-Cold War security environment, and how NATO responded to them. Chapter 2 considers the utility of institutional theory as a means of explaining NATO transformation and provides a theoretical basis for the analysis of the case studies with rationale for the methodological choices made and case study selection provided. Chapters 3, 4, and 5, examine in closer detail three case studies, each addressing a different security challenge that NATO has recently faced; counter-insurgency (COIN), the reinvigoration of collective defence, and the cyber domain. As noted above, each of these cases aligns with a specific area of threat for the Alliance in; the South, the East, and at home.[8] Chapter 3 analyses NATO's transformation in a combat mission by examining the case of Afghanistan. Chapter 4 examines the return of collective defence and the resurgence of Russia as a significant threat to the Alliance. Chapter 5 explores the more amorphous nature of NATO's response to the challenge from cyberspace. Each case has a different level of exogenous shock present and geographic focus, as identified in the Introduction. Thereby, judgement can be made as to whether NATO is able to instigate institutional change that is primarily endogenously driven. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes that NATO is able to facilitate transformation effectively, and that this is likely to continue as the security environment continues to change, and new security challenges emerge.

[8] Identified by Jamie Shea, Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Emerging Security Challenges, during a presentation at University of Birmingham, 12th March 2018, on 'What's Next for NATO'. Home in this instance includes the allies home countries as well as within the NATO area itself.

Chapter 1: NATO and The Post-Cold War Security Environment

> *The world that NATO has been helping to build over the last sixty-five years… withstood the tests of the Cold War and created the secure environment which allowed the European Union to develop and NATO will continue to play a key role to keep our nations safe and help keep the world secure.*
>
> Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former Secretary-General of NATO, 19th June 2014.[1]

The quote from Rasmussen evidences the critical importance of NATO's role in securing Europe, both historically and in the future, hence the importance of understanding NATO's transformation. NATO defines transformation as 'a continuous and proactive process of developing and integrating innovative concepts, doctrine and capabilities to improve the effectiveness and interoperability of military forces.'[2] The Alliance's conception of the transformation process is exemplified in the 2004 publication *NATO Transformed*. The ability to transform makes NATO unusual, as Hay (2002, 12) notes, institutions 'tend to become embedded in routine and convention and are, consequently, difficult to transform'. Not only has NATO been able to transform, but it was also able to do so quickly, with the beginnings of the post-Cold War process evident as early as the 1991 Strategic Concept.[3] As already mentioned that this has occurred in a military alliance is even more surprising. The fundamental question is why has NATO been able to enact transformation that other institutions - especially military alliances - find so difficult, and even more so, enact successfully. For example, the Warsaw Pact disbanded on 1st July 1991 which follows the traditional ending of military alliances once their purpose has been served, as seen in historic military alliances such as the Quadruple Alliance during the Napoleonic Wars.

[1] Speech on the Future of NATO delivered at Chatham House.
[2] Definition provided in *AAP-06*, 2014, 2-T-8.
[3] *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 1991, part I para 5, for example, identifies that despite 'a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain', which positions a potential future role for the Alliance that differs from its Cold War posture.

The definition of transformation, utilised by NATO, establishes the primacy of improving the effectiveness of the military instrument. Despite assertions that during the late 1950s 'NATO was seen as purely a military alliance' (Williams, 2009, 28) statements that the Alliance is more than a military body are numerous.[4] Indeed, given the inherent political nature of NATO Secretary General Lord Ismay's famous statement on the Alliance's purpose as keeping the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down, a view that the Alliance is more than a military alliance would seem appropriate.[5] The Alliance's ability to deploy military force and engage in operations, therefore, is but one aspect of NATO's transformation in the post-Cold War era. Consequently, the focus of exploring the transition from Cold War to Post-Cold War NATO in this chapter differentiates between strategy, doctrine, and policy, in order to fully place the transformational processes explored in the case studies within the context of the post-Cold War security environment.

AAP-06 Glossary of Terms and Definitions provides a four-hundred page list of agreed terminology and meaning within NATO. It defines military strategy as '…the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations'.[6] Doctrine, meanwhile, is defined as the 'fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application'.[7] Policy is represented by the official position of the Allies and requires a consensus for an authoritative statement to be made on behalf of NATO (Webber et al., 2012, 48).

[4] For example, Secretary-General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen explicitly made the point during a speech at Chatham House, 19th June 2014, on the future of the Alliance.
[5] For example, Chairman of the Military Committee, Admiral Giampaolo di Paola, speech at the SHAPE Officer's Association 50th Annual Symposium, 16th October 2010, made this a central theme.
[6] *AAP-06*, 2014, 2-M-6. The definition begins by placing military strategy as a subservient component of national or multinational strategy. This has been omitted to maintain clarity.
[7] *AAP-06*, 2014, 2-D-9.

The separation of doctrine and policy forms the opening segment of *AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine* which establishes that doctrine is 'not about why they do what they do, which is the realm of policy [and]… it is recognized that policy, as agreed by the highest National Authorities, normally leads and directs doctrine'.[8] This definitive statement establishes the inter-relationship between policy and doctrine. Therefore, doctrine 'concerns the manner in which policy is pursued' and strategy 'refers to policy on the use of the military instrument' (Webber et al., 2012, 48). In essence, policy is what NATO does and doctrine how NATO does it. Strategy, is reflected in what NATO says with NATO, the organisational structure, being the means of delivery. For example, during the Cold War in order for NATO to respond to the political will of the allies and adopt a 'forward strategy'[9] to resist 'as far to the East as possible'[10] any Soviet aggression, the Alliance had to ensure that; the policy decisions ensured that the forces assigned were credible, the overall strategy of deterrence was maintained via clear expressions of Allied will, the individual commanders had clear doctrinal guidance on how to invoke the fundamental principles of warfare, and an adequate organisational structure existed to facilitate this goal, without damaging the cohesion of the Alliance.

The *modus operandi* of the Alliance, emphasised in the preceding paragraph, is designed to ensure delivery of the essential purpose of NATO, which is 'to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members in Europe and North America in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter'.[11] This fundamental purpose of the Alliance has remained largely unchanged despite the dramatic changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, which is not surprising due to the general nature of the principles on which the Alliance is formulated. How NATO engages with the provision of security for its

[8] *AJP-01(D)*, 2010, para 0101 and 0102.
[9] Unanimously adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 15th September 1950.
[10] *NATO Handbook*, 1959, page 22.
[11] *NATO Transformed*, 2004, page 2.

members has, however, changed markedly. During the Cold War 'the Alliance's main task was to maintain sufficient military capabilities to defend its members against any form of aggression by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact'.[12] The strategy, doctrine, and policy, of NATO was orientated towards countering a specific and defined threat. With the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of a clearly defined threat led a number of scholars to question the continued relevance of the Alliance (Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 1993; Weber, 1992; Wohlforth, 1994). The post-Cold War security environment, however, was characterised by a proliferation of security threats (Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al., 1998). A continued role for the Alliance in the post-Cold War era was deemed necessary, given the, already highlighted, fundamental purpose 'to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members'.[13] NATO, thus, transformed its policies and structures to enable the mitigation of risk from these new security challenges. The defining characteristic of transformation, implicit as early the 1991 *New Strategic Concept*, was a shift of focus toward risks and away from threats (Coker, 2002).

Before analysis of the transformation of NATO in the post-Cold War era can begin it is necessary to place the developments of the early 1990s in the context of two salient debates. First, the scholarly challenge of realism to the continued existence of NATO. Second, the policy debate on the future provision of European security in the lead up to the London Declaration and the *New Strategic Concept*. Whilst considered separately in this thesis, it should be noted that the interconnected nature 'between events and theory was undeniable' during the Cold War (Wohlforth, 1994, 91). It is not the place of this thesis to reflect on the debate regarding the lack of realisms predictive ability and the general theoretical challenges that were made of the theory, primarily in regard to a narrow interpretation based on structural realism (Lebow, 1994; Waltz, 1979). Rather the focus on

[12] Ibid., page 3.
[13] *NATO Transformed, 2004,* page 2.

the specific assertion of realism that NATO will dissolve, along with the Warsaw Pact, though 'they may persist on paper, but each ceases to function as an alliance' (Mearsheimer, 1990, 5).

The removal of the threat of Soviet attack and 'the glue that holds NATO together' should have led to the end of the Alliance (Mearsheimer, 1990, 52). Indeed, the Warsaw Pact formally disbanded on 1st July 1991. Considering Wohlforth (1994) assertion of the link between theory and events, the failure of realism to consider the possibility of a future role for NATO in the 'new' security environment is evident in Mearsheimer (1990, 6 fn) statement that 'without a specific threat, which now appears to be diminishing rapidly, German is likely to reject the continued maintenance of NATO as we know it'. Furthermore, that the future of European security would be best assured by the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Mearsheimer, 1990; Waltz, 1993). Therefore, the consideration of the applicability of realism to offer explanations to the continued existence of NATO has explicitly been tied to the policy that the NATO allies chose to pursue.

The policy debate that developed after the fall of the Berlin Wall focussed primarily on the future role of the United States in European security. The position of the United States was made clear by Secretary of State James Baker when he declared, on 12th December 1989, that 'NATO will remain North America's primary link with Europe'.[14] In other words, United States leadership in European security would be sustained (Costigliola, 1994). The French, supported by Germany, 'developed a strategy for replacing US power with a more cohesive European Union security and defence identity' (Schake, 1998, 379). Essentially the French plan saw a diminished need for an integrated military command, the bedrock of Alliance cohesion during the Cold War, and instead sought a twin pillar Alliance, with Europe having

[14] Baker, J. (1989) *A New Europe, A New Atlanticism: Architecture for a New Era*, speech at the Steigenberger Hotel, Berlin, 12th December.

its own independent force, the Eurocorp, that could act as a European army to address security concerns outside of NATO but would available to NATO in the event of an Article V contingency (Schake, 1998).

Schake (1998) asserts that the French plan didn't materialise for three main reasons. First, the ability to carry out missions in the post-Cold War environment benefitted from the integrated military command, the involvement of the United States, and the rapid reorganisation of NATO to accomplish the new security tasks. Second, the European states lack a strategic heavy lift capability and are unable to deploy any significant force beyond their borders without assistance from the United States. Third, the collapse of Yugoslavia reiterated the importance of the United States to European security and the importance of America being involved from the start of an operation to ensure its involvement with it. In essence, to secure Europe in a potentially volatile time the United States had to remain at the forefront of European security architecture and the only way to ensure that 'was to keep NATO at the centre of Europe's security structures' (Schake, 1998, 382). Furthermore, that the decline in stability in Europe, as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union, increased the importance of NATO to fend off potential instability (Costigliola, 1994).

To continue the analysis of post-Cold War change, this chapter establishes how the strategic environment developed during the Cold War and the fundamental transformation in the Alliance's role in the post-Cold War era. 'As the strategic environment has changed, so too has the way in which the Alliance responds to security challenges'.[15] Each period is analysed in relation to the enemy, geographic remit and the nature of the threat. The context for understanding the transformation in strategy, doctrine, and policy is, thus,

[15] Ibid.

emphasised. The core concern of this thesis is how and why NATO has been able to transform in response to the changing security environment of the post-Cold War era. This section provides evidence as to the nature of that changing environment, making a distinction between security developments in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.

The London Declaration, 6th July 1990, which effectively signalled the end of the Cold War,[16] states in its opening paragraph that

> Europe has entered a new, promising era. Central and Eastern Europe is liberating itself. The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey toward a free society. The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are determining their own destiny. They are choosing freedom. They are choosing economic liberty. They are choosing peace. They are choosing a Europe whole and free. As a consequence, this Alliance must and will adapt.

It is thus axiomatic that the end of the Cold War represents a critical juncture in the history of NATO. Prior to the London Declaration, NATO operated within tight geographic confines to counter a known threat and a clearly defined enemy. By contrast, since the London Declaration, NATO has embarked on multiple military operations versus a multitude of adversaries and a range of different threats. In that light, the transformation of the security environment will be explored below in relation to the *enemy*, *geography* and the *nature of the threat*.

The Cold War Environment

NATO documentation during the Cold War period makes clear reference to the nature of the strategic environment that confronted the Alliance. Three consistent factors were prevalent throughout this period. First, NATO's adversary was seen as the Soviet Union and

[16] Although 1991, and the collapse of the Soviet Union during the August Revolution, is in more common usage as the end of the Cold War, this thesis utilises the London Declaration as the end of the Cold War as it represents a substantive change in the approach of NATO in relations towards the Soviet Union. An alternate possibility of arguing that the fall of the Berlin Wall, in November 1989, was discounted as being largely symbolic.

its communist satellites in the Warsaw Pact. Second, the area of NATO's remit was confined to the North Atlantic Area as stipulated in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Finally, whilst both a conventional and nuclear threat existed, NATO, from the outset, was concerned with 'the prompt delivery of the atomic bomb'.[17]

The Contingent Situation

NATO, at heart, is a vehicle for expressing the collective will of its members. Given that the United States, and its allies, were involved in an ideological contest against Communism, it is perhaps surprising to find that the first two Strategic Concepts make no specific mention of the Soviet Union as such an adversary of the Alliance.[18]

An explanation is provided by SG 13/16 which states that 'because of the wider dissemination of DC 6/1, it was necessary, due to security considerations, to outline the overall defensive concept for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in general terms only'.[19] The document goes on to list, in a section entitled 'Contingent Situation', a series of major assumptions which clearly define the Soviet Union, and its allies, as NATO's adversary.[20] SG 13/16 formed the basis for DC 13 which contained an 'estimate of enemy capabilities and possible course of action' with a sub-section on the 'strategic intentions of the Soviet Union'.[21] DC 13 was subsequently acknowledged as providing 'the basis for all NATO strategic planning'.[22] For the 1957 Strategic Concept the general terms of MC 3/5 and the specific strategic guidance of MC 14/1 were merged into a unified document that identifies

[17] *DC 6*, 1949, para 7a. Despite the Harmel Report and the shift towards Flexible Response, NATO's official position remained that first use of nuclear weapons was an policy, a position which only altered to 'weapons of last resort' following the Defence Ministers Meeting of October 1991, see Defence Planning Committee, *Final Communique,* October 1991.
[18] *DC 6/1*, 1949 and *MC 3/5(Final)*, 1952.
[19] *SG 13/16, 1950*, enclosure para 1.
[20] Ibid., enclosure para 5.
[21] *DC 13*, 1950, page 5.
[22] *MC 14/1, 1952*, enclosure A para 3.

the Soviets as NATO's adversary in a section entitled 'the probable nature of a future general war involving NATO'.[23]

Despite the expression of détente in The Future Tasks of the Alliance Report of 1967,[24] itself a response to the Soviet doctrine of 'peaceful co-existence' (see Khrushchev, 1959), NATO only foresaw a change in 'the nature of confrontation… but not the basic problems'.[25] The basic problem that concerned NATO was how provide for the security of its members. The Harmel Report, therefore, exemplified how the Alliance was able to adapt to an evolving security environment without deviating from the fundamental objectives of the Alliance. The central reason behind the change in the security environment is provided by the Declaration on Atlantic Relations,[26] 19th June 1974, which notes 'that the circumstances affecting [the members] common defence have profoundly changed in the last ten years: the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has reached a point of near equilibrium'.[27] The Soviets' nuclear programme, in terms of technology, numbers of missiles and delivery systems had caught up with the United States, whilst maintaining numerical conventional superiority in continental Europe over NATO forces.

Despite the focus of the Ottawa Declaration on addressing vulnerabilities present in the European theatre the security environment did not improve over the next decade. The Foreign and Defence Ministers special meeting in Brussels, 1979, declared that 'the Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe'.[28] The primary reason for concern was established in the communique

[23] *MC 14/2 (Revised)*, 1957, para 9-22.
[24] More commonly referred to as the Hamel report.
[25] *C-M(67)74 (2nd Revise)*, 1967, para 4.
[26] More commonly referred to as the Ottawa Declaration.
[27] *Declaration on Atlantic Relations (Ottawa Declaration)*, 1974, para 4.
[28] *M2 (79) 22*, 1979, para 3.

as the deployment of the SS-20 missile and quantitative and qualitative enhancements to the Soviet Union's Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF).[29] The 28th October 1983 Montebello meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) stated that 351 operational SS-20 launchers were deployed with 1,053 warheads and that 'in contrast to NATO's policy of restraint, the Soviet build-up is continuing relentlessly at all levels'.[30] The 31st May 1984 North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting, in Washington, emphasised that the 'massive [Soviet] military build-up… posed a continuing threat to Alliance security and vital Western interests'.[31] Considering that the Alliance had identified rising Soviet military power in 1974 at Ottawa the fact that it was still viewed with such serious concern at Washington, in 1984, demonstrated that the ongoing centrality of the Soviet challenge during the Cold War period.

Geographic Operational Remit

The North Atlantic Treaty established the Alliance as a collective defence organisation with recourse to consultation, under Article 4, or to military force, under Article 5. The geographic limits are established in Article 6 which states that,

> For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:
> - on the territories of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
> - on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

The sole alteration to this geographic area came on 16th January 1963 when the North Atlantic Council noted that references to the Algerian Departments of France within the Treaty had become inapplicable following Algerian independence on 3rd July 1962.

[29] Ibid.
[30] *M-NPG-2 (83)23*, 1983, 1.
[31] *M-1(84)11*, 1984, para 4.

An early test of these limits arose with the Suez Canal problem. Despite 'the strategic importance of the Suez Canal to NATO both the United Kingdom and France were keen to stress that 'they did not wish to make it a matter for decision by NATO'.[32] The discussions were not made public at the time 'and the utmost discretion was recommended'.[33] A different approach was applied to Indo-China where NATO 'agree[d] that the campaign waged by the French Union forces in Indo-China deserve[d] continuing support from the NATO governments'.[34] The nature of this support, however, was political and vocal (not military).

NATO maintained its military focus within the geographic confines of Article 6 throughout the Cold War period despite potential to engage out-of-area. The centrality of the Soviet threat ensured that potential alternate security concerns 'were regarded as very much secondary' as 'the further NATO strayed from its core concern… the more likely it was to disagree' (Webber et al., 2012, 25). The Alliance, hence, indicated no appetite for involvement in either the American engagement in Vietnam or in support of the United Kingdom in the Falklands. This limitation, furthermore, is acknowledged by the United States (Bentinck, 1986; Stuart and Tow, 1990).

Nature of the Threat

NATO's principal means of ensuring its policy of defence during the Cold War was deterrence. Deterrence had both conventional and nuclear aspects, and the role of nuclear weapons, and arms control negotiations, came to define the period. During the formative years of NATO, the United States operated and maintained the sole nuclear guarantee of

[32] *C-R(56)45*, 1956, para 12 and para 9.
[33] *LOSTAN 1786*, 1956.
[34] *C-M(52)140*, 1952.

the Alliance. The United Kingdom carried out its first nuclear test on 2nd October 1952 with the French following suit on 13th February 1960.[35] Furthermore, at this time the nuclear deterrent was maintained by the United States Air Force and the transition to missiles and silos was still to be made.

The Defence Committee produced the inaugural *Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area* on 29th November 1949. A basic undertaking of the Alliance was to 'insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing including the prompt delivery of the atomic bomb.' This was 'primarily a US responsibility assisted as practicable by other nations'.[36] Nuclear weapons were, therefore, at the centre of Alliance politics from the beginning and enabled NATO 'to compensate for the numerical inferiority of the armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty nations' when compared to the Warsaw Pact.[37] The nature of the threat that NATO faced was, thus, at its core focussed on how best to ensure the territorial integrity of Western Europe, albeit that the role of nuclear deterrent attracts the most focus.

Although Margaret Thatcher (1993, 771) notes that the strategy of Flexible Response, initiated in MC 14/3,[38] relied on the West to escalate its response 'through each stage of conventional and nuclear weapons' the fact that nuclear arms control negotiations were consistently tied to conventional force reduction, especially the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) (see Study Nr 1, 1975), meant that, ultimately, NATO was fully aware that the sole credibility of its deterrence posture relied on 'the ability to carry out an instant and devastating nuclear counter-offensive by all available means'.[39]

[35] Though the French did not commit their nuclear forces to the integrated command of NATO.
[36] *DC 6*, 1949, 5.
[37] *MC 14*, 1950, para 6d.
[38] *MC 14/3*, 1968.
[39] *MC 14/2*, 1957, para 25b.

Security for NATO members during the Cold War was, thus, determined, solely by the credibility of nuclear deterrence, within a defined geographic area, designed to counter a singular defined threat. The cohesion of the Alliance was tightly linked to credibility, as if the threat was not credible then it is unlikely cohesion could be maintained, similarly, if the Alliance started the fracture then an obvious impact on the credibility of the nuclear deterrence would be felt. The post-Cold War environment represents a reduced reliance on nuclear deterrence, and hence, a greater opportunity to challenge alliance cohesion without forcing a response for NATO as its credibility has been undermined.

The Post-Cold War Environment

The magnitude of the transformation in NATO's role in the post-Cold War security environment, was succinctly articulated in 2007 by Daniel Fried, United States Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Relations. In a section on transformation he noted that,[40]

> In 1994, NATO had 16 members and no partners. It had never conducted a military operation. At the end of 2005 the alliance was running eight military operations simultaneously and had 26 members and partnership relations with another 20 countries around the world.

The post-Cold War security environment is a nebulous term. In essence, it refers to the proliferation of security challenges facing NATO. The nature of this 'new' security environment was addressed by Admiral di Paola, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, in a 2010 speech in Moscow. He contends that the fundamental change in the post-Cold War era is a revolution in the international environment fuelled by three trends: globalization, demographic change and demographic shift, and climate challenges. *Allied*

[40] Daniel Fried 'The Future of NATO: How Valuable an Asset?', Washington DC, 22nd June 2007.

Joint Doctrine, also, highlights these trends as part of 'The Evolving Strategic Environment'.[41] These trends led Admiral di Paola to conclude[42]

> that the centre of gravity of the international geopolitical landscape is moving away from, let's say, our obsession in the 20th for the line dividing Europe in the West from the East, or the Alliance and the Soviet Union, at that time. That line is no longer relevant to our security because globalization also means that the security challenges have no boundaries, have no geopolitical location, they are trans-national and trans-continental and they don't even, necessarily have state identities.

Wallander and Keohane (1999, 46) observed at the turn of the century 'NATO is changing from an exclusive alliance focused on threats to an inclusive security management institution concerned chiefly with risks'. The transformation towards risk mitigation, first evident in the 1991 Strategic Concept, altered the nature of the post-Cold War Alliance. Furthermore, the transformation was underpinned by three factors, which align with the categories of *enemy*, *geography* and *nature of the threat* used in the previous section. First, 'NATO is no longer geared to countering a specific and clearly identifiable threat' (Webber, 2013, 34). Second, NATO has reoriented itself from an exclusive Alliance to an inclusive network of partners with a global security remit. Third, as the Cold War ended 'the idea… was to signal [a] reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and moves away from plans for early use' (Wheeler, 2001, 139).

New World, No Enemy

The 1991 Strategic Concept baldly declared that 'the political division of Europe… has been overcome' something which 'radically improved the security environment' which the Alliance faced.[43] The document goes on to state, however, that 'a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risk to the security of the Alliance remain.[44] The removal of a clearly identifiable enemy, thus, provided a series of different challenges for NATO, all the more

[41] *AJP-01(D)*, 2010, para 0212.
[42] Admiral Di Paolo 'NATO's New Strategic Concept, the New Security Environment, and the NATO-Russia Partnership', Moscow, 23rd July 2010.
[43] *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 1991, part I para 3.
[44] Ibid., part I para 3.

significant as these enabled it to buck a historical trend whereby an alliance is dissolved once its principal threat passes from the scene.

The 1991 Strategic Concept does appear to contain contradictory assertions. Most notably the statement that 'the Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence, and it does not consider itself to be anyone's adversary'[45] whilst also stating that 'co-ordinating appropriate crisis management measures as required from a range of political and other measures: including those in the military field'.[46] Crisis management and proactive intervention stretches the concept of self-defence,[47] however, NATO's fundamental purpose is to provide for the security of its members which requires the mitigation of risk by tackling potential threats at source and in doing so promote stability across the globe (Daadler and Goldgeier, 2006). The concept that the application of military power in one geographic location enhances security in another was evident in NATO thinking as early as the 1970s, when it was stated that 'all members of the Alliance agree that the continued presence of Canadian and substantial US forces in Europe plays an irreplaceable role in the defence of North America as well as Europe'.[48]

Even in the absence of a declared enemy, NATO has continued to express its collective unity via a 'firm and binding' commitment to Article V.[49] It is acknowledged that 'the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low',[50] therefore, the enemy of modern NATO[51] is not territorial defined but more closely aligned with the nature of the threatscape,

[45] Ibid., part IV para 2.
[46] Ibid., part III para 10.
[47] Specifically, the immediacy of the threat, across time and space.
[48] *Declaration on Atlantic Relations (Ottawa Declaration)*, 1974, para 9.
[49] *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, 2010, para 4a.
[50] Ibid., para 7
[51] Although the Milosevic regime, and the Taliban, could be considered enemies of NATO, at least they certainly viewed NATO as an enemy, they existed in the enemy capacity for a short space of time. The relationship between NATO and these enemies hasn't defined the international security environment in the same manner as the Cold War. Russia, especially post-Crimea, could be considered an enemy of NATO,

specifically the ability to manage a variety of different security risks. Mattelaer (2018, 340) argues that it is surprising 'the extent to which the importance of geography was reduced as NATO adapted to the post-Cold War environment', which impacts defence planning, thereby, making the Alliance functional to the political agenda of a given time. The lack of a defined enemy and the removal of the geographic confines of Alliance operations, therefore, ensures that the ability of NATO to be proactive in defence planning is lacking, whilst also subjugating the Alliance to shifting political whim. Adapting to different political realities is not necessarily disadvantageous, but it does guarantee to the Alliance an inherent lag between a threat developing, the political will to deal with the threat demonstrated, and a role for the Alliance identified.

Globalisation of NATO

Senator Richard Lugar gave a speech in 1993 entitled 'NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business'.[52] Lugar's speech, despite its prominence, was not new either in terms of the debate or the language utilised. An article for *Executive Intelligence Review*, December 1990 was entitled 'NATO: "Out of Area" or Out of Business?' and reflected on the deep divisions at the Foreign Ministers meeting, 17th and 18th December 1990 (Liebig, 1990). Although the objectives of the London Declaration emphasise the ambition to enter a promising new era and that the Alliance will adapt, the Foreign Ministers meeting provides evidence that there was no clear decision about the format of the adaptation that would take place, which as Lugar's speech exemplified was still to be resolved some three years later. Even with a substantive change in the international security environment, the collapse of the Soviet Union and, an established debate, whether to go out of area or not,[53] the

however, the repeated statements seeking to maintain cooperation and dialogue, and reinvigorate the NATO-Russia council, imply that Russia is a 'strategic competitor' rather than an enemy. See MacAskill, E. (2017) 'Russia is a "Strategic Competitor" to the West, says James Mattis', The Guardian, 31st March.

[52] Rosenfeld, S. (1993) 'NATO's Last Chance', The Washington Post, 2nd July.

[53] The potential for out of area operations had supporters in the United States and the United Kingdom, especially after the Falklands, and became clearly linked to the development of the 'New World Order'.

Alliance had not shown itself capable of being able to adapt quickly to a new environment. Furthermore, the failure to adapt quickly is more striking when the words of NATO Secretary-General Manfed Wörner are considered,[54]

> we are now more aware of the importance of challenges from outside our Alliance's territory. Risks can arise from new and unexpected quarters. Moreover, the trend toward disarmament and reduced military spending in the industrialized world magnifies the significance of Third World arsenals that also now include ballistic missiles and technologies of mass destruction, and gives smaller states a new, undesirable leverage. So we in the West cannot renounce a coherent defence. Along the southern perimeter of Europe there is to some extent an arc of tension from the Maghreb to the Middle East. Tensions are exacerbated not only by the ambitions of dictators like Saddam Hussein, but also by population growth, resource conflicts, migration, underdevelopment, religious fundamentalism and terrorism. Clearly threats to NATO's territorial integrity from beyond Europe cannot be downplayed as out-of-area threats. Turkey is directly threatened, and our Southern Region is an area where the collective interests of all Allies are engaged.

France and Germany where particularly opposed to an out of area role for NATO, with German Foreign Minister Genscher warning of 'the danger that NATO may break apart' (Liebig, 1990, 34). Genscher (1995, ch. 17) vision for post-Cold War Europe emphasised a 'partnership of stability between East and West'.[55] The partnership network, that NATO developed, and the desire for a crisis management role, ensured that the argument in favour of out of area operations prevailed. As a result, NATO has engaged in substantive combat operations out of area, specifically the former Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan, and a number of assistance crisis response operations. Indeed, one of the first NATO crisis response missions was Operation Allied Goodwill I & II which provided assistance to the former Soviet Union, in the wake of the collapse of Communism, during the early part of 1992. NATO is yet to undertake a combat operation 'in-area'.

The role of the United Nations (UN) is central to the development of NATO's out of area

[54] Manfed Wörner (1990) Speech to the 36th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly. London, 29th November.

[55] See the Bonn Cable, February 1990, which has recently been declassified by the United States, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4325675/Document-01-U-S-Embassy-Bonn-Confidential-Cable.pdf

operations, specifically with regard to the former Yugoslavia.[56] Initially, the Alliance was engaged in passive operations supporting the arms embargo and maintaining the no-fly zone declared by the UN Security Council (UNSCR). Although, it was whilst enforcing the no-fly zone that four Bosnia Serb fighter-bombers were shot down on 28th February 1994, marking the first combat operation in NATO history. In August 1995, the UNSCR, keen to bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table requested NATO to perform air strikes, which resulted in Operation Deadeye and the transition to specifically targeting command and control facilities in Operation Deliberate Force. These operations ultimately helped to bring about the Dayton Accord in December 1995 and NATO took a lead role in the Implementation Force (IFOR) in securing the peace in Operation Joint Endeavour, and the subsequent Stabilisation Force (SFOR).

Whilst an out of area operation, as the former Yugoslavia was not a NATO country, the global scale of NATO operations was not fully reached until operations in Afghanistan. NATO's leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was significantly aided by the cooperative security principles that had developed in the post-Cold War period. This is exemplified by the 2010 Strategic Concept, which states that 'the Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations'.[57]

Nature of Threat

The 1991 Strategic Concept was quick to recognise the changed nature of the threatscape within Europe and states that 'the threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for

[56] NATO also operated out-of-area under a UN mandate in Afghanistan and Libya.
[57] *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, 2010, para 4c.

Allied strategy'.[58] Furthermore,

> Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territories of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may rise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The tension… could… lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.[59]

The problems associated with operations on the threshold of war and peace, sub-state actors, delineation of the battlefield, and from new domains, therefore, can not be classified as a surprise to NATO strategic planners. The 1991 Strategic Concept clearly anticipated a fragmenting of state-based conflict away from purely military strategies into hybrid warfare,[60] and, furthermore, that events outside of the territorial boundaries of the NATO member countries could have security implications for the Alliance. Hence, the threats facing post-Cold War NATO were not clearly defined, dominated by uncertainty, and could shift in character, geography, and immediacy at a faster pace than the defence planning process of the allies.[61]

Despite this fluidity, NATO has continued to maintain the position that nuclear deterrence is

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[58] *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 1991, part I para 7.
[59] Ibid., para 10.
[60] The term hybrid warfare is contentious, especially in relation to whether it represents a new form of warfare, though in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in 2017, Christopher Chivvis, of the RAND Corporation, identified key characteristics associated with hybrid warfare, and the central elements of subversive activity, usually non-military, to further the national interest.
[61] The case of the F-35 provides an example of the problem of extended timeframes, having originally been conceived in 2001, with the United States taking initial operational delivery in 2011 and Tier 1 partner, the United Kingdom, achieving initial operational capability in 2018. Furthermore, the F-35 procurement has been the subject of a House of Commons Inquiry, which found that the Link 16 (for military tactical communications), as used by NATO 'maybe detectable, and, therefore, compromise survivability', among other technical and integration issues. Procurement is an area where NATO is seeking to expand its cooperative role, for example, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency placed Life Cycle Management as a key element of its Strategic Direction 2018-2022, having gained an acquisition function, in March 2015, following North Atlantic Council approval. However, countries primarily operate bilateral agreements, such as the three tiers of partners in the F-35 programme, and a more general example is provided by the Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Procurement signed by the United States and Finland, which entered into force on 3rd October 2009.

the ultimate guarantor of security. In 1988, then NATO Secretary-General, Manfed Wörner, stated that 'far from reducing the risks to our security [a nuclear-free Europe], would in practice entail the much greater risk of leading to greater instability'.[62] The 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) confirmed the centrality of nuclear weapons in the provision of security by acknowledging that

> the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.[63]

It is clear, therefore, that the role of nuclear weapons, even in this new security environment remains central to Alliance planning and cohesion. Although, Smith (2011, 1397) argues that the 1990s were 'characterized by a deliberate process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons', before going on to quote a senior official that stated nuclear weapons should be 'put in a small box somewhere in the corner and that is where they should stay'. Kroenig and Slocombe (2014) question how nuclear weapons guarantee security against the 'adverse consequences of instabilities…',[64] and the problem is not just confined to nuclear weapons as conventional forces faces challenges of a 'disconnect between NATO's configuration for major combat operations' and the nature of threat provided in the new security environment (Berdal and Ucko, 2009, 57). Despite clearly articulating the changing nature of the threat from the beginning of the post-Cold War era the Alliance, or more accurately its members, has not fully embraced the decreased utility of nuclear weapons in the provision of security, and, hence, suitably adapted force posture away from the primacy of the nuclear deterrent. The central challenge of the post-Cold War threatscape for NATO, therefore, and exemplified in the three case studies in this thesis, is

[62] As reported in Hella Pick's Guardian article 'Soviets "in Arms Strategy Shift", 24th November 1988.
[63] *Deterrence and Defence Posture Review*, 2012, para 9.
[64] *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, 2010, para 10.

how to incorporate flexibility and speed into its decision-making process, both strategically and operationally, to mitigate the transition between risks and threats, whilst maintaining a credible deterrence posture without impacting adversely on Alliance cohesion.

Strategy

Strategy concerns what NATO says in relation to how the military instrument will be utilised,[65] as such 'strategy is about the overall relationship between military means and the ends of policy' (Freedman, 2003, 112). The challenge of the Cold War was ensuring the territorial integrity of NATO members from a defined threat from the East, with deterrence the primary strategic military response of the Alliance to mitigate the threat - alternate strategies such as the pre-positioning of equipment and commander pre-authorisation ultimately supported deterrence as the overarching strategy of the Alliance (Gentry, 1992, 33-5). As seen, in the previous section, the threatscape in the post-Cold War world has morphed and diversified into a complex matrix of risk-management that forces NATO to not only consider the Eastern front and territorial integrity, but also diverse threats arising from the Southern front and the Home front, and how these relate to the challenges posed by credibility and cohesion.[66] A fundamental question is raised as to whether the acceptance of the NATO 360 Approach,[67] is strategically sound and enhances the provision of deterrence across the three fronts, Eastern, Southern, and Home. The substantive answer to the question will form the conclusion to this thesis, following analysis of the case studies. In this section the objective is to identify how deterrence, as the principle means for enacting a policy of defence, has altered for NATO since the end of the Cold War. First,

[65] As identified in the Transformation section of this chapter, see *AAP-06*, 2014, 2-M-6 and Webber et al. (2012, 48-51).
[66] Comments by Jamie Shea, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, 'What's Next for NATO', 12th March 2018, Univeristy of Birmingham.
[67] See the Statement by NATO Defence Ministers, 25 June 2015, Press Release (2015) 094.

Cold War deterrence is analysed, by exploring the strategies of massive retaliation and flexible response, before examining conventional deterrence. Following the end of the Cold War NATO shifted policy away from defence, hence diminishing the importance of deterrence to the Alliance, towards broader security tasks. The Post-Cold War strategy of the Alliance will be analysed via three sections, which align with the core security tasks as set out in the 2010 Strategic Concept; collective defence, cooperative security and crisis management.

Deterrence during the Cold War

Deterrence, specifically deterrence by denial, has been the product of the development of nuclear weapons. Freedman (2013, 158) questions 'what role can there be for a capability that has no tactical role in stopping armies or navies but can destroy whole cities?' before going on to assert that 'deterrence promised the prevention of future war'. The conceptual arguments underpinning deterrence by denial rest on the credibility of the threat to counter aggression, whilst entrenching the notion that punishment as such is a credible strategic option (Freedman, 2013, 159).

Mearsheimer (1983), focussing on conventional deterrence, takes a different tack, whereby, the role of deterrence is to convince the aggressor that a quick decisive victory is unlikely. Again, if credibility is lacking then deterrence has failed. For example, consider Saddam Hussein's statements regarding the 'Mother of All Battles' prior to the beginning of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.[68] Alternatively, if the enemy is prepared to engage in a longer war of attrition then the lack of a quick decisive victory would not deter aggression.

[68] See BBC (1991) 'The Mother of All Battles', 17th January.

With limited definitive information available on Soviet strategic planning, whilst the Cold War was underway, the Alliance, thus, primarily based its deterrence posture around the issue of credibility in both the nuclear and conventional spheres. NATO planners assumed that war with the Soviet Union would begin by a surprise attack on Western Europe utilising the Warsaw Pact's numerically superior conventional forces. Conventional deterrence, therefore, also included the denial of a quick victory, which was also reinforced by nuclear deterrence following the technological development of tactical nuclear weapons.

Massive Retaliation

On 29th August 1949 the Soviet Union carried out its first nuclear test. As such, bar the first months of NATO's existence, both sides of the Cold War have had the capability to deploy nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, however, did not achieve nuclear parity until the late 1960s and relied on a strategy of unlimited retaliatory strike to deliver unacceptable damage (Cimbala, 1997). The Alliance was concerned that Stalin would adopt the 'salami tactics' approach of Hitler in the 1930s (Heuser, 1995, 39) and subjected to political pressure 'that any aggression must be resisted as far to the East as possible, in order to ensure the defence of all the European countries of the Alliance'.[69] Tensions were further heightened by the Korean War, especially the Soviet involvement and support (Wheeler, 2001, 126). This combination of factors led to the development of NATO's policy of forward defence which was initially implemented via a strategy of massive retaliation. The words of Field Marshal Montgomery[70], in 1954, explained what this meant,

> I want to make it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE are basing all our planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our defence. With us it is no longer: 'They may possibly be used'. It is very definitely: 'They will be used, if we are attacked' (quoted in Freedman, 2003, 79).

[69] NATO Handbook (1959), 22-23.
[70] Montgomery was NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) at the time.

Massive retaliation was formally codified as NATO strategy in *MC 14/2 (Revised)(Final Decision)* which states that it is the responsibility of the Alliance to ensure 'the ability to carry out an instant and devastating nuclear counter-offensive by all available means'.[71] Although, in practice the strategy had existed since the new Eisenhower administration had commissioned *NSC 162/2* and the subsequent adoption of NATO's New Look in *MC 48(Final)* (Heuser, 1995, 43).[72] The strategy's rationale was borne out of fear of Soviet conventional forces being able to overwhelm NATO forces in Western Europe, and the unwillingness of the NATO governments to ensure conventional symmetry due to cost and manpower availability issues (Heuser, 1995; Wheeler, 2001)

Heuser (1995) argues that it was widely understood, as early as 1952, that the Soviets were unlikely to engage in offensive full-scale operations against NATO and that, instead, the threat of a major war came from miscalculation and accident. In such a scenario the immediate recourse to an all-out nuclear offensive would be counter-productive, however, the European allies of NATO were against any form of weakening of the transatlantic link. Therefore, 'a means had to be found to show to the Soviets that they had miscalculated NATO's willingness to resist, perhaps by dramatically demonstrating NATO's seriousness through using nuclear weapons' (Heuser, 1995, 46).

Flexible Response

The shift away from a strategy of massive retaliation, and mutually assured destruction (MAD), to flexible response embraced the limited war concept that had developed during the late-1950s (see Freedman, 2003-113). In terms of NATO's strategy of deterrence, the

[71] MC 14/2 (Revised)(Final Decision) (1957), 13.
[72] NSC 162/2 (1953) and MC 48(Final) (1954).

transition to flexible response, changed the nature of deterrence provision. No longer was deterrence solely provided by punishment but also by denial.

> Denial capabilities, [Snyder[73]] suggested, worked through influencing the aggressor's estimate of his probability of gaining his objective, while punishment capabilities influenced the estimate of possible costs, and might have little effect on his chances for territorial gain (Freedman, 2003, 107).

Flexible response was incorporated, officially, into NATO strategy in *MC 14/3*.[74] Duffield (1991) highlights, however, that the groundwork for flexible response, and the beginning of the transition, is seen in *MC 14/2* and *MC 70* .[75] The strategy is enabled by the 'full spectrum of capabilities' that the technological developments which enabled 'tactical' nuclear weapons to,

> constitute an essential component of the deterrent. Their primary purposes are to add to the deterrence of conventional attacks of any magnitude, and counter them if necessary, by confronting the enemy with the prospect of consequent escalation of the conflict; to deter, and if necessary respond to, the use of tactical nuclear weapons by posing the threat of escalation to all-out nuclear war.[76]

Freedman (2003, 112) posits that

> To talk of 'tactical' nuclear weapons was a misnomer. Strategy and tactics properly refer to different aspects of warfare. Strategy is about the overall relationship between military means and the ends of policy, while tactics is concerned with the specific application of military means for direct military ends… 'strategic war' is a nonsense term, for strategy is a feature not a type of war… Similarly, to talk of a 'tactical' weapon is nonsensical. The use of any weapons in battle involves judgments on targeting, the avoidance of counter-measures and concentration on immediate objectives, i.e. tactics.

Despite the contradictor nature of flexible response, and the conceptual limitations of the limited war concept, it remained the core principle underpinning NATO deterrence until the end of the Cold War. The arms reduction and control agendas that began in the late 1970s, especially the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and subsequent Short-range Nuclear Forces (SNF) negotiations, emphasised the Alliance's fixation with maintaining a

[73] Glenn Snyder author of Deterrence and Defence Princeton University Press, 1961.
[74] MC 14/3(Final) (1968).
[75] MC 14/2 (1957) and MC 70 (1958).
[76] MC 14/3(Final) (1968), 16.

flexible response, despite the bilateral nature of the US-Soviet discussions. As Margaret Thatcher (1993, 771) noted the 'strategy depended on [the] ability of [the] West to escalate its response to Soviet aggression through each stage of conventional and nuclear weapons'. However, despite the flaws in thinking that attempted to separate geo-strategic from theatre nuclear weapons, the fact that this was done enabled the focus on theatre weapons, the SS-20 and Pershing II specifically, during the INF negotiations. The importance of this can not be underestimated as Gorbachev (1996, 443) asserts that 'the INF Treaty represented the first well-prepared step on our way out of the Cold War, the first harbinger of the new times'.

Conventional

The nuclear strategy debates and the transition from massive retaliation to flexible response represented a change in the underlying notion of the premise of deterrence, by shifting away from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial. Considering that NATO, as a defensive alliance, explicitly ruled out offensive action (Mearsheimer, 1985, 160-1), even as part of a defensive strategy, deterrence by punishment has little conceptual value with regard to conventional deterrence. Therefore, NATO's strategy of forward defence, with regard to conventional forces, was geared solely towards deterrence by denial and focussed on denying the Soviets the opportunity of a quick victory in Western Europe.

Forward defence, may be a suboptimal strategy, however, in light of political considerations and sensitivities it was the only tenable strategic option. Other than an offensive strategy the alternatives were mobile[77] defence (Mearsheimer, 1981) and area defence (Strachan, 1984). Mobile defence, involved a limited number of troops protecting the front but a high number in reserve who would deploy to defend a breach. Area defence, meanwhile,

[77] Also referred to as manoeuvre defence.

involved employing a high number of smaller units, who would wear down the enemy as they advanced over a wide front. Both of these strategies involved the surrender of West German land to the Soviets and were, thus, as politically untenable in the 1980s as in the early 1950s.

The problem of how to deliver effective conventional deterrence was primarily a political, not strategic problem. The central political points were the level of involvement of United States troops and the position of West Germany within the strategic plans. *DC 6/1* noted that 'the hard core of ground forces will come from the European nations',[78] which Park (1986, 15) observed 'reflected Washington's intention to confine its contribution chiefly to the strategic bombardment and naval missions'. Park continues by arguing that the United States considered West Germany integral to European security and the strategy of forward defence, which required German rearmament. The recurring theme, throughout the Cold War was the resistance of the European members of NATO to any form of United States disengagement from continental Europe. As Park (1986, 15) observed 'American troops were needed in Europe, both for the physical contribution they would make and the psychological effect they would have'. These assumptions based on the transatlantic link and the indivisibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic area have remained a source of material, and symbolic, importance in the post-Cold War era.

The Post-Cold War Period

As noted above, the core aspect of post-Cold War NATO has been the shift away from the primacy of deterrence, towards strategies that invoke a wider conception of security. NATO's role has no longer been confined to collective defence, strategic deterrence, but also cooperative security and crisis management, which Brown (1998) refers to as 'strategic

[78] DC 6/1 (1949) para 7b.

reassurance.' In the strategic sense, NATO's response to the changing security environment, and the new security challenges that it heralded, evoked a shift towards risk management and collective security, that can be demonstrated via analysis of the Strategic Concepts of 1991,[79] 1999,[80] and 2010.[81]

Collective Defence

The Alliance objective, as stated in *Active Engagement, Modern Defence* is to 'deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges'.[82] Deterrence had a limited role in Alliance strategy, with a shift towards strategic reassurance based on a wider conception of security influence. Though the increased threat from the East has focussed attention once more on the importance of deterrence to the Alliance and Article V (Fryc, 2016). With NATO's post-Cold War enlargement, the primary challenge to Article V rests on the individual members' willingness to uphold the Article's principles in the wake of renewed Russian bellicosity along its Western frontier, which predominantly threatens the newer members of the Alliance. An example of the clarification of Article V, in the context of emerging security challenges, would be the explicit iteration at the Wales Summit that a cyber-attack, a previously opaque area of NATO policy, could lead to an invocation of Article V.[83] The clarification of cyber-attack in relation to Article V is especially important with regard to Russia, due to the willingness of Russia to use cyber, or hybrid, techniques to secure an advantage, as seen in Estonia 2007, Georgia 2008, and Ukraine 2014.

[79] T*he Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 1991.
[80] *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, 1999.
[81] *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, 2010.
[82] Ibid. para 4a.
[83] Wales Summit Declaration (2010) para 72.

There have been distinct changes to how NATO supports deterrence. The 1991 Strategic Concept stated that

> NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.[84]

The equivalent paragraph in the 1999 Strategic Concept dropped the reference to the London Declaration as it was seemingly no longer relevant.[85] The references to the United Nations Charter were also removed, which considering NATO caused controversy by engaging in Kosovo without a specific UN mandate is perhaps not surprising as to reaffirm commitment explicitly to the principles of the UN Charter could have damaged credibility. *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, the 2010 strategic concept, goes further by stating that 'NATO's fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means.'[86] Whilst references to the Washington Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations appear, the potential for the Alliance to distance itself further from these principles is formally codified, and had already become accepted practice with the unilateral intervention in Kosovo, 1999, and the out-of-area engagement in Afghanistan, since 2003. The dominance of strategic deterrence, and collective defence, had, therefore, diminished as a result of how NATO chose to adapt to the post-Cold War security environment.[87]

Cooperative Security

Perhaps the clearest example of NATO's transformation is the incorporation of cooperative security as a fundamental task of the Alliance. The end of the Cold War forced the

[84] T*he Alliance's New* Strategic Concept, part II para 1.
[85] *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, para 6.
[86] *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, page 6.
[87] Though as part of the return to collective defence, as discussed in Chapter 4, the *Deterrence and Defence Posture Review*, 2012, strategic deterrence is reinvigorated within the Alliance.

members of NATO, especially the United States, to consider what their interests and objectives were and how those interests and objectives were threatened. Posen and Ross (1996, 6) suggested that four strategic options existed for the United States, in the post-Cold War World; *neo-isolationism*, *selective engagement*, *cooperative security*, and *primacy*. The other NATO members had similar strategic choices, albeit without *primacy* as a viable option and isolationism unlikely given the emergence of the European Union after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. In terms of NATO; *neo-isolationism* would mean a US withdrawal, and likely collapse of the Alliance; *selective engagement*, maintenance of the Alliance; *cooperative security*, transformation and expansion; and *primacy*, a singular focus on expansion (Posen and Ross, 1996). Furthermore, the broadening and deepening of the concept of security (Buzan, 1991; Payne, 2012) led to a shift towards risk management (Wallander and Keohane, 1999) which was, and is, best suited by a cooperative security environment, in the Euro-Atlantic sphere. Cooperative security reflects the role of international institutions in coordinating state actions for 'the deterrence and defeat of aggression' (Posen and Ross, 1996, 23).

The post-Cold War cooperative security arrangement was established by the response to the collapse of Yugoslavia, and the subsequent ethnic conflicts over the next decade. Yugoslavia demonstrated that, contrary to traditional ideas of cooperative security,[88] 'supporters of cooperative security did not shy away from advocating the use of force', especially in relation to the broadened notion of security, focussed on human security (Payne, 2012, 609). The divergence of European and American conceptions of cooperative security became evident in Yugoslavia, where certain European nations were not keen to engage militarily. This enabled the United States to assert a leadership role, by defining the peacekeeping policy of the Euro-Atlantic community and leading the peace talks at Dayton,

[88] Cooperative security proponents traditional favoured non-violent means, such as economic sanctions and arms control treaties.

Ohio (Cucic, 1998). By 1999, and the Kosovo crisis the United States saw NATO as the primary mechanism for pursuing its cooperative security agenda, as opposed to the United Nations. A position only enhanced after 11th September 2001, and evident in the subsequent NATO led missions in Afghanistan, Libya, and the keenness of the United States for NATO to have an increased role in counter-terrorism operations against Islamic State in Syria.[89]

To enact a cooperative security strategy, NATO instigated two related policies of partnership and enlargement. The primary mechanism for enabling cooperative security was initially the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme introduced at NATO's Brussels Summit in 1994.[90] The role of partnerships is central to the cooperative security environment. For example, during the current Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan forty-two nations have contributed manpower, which included a significant number of partner countries, such as Georgia which has contributed 885 troops – the second highest.[91] PfP was heavily criticised by prominent individuals, such as Henry Kissinger, in the run up its inception. Kissinger feared that the Alliance would lose sight of its clear mission and 'risk dissolving [into] a vague concept called Partnership for Peace'.[92] PfP was confined to Europe and NATO has since expanded and developed a global network of partners, some via explicit institutional arrangements such as the Mediterranean Dialogue. This enhances the potential manpower and capabilities available to the Alliance and has enabled NATO to engage in multiple operations across the globe simultaneously (Johnson, 2011, 392-394). The expansion of states involved with the Alliance, beyond the formal members, has helped

[89] See Bethan McKernan's 2017 Independent Article, NATO to Join the US-led Coalition Against ISIS fighting in Iraq and Syria, and the 14th April 2018 Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Actions taken against the Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria.
[90] Brussels Summit Declaration (1994), para 13-16.
[91] Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures, June 2015, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_06/20150622_2015-06-RSM-Placemat.pdf
[92] Henry Kissinger, 'Not This Partnership', The Washington Post, 24th November 1993.

to mitigate the reluctance of members to engage in the full spectrum of Alliance operations, whilst enabling the reluctant members to still agree a consensus of what should be done.

Crisis Management

The third core security task of the Alliance, crisis management, demonstrates how cooperative security was to be achieved. The essential shift in the strategic rationale of the Alliance, is the transition to a global role and the prospect of out-of-area operations. A perimeter defence is sufficient for a collective defence organisation, however, a security institution, where potential risks are the crucial factor has to look beyond the perimeter, and the confines of geography and time. In other words, to provide cooperative security and maximise the benefits of interdependence, identifying and stopping threats before they elevate to such a level plays an important strategic role. Such a role requires a proactive institution that is able to shape the environment in which it operates, as opposed to simply reacting to it.[93]

NATO sought to enhance the provision of security for its allies via non-Article V crisis response operations (NA5CRO). NA5CROs enabled the Alliance to operate militarily outside of the collective defence provisions of Article V, removed the geographic constraints evident in Article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty, and established a mechanism through which partners could be integrated into NATO command & control structures, and more broadly, the Euro-Atlantic (security) community. The decision to implement a strategy based on cooperative security, and the incorporation of partner nations, is, therefore, central to the post-Cold War transformation of NATO to a security institution.

[93] The desire to shape the international security environment is explicitly stated in *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, 1999.

Doctrine

The relationship between strategy, doctrine and policy has often been conflated, especially prior to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)[94] of the 1990s. Freedman (2013, 216) states that 'the origins of the RMA lay in doctrine.' In order to enhance the operational effectiveness between NATO's new partners and in the engagement of non-Article V operations the Alliance began a process of internal transformation, in doctrine and organisational structure, in the lead up to the Madrid Summit, 1997. Much analysis of the Madrid Summit has focused on the transition of the NACC into the EAPC and the invitation to the Visegrád states for membership. Often overlooked, however, is the 'major decisions necessary to shape the new NATO to meet the challenges of the next century.'[95] The necessary steps were to develop a new command structure, as illustrated in the previous section, and the development of the Allied Joint Doctrine Hierarchy (AJDH).

The introduction to this chapter noted that doctrine refers to the 'fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.'[96] Whilst joint doctrine, in general terms, 'establishes a link between the 'ends' (what must be accomplished) and the 'means' (capabilities) by providing 'ways' (how) for joint forces to accomplish military strategic and operational objectives in support of NATO's goals.'[97] Furthermore, 'NATO policy leads and directs the development of Allied joint doctrine… [and] joint doctrine is strongly linked to the development of NATO military strategy, related policies, supporting concepts, lessons learned and best practices.'[98] It is logical, therefore, that as NATO policy and strategy

[94] There have been several other RMA's during the course of history and reference to the RMA in this thesis specifically refers to the 1990s incarnation.
[95] *M-NAC-D-1(97)71*, 1997, para 2.
[96] *AAP-06*, 2014, 2-D-9.
[97] *AAP-47*, 2013, 1-3.
[98] Ibid.

develops, doctrine has to evolve to ensure that the military instrument remains effective. Thereby, enabling 'Alliance force to work in concert' towards the desired objective.[99]

The initial focus of the Alliance, between 1997 and 2002, involved bringing together existing doctrines and Allied Tactical Publications (ATP). The keystone document here was AJP-01 *Allied Joint Doctrine* supported by primary capstone documents, such as AJP-02 Intelligence and AJP-03 *Operations*. The keystone and capstone documents are known as Level 1, whilst each of the capstones that have associated doctrines beneath them, known as Level 2, which can each have further subsidiary documents as necessary. For example, AJP-3.4 *Non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations* is supported by AJP-3.4.2 *Non Combat Evacuation Operations*, whilst AJP-3.3 *Air Operations* is supported by AJP-3.3.1 *Counter Air*[100]. The hierarchical structure means that the documents increase in specificity in Level 2, while the Level 1 documents provide more broad guidance and incorporates the MC 400/2 Guidance for Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy, which although 'not doctrine, it formulates the basis from which Allied joint doctrine flows.'[101]

In 2002, following the adoption of AJP-01(B) *Allied Joint Doctrine*, the AJDH, which also incorporate a Level 3 mainly made up of ATPs, was as illustrated in Figures 1.1 and 1.2.

[99] *AJP-01(C),* 2007, 2-29.
[100] This list is not exhaustive but merely and illustration.
[101] *AAP-47,* 2013, 2-7.



Figure 1.1. Allied Joint Doctrine Hierarchy – Levels 1 & 2, 2002.[102]



Figure 1.2. Allied Joint Doctrine Hierarchy - Level 3, 2002.[103]

To coincide with the launching of the most recent version of *Allied Joint* Doctrine AJP-01(D), in 2010, the AJDH was reformulated as the Allied Joint Doctrine Architecture (AJDA).

[102] Taken from http://www.db.niss.gov.ua/docs/nato/nato/assets/objects/233.jpg accessed 21 Dec 15.
[103] Taken from http://www.db.niss.gov.ua/docs/nato/nato/assets/objects/236.jpg accessed 21 Dec 15.

The substantive difference is that although ATPs still exists, though prone to infrequent updates and obsolescence, the AJDA only focusses on Level 1 and Level 2 publications as illustrated in Figure 1.3 from 2012.



Figure 1.3. Allied Joint Doctrine Architecture. 2012.[104]

Figure 1.3, also, illustrates that a number of the documents are under development or review. Given the earlier assertion that doctrine follows and implements Alliance policy and strategy this should be expected following the 2010 Strategic Concept. When combined with the most recent, publically available, AJDA from 2014, as shown in Figure 1.4, the continued evolutionary process of doctrinal development is evident.

[104] Taken from http://www.cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/allied-joint-doctrine-architecture.jpg accessed 21 Dec 15.



Figure 1.4. Allied Joint Doctrine Architecture. 29 April 2014 (Hangya, 2014, 7).

The Allied Joint Doctrine Working Group (AJOD WG) operates under the auspices of the Military Committee Joint Standardization Board (MCJSB) and is the primary, though not exclusive, mechanism for developing doctrine. The AJOD WG is responsible for the management and development of the AJDA, though other actors, either Tasking Authorities (TAs) or Delegated Tasking Authorities (DTAs), can impact this process by identifying voids and making their own doctrinal propositions. Examples, of TAs would include the Military Committee and the Consultation, Command and Control Board, with DTAs being subsidiary entities of the TA such as the Military Committee Terminology Conference or Communication and Network Services. A full list is provided in AAP-03.[105]

The process of doctrine development takes twenty months, though a fast track aims to complete the process quicker, and usually takes around 12 months.[106] Typically, the

[105] *AAP-03*, 2009, J-1 to J-3.
[106] *AAP-47*, 2013, 2-31.

process involves identification of a doctrinal gap, a proposal, assessment by Allied Command Transformation (ACT), AJOD WG recommendation, MCJSB approval and doctrine task as illustrated in Figure 1.5. The ratification process is expanded in Figure 1.6.[107]



Figure 1.8. Allied Joint Doctrine Development Process.[108]



Figure 1.9. Ratification process for a Level 2 AJP.[109]

[107] The process for a Level 2 AJP is shown. A slightly different procedure is in place for Level 1 (Capstone) AJP.
[108] *AAP-47*, 2013, 2-10.
[109] *AAP-47*, 2013, 2-28.

The AJOD WG meets twice yearly, in March and September at present. Figure 1.4 enables the clear identification of which doctrines are being developed, or incorporated, at any one time, via the colour coding. For example, under the capstone *AJP-3 Operations* Doctrine and the subservient *AJP-3.4(B) Non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations* it can be seen that as of April 2014 the Alliance was working on developing *AJP-3.4.3 Humanitarian & Disaster Relief Operations*. Given the process outlined above the new doctrine can expect to be promulgated by early 2016.

NATO, therefore, has established a formal process of doctrinal development, which is both flexible and responsive. The structure of the AJDA reflects the versatile range of potential Alliance operations, whilst the promulgation and ratification process has been designed to enable a variety of stakeholders to have an input into the development process. For example, the responsibility for maintaining AJP-3.9 *CIMIC* rests with the Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CMCCOE) based in The Hague. Though the primary responsibility for addressing doctrinal voids and maintenance rests with the AJOD WG.

Policy

The policy of the Alliance has undergone a marked transformation since the London Declaration signalled the end of the Cold War. The core manifestation of change has been the transition of the Alliance from a primary concern with mounting a defence against a singular defined threat into a risk management institution concerned with security (Coker, 2002; Wallander and Keohane, 1999). The Ottawa Declaration states that 'the ultimate purpose of any defence policy is to deny to a potential adversary the objectives he seeks to attain through an armed conflict'.[110] During the Cold War, NATO initially focussed on a

[110] *Declaration on Atlantic Relations (Ottawa Declaration),* 1974, para 8.

policy of defence before expanding to a broader concept of détente, which was formally codified in the Harmel Report of 1967.[111] The post-Cold War era has seen the Alliance focus on enhancing security by developing a partnership network and enhancing the overall security environment of Europe by incorporating former adversaries into NATO. In summary, NATO policy can be defined as one of collective defence during the Cold War and collective security in the post-Cold War era (Yost, 1998b). This transition was recognised by Robert Simmons, NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, who stated in 2004 that 'NATO's transition from a purely collective-defence organization into a security manager in a broad sense has enabled it to act… in Europe and now beyond' (Yost, 2007, 35).

NATO policy does not operate in vacuum and, as such, it has to be placed within the wider context of American, the hegemonic power, policies towards the Soviet Union. The United States pursued a policy of containment in the early years of the Cold War. The origins of containment are illustrated by Kennan's *Long Telegram* of 1946[112] and his *X Article* of 1947 which states that 'the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies' (X, 1947). The Marshall Plan, 1947, provided economic support to help counter communist expansion in Europe, notably towards Greece and Turkey, whilst the creation of NATO, 1949, provides the military component via collective defence. Although Kaplan (1999, 2) argues that the formation of NATO was the 'product of a European initiative to which the United States responded', the end effect was the alignment of a number of European nations and the United States, who opposed Communist expansion, in the political, military and economic spheres.

[111] The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel) Report. 14th December 1967. The report marked the transition from a policy of defence to détente, and is more commonly referred to as the Harmel Report.
[112] Kennan, G. (1946) Long Telegram. [22nd February].

In the post-Cold War era, and the removal of Communism as a clearly defined threat, the continuation of a collective defence policy, associated with containment, served no further logic. The transition towards a collective security organisation became evident in NATO's post-Cold War policies of enlargement, the development of partnership networks, and the engagement in peacekeeping operations, which required the Alliance to engage in military operations out-of-area (OOA). Furthermore, as post-Cold War security provision increased in complexity so NATO stood as only one among a multiplicity of actors within the European security matrix albeit one dominant in 'the realm of military security' (Webber et al., 2004, 9). Containment, as opposed to co-operation, has gained support,[113] following the Crimea crisis, which could reverse the co-operative approach established via détente (Allin, 1995).

Collective Defence in the Cold War

NATO's policy in the Cold War was one of collective defence. This section analyses the operationalisation of strategy and doctrine by focussing on how national defence postures and capabilities fit within overarching NATO objectives. The shift to détente away from defence, in the Harmel Report, was primarily a reactive reorientation in response West German concerns,[114] as indeed was the policy of containment - which replaced the initial American attempts of liberation (Allin, 1995; Gaddis, 2005). The overarching policy of collective defence was not fundamentally altered by the application of détente, however, largely due to the flexibility of the North Atlantic Treaty that enabled a broad interpretation of the Alliance's roles and purpose.

[113] For example, see Ivo Daalder's Financial Times article 'The Best Answer to Russian Aggression is Containment', 16th October 2016. Though containment has, in the recent past, more often be analysed in the context of US-Iran relations, for instance (Lindsay and Takeyh, 2010)

[114] The *Neue Ostpolitik* introduced by William Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, further reinforce the efforts towards rapprochement with the East.

Defence

Collective defence established the unity and cohesion of the Alliance as critical to its ability to successfully deliver its aim of enhancing the security of all its members. Consequently, NATO policy was restrained by potential impediments to cohesion, which can be categorised as political, financial and technological. Although, the requirement for consensus means that the action of the Alliance is agreed upon, the actually number of options realistically available for consideration may be limited. The Committee of Three report explicitly states that the constraints on Alliance policy, to deliver effective defence, were appreciated when it stated that the 'deterrent role of NATO, based on solidarity and strength, can be discharged only if the political and economic relations between its members are cooperative and close.'[115]

NATO, as an alliance, is dependant on the collective will of its members, who as individual sovereign nations have certain obligations and considerations to their specific security concerns. The primary concern of the sovereign states of Western Europe was the maintenance of their territorial integrity. As such any policy, or indeed strategy, that was to accept, even a temporary, surrender of territory to the Soviet Union would be untenable. NATO's policy in the Cold War, therefore, involved 'integrat[ing] the disparate political interests of its member states' and was constrained by political considerations of the individual members (Wenger, 2006, 165).

The basis for policy is an assessment of the perceived ability of the enemy to threaten. The conventional force balance was perceived to favour the Soviet Union which enjoyed 'a marked predominance in Armed Forces and conventional weapons over the free nations of

[115] C-M(56)127(Revised), 1957, para 9.

the West.'[116] Despite efforts to redress the balance, such as the Lisbon Force Goals, the inability of the Alliance to adequately implement force requirements provided 'both motivation and rationalisation of NATO's early drift towards a heavy dependence on nuclear weapons' (Park, 1986, 22).

An explanation for the lack of effective policy options can be provided by the unwillingness of the, mainly European, allies to commit sufficient finances and manpower to enable an effective alternate policy. MC 26/1[117] provided the basis for the Lisbon Force goals and called for forty-six ready divisions, which would rise to ninety-seven within thirty days of mobilisation (M+30). The central element was the increase in mobilisation capability, as DC 28[118] called for a total of eight-two divisions to be available within ninety days. Figure 1.7 illustrates that although the defence spending, as a % of GDP, of the allies was rising from 1950 it had begun to decline from 1952, and that by the end of the decade it remained on a downward trajectory. The force requirements agreed at the Lisbon summit 1952 were never realised and illustrate the financial constraints on Alliance policy that ensured deterrence by nuclear weapons would be the only credible strategic option.

[116] SG 178/1, 1952, 6.
[117] MC 26/1, 1951, 9.
[118] DC 28, 1950, 8-9.



Figure 1.7. % GDP Defence Spending 1949-1960 (data from SIPRI).

The pace and nature of technological developments acted as a further brake on policy options, specifically in regard to weapon systems development and the ability of allies to operate together with compatible equipment. The interoperability of forces had been a concern of NATO since the establishment of the integrated command structure in 1950, with the Military Standardisation Agency (MSA), established in January 1951, to oversee 'matters which have to be standardized on a NATO-wide basis.'[119] Communications highlights the issue, until 1962, when ACE HIGH Troposphere Forward Scatter was introduced,[120] NATO relied on a landline network leased from private companies to rely communications between SHAPE, SACEUR and the subordinate commands in control of the nuclear strike capability. It could take up to fifteen minutes for the relevant orders to reach the commanders on the ground in charge or the nuclear deterrent due to differing communications equipment (Twigge and Scott, 2000, 222). The importance of a central standardisation amongst the allies to enhance the overall policy of defence was, therefore,

[119] SGM-31-51, 1951.
[120] see MC 59, 1956.

of paramount importance for the credibility of the Alliance as a cohesive entity and, also, positively affected the strategic and doctrinal choices available.

In the early years of the Alliance, therefore, a policy of defence was the only tenable option that the Alliance could pursue due to political, financial and technological constraints. NATO, however, considered itself to me more than a military alliance.[121] The original NATO Handbook states that 'the treaty is not an old-style military alliance… nor is the Treaty simply a defensive instrument.'[122] The Committee of Three further emphasised the non-military role of the Alliance by recognising that 'while defence cooperation was the first and most urgent requirement, this was not enough.'[123] A shift away from a policy focusing on defence, and the military instrument, to the more encompassing notion of détente was, therefore, the product of changing circumstances in the security environment and fully in line with NATO's original conception.

Détente

The transition from a policy of defence, privileging the military aspects of the Alliance, to détente, which developed a political role, was formally codified as NATO policy in the Future Tasks of the Alliance report, in 1967. The origins of the policy can be seen in the Committee of Three, 1956, and came about as a response to the Soviet doctrine of 'peaceful co-existence' (Khrushchev, 1959). The role of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Chancellor William Brandt, and the *Neue Ostpolitik*, epitomises the tone of détente and reflects the shifting nature of the, mainly European, NATO member states for a new basis

[121] The 1991 Strategic Concept makes the point when it highlights the risks to Allied security as 'instabilities that may arise from the serious economic social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes…', part I para 9.
[122] NATO Handbook, 1952, 11.
[123] C-M(56)127(Revised), 1957, para 15.

for relations with the Soviet Union (Saeter, 1982). NATO's shift from defence to détente was not, however, a fundamental policy shift, as the Alliance only foresaw a change in 'the nature of confrontation… but not the basic problems.'[124] The Harmel Report, thereby, is not solely reactive to the new Soviet policy, or indeed West German pressure, but rather the representation of gradual shifts in Alliance thinking that had been evident for a number of years.

The Harmel Report stated that the Alliance had two primary functions. First, 'to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggressions should occur.'[125] The pre-eminence of defence as a central policy of the Alliance is, thus, maintained. The second function of the Alliance, 'to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved,'[126] is, however, more representative of the political will of the Alliance members, especially the hegemon United States, than a direct influence on Alliance policy. For example, détente is most closely associated with the arms control agenda, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Although NATO was not involved as a direct participant in the SALT bilateral discussions between the United States and Soviet Union, it did provide political support as an expression of the collective consensus opinion of the Alliance members. Secretary-General of NATO, Manlio Brosio, communicated on 27th May 1970, in relation to the SALT that 'Ministers welcome these talks, the outcome of which is so important for the security of Europe and the future of humanity.'[127]

[124] C-M(67)74 (2nd Revise), 1967, para 4.
[125] C-M(67)74 (2nd Revise), 1967, para 5.
[126] C-M(67)74 (2nd Revise), 1967, para 5.
[127] Final Communique of North Atlantic Council, following session in Rome, 26-27 May 1970.

The Harmel Report provided the climate for the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) – and the subsequent Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, begun at Helsinki 3rd July 1973 - proposal at the June 1968 NAC meeting at Reykjavik.[128] Although there was no initial response from the Soviet Union,[129] and that the magnitude of the problems associated with MBFR, the process could be indicative of NATO being proactive in shaping the environment in which it operates (Brayton, 1984). However, NATO was the only format in which the multitude of different weapons systems and troop deployments could be considered as a whole, given the need for a mixture of symmetrical and asymmetrical cuts and concessions, due to the Soviets larger force size (East-West, 1971). Furthermore, the prospect of American drawdown from Europe under the Unilateral Force Reduction (UFR) threatened the indivisibility of transatlantic security. Although, Bull (1983) argues that an increased European pillar would be beneficial for the Alliance, the fear and prospect of a diminished United States presence on continental Europe was not in the security interests of the European powers.[130] The actions of the Alliance following the Harmel Report demonstrate that below the core concern of collective defence, and the capstone strategic shift, from massive retaliation towards flexible response, that debate and division on how to proceed as a matter of policy choice was evident (Kaplan, 1999). Furthermore, that the individual members of NATO were seen to be acting rationally according to their own policy choices and strategic interests, the consensus of which is reflected in the overall direction of Alliance policy.

The Ottawa Decision showed that a fundamental policy shift away from collective defence had not occurred. The declaration stated that NATO 'provides the indispensable basis for

[128] Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: Declaration adopted by Foreign Ministers and Representative of Countries Participating in the NATO Defence Program, 24-25th June 1968, Reykjavik.
[129] Brezhnev's speech to the 24th Party Congress in March 1971 is arguably the formal acknowledgement of the Soviet Union to enter into MBFR discussions with NATO.
[130] Then Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen addressed the pitfalls of a growing transatlantic divide in his address to the Munich Security Conference in 2011.

their [the members] security, thus making possible the pursuit of détente.'[131] Although, the declaration notes that 'the circumstances affecting their common defence have profoundly changed in the last ten years,'[132] 'the essential elements in the situation which gave rise to the Treaty [North Atlantic] have not changed.'[133] The Ottawa Declaration, therefore, represented a continuation of the dual approach of defence and détente introduced in the Harmel Report, as well as further evidencing the continuation of Alliance policy based on defence. The Foreign and Defence Ministers meeting of 12th December 1979, which initiated the Double-Track approach provided further evidence of the dominance of defence in Alliance policy. The communique states that 'the Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe.'[134] The substantive difference that emerged was that despite the 'near equilibrium'[135] in strategic nuclear forces acknowledged in the Ottawa Declaration 'Soviet Superiority in theatre nuclear systems could undermine stability… and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance.'[136] The Alliance response was to upgrade the LRTNF in Europe with 108 Pershing-II launchers and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles.[137] This was despite the assertion in the next paragraph that 'Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States.'[138] The clear message established is that defence will not be sacrificed in favour of détente, as defence is seen as the enabler of détente. NATO's policy, thus, remained fundamentally unaltered during the Cold War, despite deviations in language and posture that were responsive to the changing nature of the relationship with the Soviet Union.

[131] *Declaration on Atlantic Relations (Ottawa Declaration)*, 1974, para 2.
[132] *Declaration on Atlantic Relations (Ottawa Declaration)*, 1974, para 4.
[133] *Declaration on Atlantic Relations (Ottawa Declaration)*, 1974, para 5.
[134] M2(79)22, para 3.
[135] *Declaration on Atlantic Relations (Ottawa Declaration)*, 1974, para 4.
[136] M2(79)22, para 5.
[137] M2(79)22, para 7.
[138] M2(79)22, para 8.

The Harmel Report and the desire to enhance security due to 'the possibility of crisis,'[139] combined with the merits of non-military cooperation established by the Committee of Three, enabled NATO to be viewed, in actuality as well as perceived, as viable mechanism for embracing the changing nature of international relations (Bozo, 1998). The principle of transformation as the security environment evolved was, therefore, embedded within NATO prior to the end of the Cold War. The change - from an Alliance focussed on defence during the Cold War towards an Alliance focussed on security in the post-Cold Wars - furthermore, can be seen as a logical extension of the Harmel Report objectives and, therefore, the adoption of new security tasks, and substantive change in Alliance policy, as a continuation of NATO goals 'for the preservation of peace and security' as stated in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty.

> These two aspects of security – civil and military – can no longer safely be considered in watertight compartments, either within or between nations. Perhaps NATO has not yet fully recognised their essential interrelationship, or done enough to bring about that close and continuous contact between its civil and military sides which is essential if it is to be strong and enduring.[140]

Security in the Post-Cold War Era

The rationale for NATO as a purely defensive military instrument was, during the Cold war, clearly established in relation to the Soviet threat, implying that the removal of the threat would lead to a diminished rationale for the Alliance (Bozo, 1998, 347). The extension of NATO activities, as highlighted in the previous section, however, ensured that the Alliance had a valuable role to play in the post-Cold War security environment. That transition required substantive changes in Alliance policy.

[139] The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel) Report. 14th December 1967, para 5.
[140] C-M(56)127(Revised), 1957, para 16.

In simple terms, the Alliance used the end of the Cold War to move from a policy focused on enhancing the defence of its members to embracing a security responsibility for Europe as a whole through partnerships and enlargement. As such rather than a cost-benefit analysis in relation to credibility and deterrence the post-Cold War policies of the Alliance is best reflected by the operations undertaken. Pursuing enlargement and partnerships, thereby, enabled not only an external enhancement to collective defence, but also promoted security and stability amongst the new partners and members, especially those previously aligned with the Soviet Union, and ensured that inter-state conflict within Europe was mitigated. NATO recognises 'extending security through partnership' and 'opening [the] Alliance to new members' to be essential components of its transformation.[141] The reasoning behind the transition is summed up well by the German Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor, in March 1990, Genscher who stated that,

> if in the 1967 Harmel Report we committed ourselves to establishing a lasting peaceful order in Europe, does this not necessarily include a willingness to be integrated into a permanent system of mutual collective security?... Power politics will be replaced by a policy of responsibility... Let us build a world made up of a friendly alliance of free nations and democratic states, in which hatred and animosity are superseded by humanity and brotherhood (quoted in Yost, 1998a, 48).

The following segments will look at the policies of partnership, enlargement, and organisation in turn. Although, partnership became a precursor to enlargement the two policies are separate and have their own unique characteristics, not least because NATO does not view partnership as an automatic route to membership.

Partnership

In November 1990 the member states of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe issued *The Charter of Paris for a New Europe* which stated that 'the era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our, relations

[141] NATO Transformed, 2004.

will be founded on respect and co-operation.'[142] NATO confirmed its commitment to the principles of the Charter in the 1991 Strategic Concept. It stated that the members of NATO

> will seek to develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral co-operation in all relevant fields of European security, with the aim, inter alia, of preventing crises or, should they arise, ensuring their effective management. Such partnership between the members of the Alliance and other nations in dealing with specific problems will be an essential factor in moving beyond past divisions towards one Europe whole and free. This policy of co-operation is the expression of the inseparability of security among European states. It is built upon a common recognition among Alliance members that the persistence of new political, economic or social divisions across the continent could lead to future instability, and such divisions must thus be diminished.[143]

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was duly established on 20th December 1991 to reinforce that 'security is indivisible and the security of each of our countries is inextricably linked to that of all States participating in the CSCE.'[144] The focus of the NACC was primarily to enhance dialogue amongst former Cold War adversaries. The statement on dialogue and cooperation that launched the policy emphasized four particular meetings at various levels within the Alliance structure[145] and focused on security cooperation within not only the military and civil spheres but also 'NATO's "*Third Dimension*"' encompassing scientific and environmental programmes.[146] The fusion between these areas is illustrated in Figure 1.8.

[142] *The Charter of Paris for a New Europe*, 1990.
[143] *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 1991.
[144] *North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership, and Cooperation*, 1991, para 2.
[145] Ibid., para 4.
[146] Ibid., para 5.

Figure 1.8. North Atlantic Cooperation Council.[147]

The overarching topic of the inaugural meeting of NACC ministers, in December 1991, was 'how to keep the peace among the newly emerging states of Central and Eastern Europe' (Drew, 1995, 24). The meeting developed two primary themes, the desire of NATO's new partners for closer alignment with NATO activities 'as a hedge against instability and external threats' and 'the specific need for cooperation in developing a common approach to peacekeeping' (Drew, 1995, 24). The latter was addressed first and the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping was established in December 1992 and measures 'for practical cooperation in peacekeeping' endorsed at the June

[147] Taken from NATO's 1996 publication *NATO and the Partnership for Peace: Shared Security*.

1993 NACC Foreign Ministers meeting, with a high-level seminar organized for July 1993 to discuss 'conceptual and doctrinal aspects of peacekeeping and exchanging practical experiences.'[148]

The ongoing conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia and operations involving NATO members, such as the no-fly zones over Iraq, ensured that the role of peace support operations, including peacekeeping, was highly relevant to the issue of security provision. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) originally proposed a 'Partnership for Peacekeeping', however, the importance of the political component of peace support operations was gradually incorporated into the plans (Drew, 1995, 27).

In January 1994 NATO established the Partnership for Peace (PfP) to go 'beyond dialogue and cooperation [and] to forge a real partnership', supported by the establishment of permanent facilities at NATO HQ.[149] PfP offered NATO consultation, in line with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to active partners that perceived a threat 'to [their] territorial integrity, political independence, or security.'[150] The phrase 'active partners' leaves sufficient scope for manoeuvre as clear criteria for what such activism entailed was left unstated. Though the implication from the rest of the paragraph is that involvement in transparency, joint planning and joint exercises would be the requirement for a partner to be considered active. Furthermore, the role of partners in NATO's new crisis management role was clearly stated by the desire to create 'an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.'[151] Thirty-four countries went on to join PfP, with thirteen going on to become full members of NATO, and the final additions of Montenegro, Bosnia and

[148] *Press Release (93)45*, 1993.
[149] *Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document*, 1994, para 2.
[150] Ibid., para 4.
[151] Ibid., para 4.

Serbia in December 2006 enabled the full Euro-Atlantic area, as identified in the PfP Framework Document,[152] to be encompassed.

In May 1997, the NACC was succeeded by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) 'to launch a new stage of cooperation… to raise political and military cooperation… to a qualitatively new level.'[153] The EAPC Basic Document emphasised the 'expanded political dimension'[154] and 'increased decision-making opportunities relating to activities in which they participate'[155] with 'new opportunities for Partner Consultations with the Military Committee.'[156] Furthermore, 'special bilateral relations have been forged with both Russia and Ukraine, the two largest countries to emerge out of the disintegration of the Soviet Union' (Waever, 2001, 6).

A substantive question arises as to whether PfP acts as a precursor to full membership and the importance of the PfP has been largely subsumed into the enlargement debate (Szónyi, 1998). Depending on whether viewed from NATO's or the partner countries perspective, the view of PfP may well be different. Importantly, the Partnership for Peace Invitation states that 'active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.'[157] Two interpretations are posited. First, PfP was always seen by NATO as a route into full membership. Second, that NATO viewed PfP as more of an evolutionary process within the Alliance that then enabled it to make the steps to the widespread enlargement of the post-Cold War era that incorporated former adversaries as full members. As such, PfP can be analysed as a single coherent scheme or

[152] *Partnership for Peace: Framework Document*, 1994.
[153] *NATO Handbook*, 2001, 19.
[154] *Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership*, 1997, para 3.
[155] Ibid., para 4.
[156] Ibid., para 9.
[157] *Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document*, 1994, para 2.

‘as a framework accommodating several different purposes, and flexible enough to further those purposes simultaneously’ (Szónyi, 1998, 19).

By considering PfP as a multitude of different policies that utilise NATO’s institutional apparatus to formalise security relations with partners, PfP is a means by which countries that cannot, or do not want to, become full members of the Alliance, can engage with the Alliance (Kaim, 2017). The EAPC, as discussed above, contains primarily former-Soviet states, who are focussed on developing their own internal security apparatus, and value the benefits of cooperation with the Alliance. The Mediterranean Dialogue was supposed to enhance security cooperation between the signatories, mainly North African, with the goal of enhancing regional security, however, political issues have led to only limited success. Similarly, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which attempted to enhance regional security amongst the Middle Eastern Countries, has struggled, not least due to the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Oman, neither of whom have accepted invitations to join. This matrix of partners is enhanced by a number of partners across the globe, such as Japan and Australia, as well as the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII) and the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative (DCB) introduced at the Wales Summit, 2014.

The PII was intended to enhance the crisis response capability of the Alliance as the existing partnership mechanisms did not provide adequate cooperation for partners seeking greater involvement in NATO operations, especially the NATO Response Force (NRF) (Leyde, 2016). Specifically, ‘enhanced opportunities’ for cooperation were presented to Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden, who would provide significant contributions to Alliance operations, and indeed had already done so notably in Afghanistan. The DCB is focussed on internal security reform, via education and training, with Georgia, Jordan, and Moldova being the first partners incorporated into the programme. Russia, understandably, has a special partnership arrangement, with the

NATO-Russia Council, as does Ukraine and Georgia, both of whom have their own bilateral arrangements, beyond the partnership initiatives they are part of.

NATO's partnerships, while essential to its role as a risk management security institution, have been mixed in their effectiveness. The PII and DCB, partly a response to the events in Crimea, was also a recognition that the framework developed during the 1990s was no longer fit for purpose. NATO, therefore, has demonstrated the ability to adapt its relationships with partners as the security situation has evolved, and further demonstrates that partnerships operate independently of the enlargement process.

Enlargement

The Alliance has engaged in a policy of enlargement throughout its history in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Greece and Turkey were admitted in 1952 and West Germany in 1955. Spain joined in 1982 after the death of General Franco. German reunification in October 1990 is not normally referenced in regard to enlargement debates despite significant arguments at the time as to whether a reunified Germany should be a member of NATO. The use of enlargement as a policy tool for enhancing security, focuses on the incorporation, of former adversaries, in three main tranches in 1999, 2004 and 2009, with Montenegro joining in 2017.[158] All the states that have been incorporated into the Alliance were PfP participating nations.

The *Study on NATO Enlargement* suggested that the purpose of enlarging the Alliance was 'to build an improved security architecture in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area.'[159] Whether enlargement was, and is, a positive contribution to European security is contested.

[158] Following the successful conclusion of the naming dispute, which NATO helped to secure, the Republic of North Macedonia signed an Accession Protocol to join the Alliance on 6th February 2019.
[159] *Study on NATO Enlargement*, 1995, para 1.

For example, Brzezinski[160] argued in favour of enlargement while Wolff (2015) argues that NATO's policy enlargement has contributed to increased insecurity in Europe by damaging relations with Russia. Kissinger[161] highlights, however, that the policy was not solely based on a proactive move by NATO rather a response to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary actively pursuing membership. In order to avoid disenchantment, especially with the outbreak of civil war and ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia, how much scope NATO had to remain as the exclusive preserve of the sixteen-allies, in 1991, remains questionable, especially given the role of partner activity in operations.

Enlargement has not been a uniform, process. Each tranche of enlargement has had its own pressures and relationship to the overall security situation in Europe. For example, Terriff et al. (2002) argued that only seven of the ten declared aspirant states should be admitted, which they duly were. Croatia and Albania had their membership approved in 2009 and Macedonia only signed an accession protocol in 2019. Just as in the case of Slovenia, the Visegrád state not invited to join, in 1999 there were specific circumstances in Albania and Macedonia that precluded membership. Ukraine and Georgia have both been touted as potential membership candidates but following Russia's annexation of Crimea and support of separatists in the Donbas it would appear improbable for a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to be developed any time soon, regardless of how much it was sought and affirmation that Ukraine[162] and Georgia[163] will one day be part of NATO. The Alliance, therefore, has sought to engage with former adversaries, and interested partners, across

[160] Brzezinski, Z. (1994) 'NATO: Expand or Die', *The New York Times*, 28th December.
[161] Kissinger, H. (1993) 'Not This Partnership', *The Washington Post*, 24th November.
[162] See the joint press conference between Jens Stoltenberg and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko at the Brussels Summit, 12th July 2018, which acknowledges the distinctive partnership with emphasis on the contribution of Ukraine to Alliance operations from Kosovo to Afghanistan, and the deepening ties between Ukraine and NATO.
[163] See the NATO-Georgia Commission Declaration at the Brussels Summit, 12th July 2018, which highlights the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package, the contribution of Georgia to operations, the improved capabilities of the Georgian military, and 'its determination to achieve NATO membership.'

the globe, and utilised a series of different policy choices, depending on the individual situation, and demonstrated the flexibility to adapt as the security situation evolved. These changes have been reinforced by changes made to the organisational structure of the Alliance, especially since the end of the Cold War.

Organisation

The inaugural structure of the Alliance featured five regional planning groups, with the Standing Group (SG), of the United States, United Kingdom and France, orchestrating their work on behalf of the Military Committee (MC) (Pedlow, 1997, xii). Within a year, following the introduction of an integrated command structure and the creation of SHAPE the inaugural structure was already obsolete and the five regional planning groups were replaced (with the exception of the Canada-US Regional Planning Group) by Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT).[164] Allied Command Channel (ACCCHAN) was created in February 1952 to help ease a political deadlock arising from Winston Churchill blocking the appointment of an American as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) (Pedlow, n.d., 2-3). The perverse situation that meant the English Channel was not part of NATO's European command existed until the end of the Cold War. Although the Cold War saw the proliferation of committees, the top level of the Alliance's command structure remained unaltered, see Figure 1.9.[165]

[164] *NATO Handbook,* 1952, 24.

[165] There were various reorganisations within each of the Allied commands which are covered in great detail by Pedlow (n.d.)



Figure 1.9. NATO's Civil and Military Structure 1992.[166]

With the end of the Cold War, to ensure the structure supporting delivery of NATO's military instrument remained relevant and efficient transformation was needed. ACCCHAN was disbanded in July 1994 and its operational responsibility passed to ACE. The Brussels Summit, 1994, reorganisation of the Alliance structure also saw changes to the subordinate commands of ACE. For example, UKAIR was disbanded and incorporated into the new Allied Forces North West Europe command. In 1995 a Long-Term Study was launched 'to examine post-Cold War strategy and structure' which led to the introduction of a streamlined command structure in 1996 (Pedlow, n.d., 12).

The streamlining of the Alliance command structure in 1996 reduced the number of subordinate commands to two, which were also rebranded as Regional Commands, RC NORTH and RC SOUTH. The motivation for the change was 'to reflect the shifting focus of the Alliance away from the Cold War emphasis on threats from the East in the area north of the Alps to a more balanced approach giving equal emphasis to the South and the new

[166] *NATO Handbook*, 1992, 20.

risks in that area' (Pedlow, n.d., 12). The two primary commands ACE and ACLANT would in future be known as Strategic Commands to help differentiate the hierarchical nature of the Alliance structure.

The major change to Alliance structure, arguably since the abolition of the five regional planning groups in 1951, was the creation of Allied Command Transformation (ACT). ACLANT was disbanded in June 2003 and in July 2003 ACE became Allied Command Operations (ACO). The structure remains in place today, although the Defence Ministers Meeting, 15th February 2018, approved plans to 'place a greater focus on maritime security, logistics and military mobility, and cyber defence.'[167] As such a new Joint Force Command for the Atlantic, likely to be based at Norfolk, Virginia,[168] which is designed to address the challenge to North Atlantic posed by Russia (Clark et al., 2016; Olsen, 2017). The new JFC Atlantic is tasked with enhancing Alliance coordination at the Operational level, with the existing Maritime Command (MARCOM), based at Northwood, UK, focusing on the tactical level and co-ordination of the Standing Maritime groups operating around continental Europe. A further support Command for logistics, reinforcement, and military mobility, has also been created, to be based at Ulm, Germany, to address the practical problems from potential Anti-Area/Access Denial (A2/AD) operations by Russia (Frühling and Lasconjarias, 2016; Lasconjarias and Marrone, 2016). NATO has also enacted substantive change to the mechanism for crisis management. For example, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corp (ARRC), and the NATO Response Force (NRF). The ARRC has provided headquarter functions the Implementation Force (IFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.[169] Furthermore, since 2017

[167] *NATO Defence Ministers take Decisions to Strengthen the Alliance*, 15th February 2018.
[168] Department of Defense Press Release, NR-137-18, 'DOD Offers to Host New NATO Command', 4th May 2018.
[169] The ARRC maintained the HQ for NATO during the initial mission expansion between 2006-2007, before returning to provide a supplemental function to the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) in 2011-2012.

the ARRC has had responsibility for the land component of the NRF, which was launched in 2002 to provide a multinational capability to react to emerging crises at short notice. Such developments complement policies that have seen the development of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), at the Wales Summit 2014, which established the Very-High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), the Enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF) and reforms to the NATO Command Structure.[170]

NATO, therefore, has demonstrated an ability to adapt its command structure as the security situation has evolved, with aspects increasing, and decreasing in terms of priority, between the strategic, operational and tactical levels, in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, the structures and policies implemented are designed with the NATO partnership programme in mind, and have a degree of fluidity which enables partner countries to opt in or out of operations on a case by case basis. Such a degree of institutional flexibility enables a range of policy options to be considered in relation not only which operations to undertake, but also the manner in which force will be utilised in an operational capacity. The transformational changes undertaken by the Alliance ensure that a unity of purposes exists between policy and strategy that is underpinned by an evolutionary approach to doctrinal developments.

Chapter Summary

NATO has transformed markedly since the end of the Cold War and the nature of the transformation has been explored throughout this chapter. Conventional thinking on alliances expected NATO to dissolve with the end of the Cold War. NATO's survival beyond the removal of the Soviet threat illustrates the ability of the Alliance to adapt and this

[170] *Wales Summit Declaration*, 5th September 2014.

institutional trait is what warrants enquiry. This chapter has shown the Alliance's ability to adapt to changing circumstances throughout its history. Furthermore, NATO has been able to adapt in relation to the changing security environment, an exogenous factor over which the Alliance has had no direct control. NATO, via strategy, doctrine, and policy exercises endogenous control over the choices that it makes. How the relationship between these exogenous and endogenous drivers of change can be analysed is developed in the next Chapter, with the theoretical basis that underpins the thesis. The case studies that follow are indicative of NATO's transformational process, as identified with the transformational model developed in Chapter 2.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Approach

> *NATO is the most successful military Alliance in history and the main reason why NATO is the most successful Alliance in history is that we have been able to change, to adapt, when the world is changing.*
>
> Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary-General of NATO, 5th April 2018.[1]

In this chapter the theoretical approach and a set of assumptions that underpin the thesis is presented. Two principal propositions become evident in relation to NATO's post-Cold War transformation. First, the Alliance has developed according to the preferences of its members, and second, NATO the institution matters and acts to constrain, or modify, member behaviour and strategies. These two propositions are regarded here as mutually exclusive – hence, by focusing on one the alternate is also being considered and critiqued. On this basis, the chapter proceeds from an institutionalist position and argues that the Alliance is a purposive actor in the international security environment.

First, the chapter considers the issue of how an institution can be defined, and the importance of providing the 'rules of the game', before identifying why NATO should be conceived as an actor. Second, the chapter establishes why institutionalism is an appropriate vehicle for considering NATO before moving on to advance a theory of change, which considers the merits of endogenous and exogenous drivers of change. Finally, a third wave institutionalist perspective is adopted, whereby, convergence between rational choice, historical, or ideational[2] institutionalism is considered the most appropriate

[1] Stoltenberg, J. (2018) Remarks at Town Hall Event at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, 5th April.
[2] Ideational institutionalism is used to reflect the broad range of second wave institutionalist theories concerned with the interaction of institutions with social norms, attitudes, and beliefs. It embraces a number of different strands of institutionalism, identified by Peters (2012) that contains sociological institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism. The specific separation between these different ideational strands is not meaningful in the context of this thesis. Koning (2015) reinforces this viewpoint, specifically in regard to

framework for analysing the change related to NATO's post-Cold War transformation. Convergence to an approach that could be described as, simply, institutionalist enables the greatest opportunity for analysis of the endogeneity or exogeneity underpinning change (Koning, 2015; Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, Ch. 2; van der Heijden, 2013). Furthermore, the adoption of a holistic institutionalist approach allows for the primacy of a particular strand of the 'new institutionalism', which is particularly beneficial when considering debate regarding institutional change (Hall, 2010; Weyland, 2008). Whilst NATO is an actor in its own right, the Alliance provides the rules within which actors rationally pursue their preferences, therefore, the dominant theoretical approach of institutionalism utilised is rational choice.

What is an Institution?

The purpose of this section is to emphasis the difference between an institution and an organisation which are not synonymous. On the surface, establishing NATO as an institution would appear to be an elementary task given that NATO has operated for seventy years. How to define an institution, however, is a contested process that has, according to Crawford and Ostrom (1995, 582), led to 'a simmering theoretical debate'. The complex institutional matrix that NATO operates, and also operates within, further exacerbates the importance establishing a basis of common understanding on which the theoretical approach can be built.

Simmons and Martin (2002, 194) suggest that 'most scholars have come to regard international institutions as sets of rules meant to govern international behaviour'. Yet, Duffield (2007, 1) asserts that discussion of institutions 'lacks a widely accepted definition

analysis of endogenous and exogenous drivers of change. The point is further explored in the section *Which Strand of Institutionalism*.

of just what they are'. Keohane (1988, 382) similarly observes that 'institutions are often discussed without being defined at all, or after having been defined only casually'. Peters (2012, 29-34) argues that the definition of an institution, and its separation from an organisation, is dependent on the theoretical approach underpinning the analysis. A theoretically inclusive definition of an institution is not possible as it only has relevance to the specific approach being adopted. Peters (2012, 33-4) also highlights that definitional problems exist within the component aspects of an institution, for example, what are rules?

The literature identifies three primary conceptions of what constitutes an institution. First, institutions are considered to be a set of rules (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1986; 1990). Second, institutions are seen as operating as operating in equilibria (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995), which also considers the more amorphous conception of norms as rules (Peters, 2012, 29).[3] The final conception considers institutions as organisations (Lane and Ersson, 2000; Scott, 1995). Each of these will be explored in turn, so that the criteria for establishing the nature of change within NATO can proceed on the basis of a common understanding.

Institutions as Rules

Rules are an important aspect in the definition of institutions (Ostrom, 1986; 1990). Mearsheimer (1994, 8) states that institutions are 'sets of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other'. Simmons and Martin (2002) contend that such a definition does not privilege the need for institutions to be effective, and, further, enables an exploration of whether rules influence behaviour by excluding consistent patterns of behaviour. They argue that Keohane's (1989, 3) assertion that institutions are 'persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe

[3] A debate has been evident in the literature as to whether these first two points can be unified and institutions conceived as rules-in-equilibrium, however, the case is not made sufficiently to consider utilising in this thesis (Hindriks and Guala, 2014; Hodgson, 2015; Rabinowicz, 2018).

behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations', does not allow for the possibility of testing how institutions impact on activities and expectations (Simmons and Martin, 2002). Thereby, Simmons & Martin (2002) highlight the importance of the definitional issue in enabling the ability to test claims of the effectiveness of rules, especially when actors concur on the understanding of the rule and the ability to influence behaviour.

A conception of institutions that correlates with the existence of formal structures is evident in the very beginning of North's (1990, 3) seminal work when it is asserted that 'institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction'. Although North's work is based on the international economy the same definitional approach is prevalent in international institutions more generally. Ostrom (1986, 5-7) emphasises the potential different uses of the term rule, depending on the approach being utilised. Ostrom (1986, 5) is explicit that rules 'are subject to human intervention and change' and 'distinct from physical and behavioral laws'. In short rules either, require, prohibit or permit action (Ostrom, 1986; 1990). Ostrom (1986, 5) is specifically seeking to differentiate from the game-theory conception (see Axelrod, 1984) and the focus on the rules of the game which incorporates 'the preference system of all the players' (Shubik, 1982, 8). Ostrom (1986, 6) argues that this conflates rules and laws together, whether physical or behavioural, and that rules 'should *not* be equated with formal laws'. Formal laws can become rules when at least tacit understanding of a law exists and accountability for a breach of law is evident, which thereby makes enforcement a necessary precondition for a law to become a rule (Ostrom, 1986, 6). This places rules as above formal laws. Therefore, it is 'frequently difficult to change the rules participants use to order their relationships' (Ostrom, 1986, 5), though change is possible, unlike physical and behavioural laws which are static. Ostrom (1986); (Ostrom, 1990) argues that despite the difficulty in change, the potential for change makes rules an interesting variable.

Institutions as Equilibria and Norms

The focus on rules forms only one aspect of a potential definition of an institution. Crawford and Ostrom (1995), for example, focus on institutions as equilibria, norms and rules, as they explore the institutional influence on actor preferences and how behaviour is optimised. All three approaches are encompassed in what they refer to as an 'institutional statement', which is a means of referring to institutions as 'a shared linguistic constraint or opportunity that prescribes, permits, or advises actions or outcomes for actors (both individual and corporate)' (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995, 583). Duffield (2007, 2) views institutions in a similar vein 'as relatively stable sets of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system, the actors in the system (including states as well as nonstate entities), and their activities'. The model of institutions as equilibria is primarily used in economic explanations of institutional behaviour, and frequently employs mathematical principles, such as the NASH equilibrium and pareto optimum, in order to explain decision-making with regard to specific events.[4] has been used to analyse specific events in NATO in the past, institutions as equilibria is primarily focussed towards economic explanations (Sandler and Murdoch, 1990). As such reducing institutional analysis to primarily economic arguments based on transactional costs-benefit analysis, is problematic, as equilibria, is unable to incorporate the full spectrum of cooperative behaviour the Alliance has developed over seventy years.

The principal separation between a rule and a norm 'arises in the differential degree of formality, and particularly enforceability' (Peters, 2012, 53). Thereby, a norm can be considered to be a rule lacking one, or more, of the characteristics as set out by Ostrom (1986). For example, consider NATO and Article V, the collective defence commitment that

[4] For example, Sandler and Murdoch (1990) consider defence expenditure behaviour of NATO members between 1956 and 1987, and subsequently develop this into a wider argument relating to burden-sharing (Sandler and Murdoch, 2000), based on public good theory.

underpins the Alliance. The question arises as to whether this is a rule or norm? Action is required, and the member states have at least a tacit understanding of what is required but is there an enforcement mechanism? Certainly none is explicitly stated, which helps to create doubt whether Article V would be enforced in all scenarios (Kroenig, 2015; Schanz, 2015); Russian hybrid warfare in the Baltic States being the most common scenario debated (Calha, 2015; Clark et al., 2016; Frühling and Lasconjarias, 2016; Giles, 2016; Zapfe and Haas, 2016). Following the logic through then, in theory, this would mean that Article V should be viewed in same light as the commitment to spend 2% of GDP on defence, reinforced at the Wales Summit (Mesterhazy, 2015, 3-6); it is a requirement with at least a tacit understanding, indicated by its inclusion in the summit declaration which is based on consensus, but with no formal codified enforcement mechanism. In reality, Article V is enshrined to a much greater degree than the 2% spending pledge. Consequently, considering the Alliance as norm based is problematic and exacerbates the potential nature of problems artificially.

Institutions as Organisations

March and Olsen (1989) acknowledge that institutions may be embodied within formal structures, though this is not a pre-requisite for classification of an institution. Peters (2012, 30) evidences a number of different definitional approaches across March and Olsen's work but concludes that,

> it is clear what is meant by "institution" in their approach to the subject. It is a collection of values and rules, largely normative rather than cognitive in the way in which they impact institutional members, as well as the routines that are developed to implement and enforce those values.

Lane and Ersson (2000, 23-37) posit the importance of defining what sense we are interrogating the term institution and establish that as well as the rules based conception of North that examining the organisation, in a holistic manner as opposed to atomistic, as a

system directed by rules is also a form of institutional analysis. In this sense they are differentiating between simple and complex institutional arrangements, with North's view representing a thin conception whilst the thick conception develops the notion of practice being more than simply rules and norms (Lane and Ersson, 2000, 4). In traditional institutional analysis the thick conception attracted little attention as international organisations were mechanisms through which states acted. Organisations 'were not actors in their own right and no independent ontological status' (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, viii). They were considered as analysis of regimes, whereby, 'a regime is a distinct set of institutions combined into a whole according to an institutional logic that makes sense' (March and Olsen, 1989, 14).

Keohane (1988, 384) goes further by differentiating the two types of institution, international regimes and international organisations, with the later being 'purposive' and having the 'capacity for action'. In this sense, NATO is an international organisation, utilising the definition above, as it is more than a simple alliance, which is illustrated by its focus on crisis management and cooperative security as well as collective defence.[5] Thereby, institutionalisation can be identified as 'the presence of formal organisations charged with performing specific intra-alliance tasks' and 'the development of formal or informal rules governing how alliance members reach collective decisions' (Walt, 1997, 167). What this would suggest is that 'there is a direct correlation between the course of NATO's development and the level and type of institutionalisation' (Webber et al., 2012, 39).

NATO as an Actor

NATO is a purposive actor with the capacity for action and, thereby, is an actor in its own right. Since the end of the Cold War it has been evident that NATO has sought to have a

[5] 2010 Strategic Concept.

greater role in, not just, regional security, but also global security (Krahmann, 2016, 1404). Furthermore, that this post-Cold War role has evolved towards offensive military operations, though the declared aim is defensive in enhancing the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. March and Olsen (1984) identify that institutions can be considered to be actors in their own right if they exhibit coherence and autonomy. Coherence enables the treatment of an institution as a decision-maker, whilst autonomy reflects an institution that has moved beyond the mirror of social forces, which in NATO's case is the individual preferences of the member states, and closely linked to the leadership role considered by Ostrom (1991).

Coherence is demonstrated by the institution making a choice on the basis of collective interest or intention (March and Olsen, 1984, 738-9). NATO meets the coherence criteria in two significant ways. First, the fundamental principle of the Alliance, enshrined in the Washington Treaty, is collective defence. The Alliance will act as a unitary whole if an individual member state is attacked. Second, the nature of decision-making within the Alliance is consensus based, thereby, every decision that the Alliance makes represents the collective interest of the member states. In other words, the actions undertaken by NATO are a choice based on collective interest.

In order to establish autonomy, it is necessary to demonstrated that the preferences of individual member states have been restricted. Empirical evidence is required to support such a statement, and will be provided in the three case studies that follow this chapter. However, as a consensus based institution for the Alliance not to be able to provide autonomy would be to argue that every member state has never objected to anything that the Alliance has done. It is, therefore, uncontroversial to state that NATO has, at least, acted with autonomy in certain situations. Furthermore, March and Olsen (1984) accommodate internal processes within institutions that have been triggered by external events.

NATO is an actor in its own right that operates beyond the preferences of the individual member states. The principle of consensus decision-making that underpins the Alliance ensures that whilst an individual member state, even a more powerful one, may not be in full agreement, they do not object to the course of action being undertaken.[6] Thereby, when NATO engages in a course of action, it is with at least the tacit support of all member states. Identifying NATO as an actor follows the theoretical logic and is demonstrated by empirical evidence. The theoretical approach now turns to consider why institutionalism is the best framework for garnering deeper understanding of how NATO has been able to transform in the post-Cold War era and incorporate new security functions.

Why Institutionalism?

NATO forms part of an established security matrix within Europe and operates in conjunction with the EU and the OSCE (Webber et al., 2004). It functions as a medium for reducing uncertainty and allows gains for its individual members, especially with regard to information exchange and lowered transaction costs, unavailable to them if acting alone or through other institutional mechanisms (Hall and Taylor, 1996). By this view, for joint gains to remain a primary benefit of membership, NATO cannot be simply subject to the whims of an individual country. Such a position would reinforce the claims of realism that NATO continues to exist as it is subject to the preferences of its leading powers (Mearsheimer, 1994). In such circumstances, NATO cohesion would weaken. In this light, the ability, or not, of 'emergent' security issues to foster cohesion, or division, becomes critical.

At a conference in 1994, the retiring NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wörner, declared

[6] See Gallis, P. (2003) 'NATO's Decision-Making Procedure'. CRS Report RS21510. 5th May.

that NATO as an institution 'represents a state-of-the-art-model' (Wörner, 1994, 102). At the same event, the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, stated that 'there is no doubt that NATO is the most effective machine for international cooperation on defence and security in Europe' (Delors, 1994, 8). Both Wörner and Delors were clear that a period of adaptation was underway, and that this would not necessarily coincide with improved prospects for peace despite an apparently diminishing threat. However, their individual arguments also illustrated the broad division in approaches to NATO in the early post-Cold War period. For Delors (1994) the crucial aspect was a continued American presence in Europe and the role of NATO as a forum for transatlantic dialogue. He argued that the American commitment was not indefinite and that 'Europeans will quite simply have to do more for their own defence' (Delors, 1994, 10). Wörner took a different approach and focused on what roles NATO should engage in the future. He was very much in favour of the development of a crisis management role and in ensuring that the capabilities, forces, structures and procedures to enable such a role were in place (Wörner, 1994). The differing perspectives of Wörner and Delors are indicative of two important ways of thinking about NATO's development in the post-Cold War era; it has developed according to the preferences of its member states or that the institution itself matters and acts to constrain, or modify, member states behaviour and strategies.

The speeches by Wörner and Delors implied, 'there is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real world of policy' (Walt, 1998, 29). Snyder (2004) offers a post 9/11 analysis on Walt's (1998) proposition that only three competing paradigms (or theories) need to be considered; realism, liberalism, and idealism (i.e. constructivism).[7] This division accords with much theoretically informed writing on NATO. Viewed another way, the academic literature on NATO can be divided into three categories. First, work that

[7] Both Walt and Snyder equate idealism with constructivism.

considers the Alliance *collectively* from a number of different standpoints. The collective approach to analysing NATO focus on specific areas of contention and views them via a series of different theoretical lenses (see Barany and Rauchhaus, 2011; Hellman and Wolf, 1993; Webber et al., 2012). Second, analysis of the Alliance that utilises a number of different theoretical perspectives across a diverse range of problems with analysis conducted *independently* of each other (see Hallams et al., 2013; Webber and Hyde-Price, 2016).[8] Third, studies that focus on exploring *individually* a specific issue via a specific theory; with focus on realist (see Hyde-Price, 2007; Mearsheimer, 1990; 1994; 2001; Rupp, 2006; Sireci and Coletta, 2009; Waltz, 1993; 2000), liberalism or institutionalist (see Keohane, 1989; 1993; Keohane and Martin, 1995; Keohane et al., 1993; McCalla, 1996; Wallander, 2000; Wallander and Keohane, 1999), and ideational perspectives (see Adler, 2008; Gheciu, 2005; Hampton, 1998; Kitchen, 2009; Moore, 2002; Sjursen, 2004).

The individual category has greatest relevance to this thesis given its concern with the particular issue of change. Here, three theoretical perspectives - realism, liberalism and constructivism - can be incorporated into a study of NATO. Given that an institutionalist position is adopted in this thesis it becomes necessary to elucidate the rationale behind the decision. Due to the different epistemological positions prevalent in realism, liberalism and ideational approaches, consideration of a positivist or post-positivist approach will enable the benefits of a positivist approach to become clear (Lapid, 1989). The analysis can then shift towards an appraisal of whether the positivist approaches of realism or liberalism offers a greater variety of explanation in furthering understanding of NATO's post-Cold War transformation. It is appreciated that the separation, as put forward in this thesis, between positivism and post-positivism may gloss over some of the nuances of a constructivist framework, the core division between the two strands reinforces the position that an

[8] This category is primarily made up of edited volumes.

ideational approach is unable, on its own, to offer an adequate framework for exploring the Alliance as a constituent whole.

The principal separation between positivism and post-positivism is how knowledge exists within the world (Dowding, 2016; Furlong and Marsh, 2010). Positivism is based on the position that 'the world exists independently of our knowledge of it' (Furlong and Marsh, 2010, 193). This means that there is an objective truth that can be understood, which translates to the ability to offer casual explanations for social phenomena. A post-positivist approach, meanwhile, 'acknowledges that "objective" analysis of the kind aspired to in the natural sciences is unattainable' (Furlong and Marsh, 2010, 199). In other words, there is no objective truth and hence offering casual explanations is problematic. The ideational position is further weakened, in the case of the end of the Cold War and NATO, in that stability is a precursor for change to be enacted (Flockhart, 2016). Therefore, in a thesis that seeks to answer questions regarding how NATO has transformed in the unstable world of the post-Cold War era and offer an explanation as to why the level of transformation has varied across security tasks it becomes clear that a constructivist approach, whilst potentially useful for explaining certain phenomena,[9] is not able to be fully applicable across the diverse range of security challenges faced by the Alliance.

Realism or Liberalism?

'When the NATO Treaty was signed in 1949, it was […] seen by many American officials as a transnational agreement that would provide encouragement and support for Europeans as they developed more unified, economic, political, and security institutions' (Ikenberry, 2001, 201). This statement implies[10] that the United States viewed NATO as a vehicle to

[9] Examples will become evident in the section examining ideational institutionalism later in the chapter.
[10] *C.P. (50) 118,* Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 26th May 1950, p. 2 exemplifies the point when it states that 'it was generally understood that the Chairman would be the American Deputy'.

manage the coordination of its European Allies until they had suitably recovered from the devastation of the Second World War and could play a more active role in their own defence. As the post-World War period extended it became clear that European recovery was not sufficient to guarantee defence self-sufficiency and reliance on the US continued in the face of the Soviet threat. The US, meanwhile, regarded its commitment to Europe as essential in the Cold War competition with the Soviet bloc.[11] NATO was the means through which this was pursued in accordance with the realist logic of balancing. According to Calleo (1987, 35) NATO removed questions regarding 'America's willingness to come to Europe's aid'. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, post-communist transition, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, this rationale was undermined and the continued relevance of NATO was questioned (Mearsheimer, 1990). In essence, the debate surrounding the applicability of realism or liberalism to understanding the Alliance has focussed on neorealism and neoliberalism, due to the appreciation of structural factors underpinned by the central concept of the rational-actor (Nye, 1988). Although different strands of realism or liberalism have been utilised in studying the Alliance they have tended to focus on specific problems, rather than offering explanatory power that can be holistically. Hence, the focus on neorealism and neoliberalism in this thesis.

More than two decades on, the fact that NATO still exists, indeed, has increased its activities and role, therefore, presents a serious challenge to the focus of neorealism on balancing, and the narrow set of tasks that, thus, arise. 'How can an alliance endure in the absence of a worthy opponent' (Waltz, 1993, 75)? Realists asked. Janowitz (1975, 31) provides a base point for beginning to seek an answer when he notes that 'the effectiveness of military alliances rests on the important element of political stability'. Neoliberal institutionalism offers an explanation as to why NATO still exists in the post-Cold

[11] *NSC 68,* A Report to the National Security Council, 14th April 1950, pp. 17-20.

War era and why it has not succumbed to untrammelled US dominance. However, the continued persistence of NATO 'cannot be considered as proof that the neorealist predictions are wrong, but behaviour contrary to neorealist arguments can be' (McCalla, 1996, 448). The primary challenge of realism to neoliberal institutionalism has been that 'institutions are merely an intervening variable' and as such have a negligible independent effect on state behaviour (Mearsheimer, 1994, 13). Institutionalist theory contends that institutions can be both an independent and a dependent variable, as it is precisely the ability to influence patterns of state behaviour that causes states to create them in the first place (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Schimmelfenning, 2016).

Martin and Simmons (1998, 730) contend that the conventional approach to studying institutional design and organisation has been dichotomous; either 'institutions matter, or they do not'. Furthermore, by continually addressing the narrow challenge of realism, institutional theory is effectively constrained by a realist agenda and as result a significant aspect of the theory has been underdeveloped (Martin and Simmons, 1998). Studies have been undertaken to unlock the full richness of institutionalism by 'posing researchable questions' of how institutions 'operate and how they relate to the problems that states face' (Koremenos et al., 2001, 761).

That each theory has attempted to claim the high ground and arguments persisted in an effort to subsume the other should be of no great surprise considering their closeness on core issues. Both conceive that states are rational actors operating in a system of international anarchy, though, the debate has been seen as 'incommensurable, because they each generate their own criteria of judgement and their own language' (Waever, 1996, 151). However, Waever (1996, 164) goes on to argue that a neo-neo synthesis between realism and liberalism is possible, though there has not been a sustained effort to achieve this end and the substantive difference of opinion on the merits of relative and absolute

gains would appear to make such a synthesis unlikely (Grieco, 1988).

Despite the possibility of synthesis, and the mutual acceptance of the rationality of states as utility maximising actors, a neorealist approach to understanding NATO is deficient. Neorealism is unable to get at the puzzle of the variable nature of security provision within the Alliance, why NATO has developed certain security functions and not others, and why the security tasks adopted have developed in the manner that they have. In essence, neorealism is too broad an approach and focuses on the leading powers in the Alliance. Although such an approach may have utility in specific instances it is unable to be applied across the board, as illustrated by the frequent revisions to the position of neorealism with regards to NATO (Webber, 2013, 46-47). By contrast, an institutionalist approach is applicable across a wide spectrum of security issues, and explain the variation between them, as institutions are seen as being able to 'surmount obstacles to cooperation', address 'collective action dilemmas' and provide the means 'for policy coordination' (Webber et al., 2012, 38).

Given the transformation that NATO has experienced in the post-Cold War era, then, the central question that arises is how that adaptation has taken place and why variation has occurred between different security issues. Institutionalism as a theoretical approach makes its benefit to answering these questions clear by highlighting the previous lack of attention 'to constructing well-delineated casual mechanisms or explaining variation in institutional effects' (Martin and Simmons, 1998, 757) and 'the potential to more clearly elucidate the relationships between institutional design and international outcomes' (Wallander, 2000, 732). Furthermore, contrary to realist claims, institutions are fundamentally rooted in the realities of power and interests (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Keohane and Martin, 1995). Therefore, Keohane's (1984) assertion that cooperation is the rational choice of self-interested, but interdependent countries, appears to have found the

necessary conditions, and political will, within Europe (Keohane and Nye, 1987; 2012).

Ikenberry (2001) observes that a significant aspect of the post-Second World War era has been American led institutional binding, via the expansion of security and economic institutions. Furthermore, institutionalisation is a matter of degree and as such 'can be measured along three dimensions: commonality, specificity and differentiation' (Wallander and Keohane, 1999, 24). Furthermore, the effectiveness of an institution 'can be measured in terms of [its] success in the areas of implementation, compliance and persistence' (Young, 1992, 163). Effectiveness, in this sense and for the thesis, refers to the effectiveness of NATO in implementing the policy objectives and member commitments that have been reached by consensus. The merits of the success of the policies enacted by NATO in achieving its wider goals is not relevant to understanding whether the institution has engaged in a transformative action. Thereby, NATO is able to have established a transformation, in an institutional sense, if it has implemented the collectively agreed decisions that have been take, which means that analysis regarding the merits of transformation can be conducted separate from the success, or otherwise, of the over-arching objective of the Alliance, such as stabilising Afghanistan, or deterring Russia.

The means for assessing how NATO has transformed in the post-Cold War era, therefore, already exist as part of established institutional theory. Before, exploring how to apply a third wave institutionalist approach to understanding NATO's transformation, however, it is first necessary to clarify an understanding of change in an institutional setting.

Theory of Change

The purpose of this section is to identify a theory of change, derived from institutionalist premises which can be utilised to explore NATO's post-Cold War transformation in relation to emergent security challenges. The manner in which NATO has incorporated emergent

security challenges into its remit provides important insight into understanding institutional change more broadly, with specific focus on whether the key driver of change is endogenous or exogenous in nature.

The collapse of the Communist system in Eastern Europe unravelled 'faster than anyone would have thought possible',[12] ultimately leading to the disbandment of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Hence, NATO was faced with an unexpected situation that required a fundamental rethink of its *raison d'être*. Wörner makes further salient points that helped to define the nature of NATO in the post-Cold War era; he identifies a key feature of a totalitarian system is its inability to change internally before going on to assert that 'we [NATO] are responsible for change; Gorbachev is as much the product of our system as of his own'. Two observations emerge. First the implication of endogeneity as a driver of change that distinguishes the NATO allies from their Soviet counterparts. Second, it can, therefore, be asserted that right from the beginning of the post-Cold War era NATO had a clear intention, and realised the need, to change and that the relationship between the global security environment and international institutions was dynamic and interdependent, and understood to be so. Each of these observations will be considered in turn.

Understanding Change

Goodin (1996, 24-5) posits three basic ways institutions arise and change over time: by intentional design, accident or evolution. Change in NATO during the early post-Cold War era was not accidental but rather the result of a series of ad hoc solutions as problems arose and formed part of a clear and coherent planning process, which can be traced by the institutionalisation of Alliance tasks. The debate is the degree of change, which NATO

[12] Manfred Wörner Speech on Reshaping East-West Relations. *NATO: Partnership and Prospects*, 12th October 1989, Washington, DC.

underwent, and the respective levels *endogenous* or *exogenous* factors in the process of change. In order to illustrate the argument that the primary driver of change in NATO, during the post-Cold War period, was endogenous, it is first necessary to clarify what the terms exogenous and endogenous mean in broad terms, before clarifying the specific situation in the international security environment and the perspective utilised to analyse the change from.

The simplest way of understanding exogenous change is as change from outside the subject with endogenous change coming from within the subject itself (Dark, 2016, 80-1). North (1990, 84) posits that whilst change can be determined by exogenous factors 'most will be endogenous', reflecting the utility maximization characteristics of the individual actor.[13] Whilst such an assertion might be valid theoretically in a dynamic environment with multiple actors pursuing their own rational objectives continually it appears problematic to separate endogenous from exogenous factors. It is clear, however, that NATO sought to influence the nature of the change rather than simply reacting to it. In a series of speeches, by the then NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wörner was unequivocal that 'the primary task of the next decade [the 1990s] will be to build a new European security structure, to include the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations'.[14] The purposive nature of this change was reinforced by the intention 'to steer change in Europe so that there are no losers, only winners'[15] which occurs due to the adaptability of the Alliance, not only 'reflecting change but also actively shaping that change.'[16] Further speeches in the latter half of 1990 emphasised the crucial role of NATO in the promotion of 'constructive

[13] In the case of NATO individual actors are the member states.
[14] Manfred Wörner The Atlantic Alliance and European Security in the 1990s. *Speech to the Bremer Tabaks Collegium*, 17th May 1990, Brussels.
[15] Manfred Wörner A Common Europe: Partners in Stability. *Speech to Members of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR*, 16th July 1990, Moscow
[16] Manfred Wörner The Future of the Atlantic Alliance. Speech at National Defence Institute, 5th November 1990, Lisbon.

change'[17] and the provision of 'stability so that change can take place in optimal conditions.'[18] Luong (2002, 15) clarifies the position by arguing that the magnitude of the exogenous shock has implications for the level of endogeneity,

> the source of institutional change lies in the transitional context. In short, the transition represents an exogenous shock to status quo asymmetrical power relations. State and societal actors then interpret the extent of this shock's impact on both the overall balance of power and their relative power within it. The greater, or more disruptive, they perceive this shock to be, the more institutional change we can expect because established elites will find less utility in clinging to their previous political identities.

The subject for understanding change in this thesis is NATO, therefore, the nature of change has to be understood from NATO's perspective and, hence, identifying the relationship between endogenous and exogenous sources of change, emphasised by the previous paragraph, is central to the conception of change used in this thesis. The Cold War defined the international system, and the security architecture within it, as such the end of the Cold War dictates a necessity for a new international system. NATO as part of the international system experiences these changes as being exogenous, however, the change that NATO undertakes in response to the exogenous shock is endogenous in nature.

Koning (2015) theorises the relationship between exogenous and endogenous factors in a third wave institutionalist approach. The utility of a convergent institutionalist approach is reinforced as a focus on one strand of the new institutionalism leads 'to the implausible suggestion that neither of the other two perspectives offers valuable insights on institutional change' (Koning, 2015, 653). Explanations of the ultimate driver of institutional change as exogenous are premised on unpredictable events that occur in the wider environment in

[17] Manfred Wörner Building a New Europe. *Speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Republic*, 6th September 1990, Prague.
[18] Manfred Wörner Speech Before the Hungarian Parliament. 22nd November, Budapest.

which the institution operates, whereas endogenous change is a dynamic process within the institution itself, as result of interactions with actors inside the institution (Koning, 2015, 643). Therefore, the assertion that NATO is an actor due to coherence and autonomy, and the consensus decision-making aspect of the Alliance, reinforces the validity of endogenous drivers of change. Obviously, a clear delineation between a particular change being exogenous or endogenous is impracticable in an objective manner, but by demonstrating internal process, particularly the institutional learning, an assertion of endogeneity can be made and tested.

Keohane (1996, 463) reinforces the argument that the end of the Cold War was an unexpected exogenous shock, like a meteor strike, and could not have been predicted by political scientists.[19] Harrison (2004), however, posits that placing the end of the Cold War was predictable due to Gorbachev's dramatic alteration of the bipolar superpower relationship, and hence the international security environment, by initiating the 'new political thinking' foreign policy, reinforced by the domestic policies of *glasnost*[20] and *perestroika*[21]. Gorbachev (1996, 401) later recounted, 'we had to recognise that we couldn't go on living like this, both inside our country and in world politics. This understanding was the starting point for everything.' The notion of an unexpected shock, therefore, appears to have lost traction, however, if the benefit of hindsight is removed and Gorbachev's speeches of the time analysed then it can be shown that the Cold War was most certainly in full swing and, hence, its rapid ending was very much an unpredictable, unexpected shock.

Shortly after taking office Gorbachev (1986, 149, 156) argued that 'the attainment of military-strategic parity with the member states of the aggressive NATO alliance is a

[19] Realists also conceptualise the end of the Cold War as an exogenous shock (see Waltz, 1993)
[20] Means openness and refers to increased government transparency and instigated in 1985.
[21] Policy of restructuring the political and economic system proposed by Brezhnev in 1979 and pursued by Gorbachev.

crucially important achievement'[22] and that 'new aggressive doctrines are being advanced and both nuclear and conventional armaments are being augmented'[23]. Reagan echoed the business as usual sentiment expressed by Gorbachev in his diary by recording, 'that Gorbachev [would] be as tough as any of their leaders' (Brinkley, 2007, 19th Apr 1985). Events, primarily the 1987 INF Treaty,[24] furthermore, make it hard to consider that, in the context of the time, an end to the Cold War was a feasible likelihood.

Reflecting on whether change is foreseeable or not is increasingly important when arguments about whether the key determinant of change is evolutionary or revolutionary in nature (Hay, 2002, 151-163). Scholars who focus on the structural conditions of change emphasise the importance of path dependence and, hence, the evolutionary nature of institutional change and the rarity of change occurring (Mahoney and Snyder, 1999; Thelen, 1999). Though such institutionalist scholars (Krasner, 1984; Pierson, 2004) acknowledge that change can occur in punctuated equilibrium or critical junctures these models 'tend to distinguish sharply between periods of institutional creation and periods of "stasis"' (Thelen, 2003, 19). The implication contained within this line of thought is that change, or at least significant change, occurs due to exogenous shocks.[25] If such a position was to be taken with NATO then the end of the Cold War is the exogenous shock that altered the strategic environment causing the Alliance to *adapt*[26] to its changed environment.

Indeed, the Alliance has openly expressed a desire 'to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.'[27] NATO does not merely adapt to change in the international security situation, but it also engages in purposive

[22] 23rd April 1985 on convening the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
[23] 26th April 1985 speech in Warsaw.
[24] For specific details of the INF issue see Wheeler (2001).
[25] 'Critical junctures are often attributed to big, exogenous shocks' (Pierson, 2004, 135).
[26] Emphasised due to the distinction between adaption and transformation.
[27] 1999 Strategic Concept, para 12.

transformative action designed to affect the security environment. Consequently, change in NATO has to be viewed as part of an intentional endogenous process, whilst acknowledging that exogenous factors will influence the nature of the change.

Change in NATO has, therefore, existed on two levels simultaneously. It has adapted to the exogenous shock of the end of the Cold War by engaging in far-reaching change from an unexpected event. The Alliance has also transformed endogenously to the security challenges that came about due to the exogenous shock. The transformative process can embrace either evolutionary or revolutionary models of change. Furthermore, the dynamic conception of an institution's relationship with its broader environment and socio-historic context is acknowledged within institutionalist theory (Pierson, 2000a). Luong (2002, 26) summarises the point,

> while the structural-historical context sets up the initial parameters within which institutional design takes place, these are neither fixed nor determinative. Rather, the immediate-strategic context indicates the degree to and direction in which these initial parameters shift or change, as well as which indicators are most relevant for determining the nature and extent of these changes, throughout the institutional design process. Their interactive effect is especially apparent with regard to strategy, because actors do not develop strategies strictly based on their interests and status as defined by the structural-historical context, but continually adjust them in response to new opportunities or constraints presented by the situation they confront.

North (1990, 3) illustrates the point when positing that 'institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change'. Though due to the conservative nature of organisations, endogenous change has traditionally been viewed as occurring on the periphery of an institution and is 'overwhelmingly incremental' in nature (North, 1990, 89). The essential premise behind incrementalism is that 'there are distinct limits on policy change' (Hayes, 2001, 5) and that a process of change 'involves many small steps that have low initial costs (Ostrom, 1990, 137). Yet slow and gradual change over a period time seems at odds with a transformation

argument, whereby a transformation represents a marked change from a pre-existing state of affairs to a new course of action. As such, a transformation appears more in line with a revolutionary, as opposed to evolutionary, theory of change (Hay, 2002, ch. 4). Revolutionary change lends itself more to an exogenous based understanding of change than to the more evolutionary endogenous conception, as illustrated above. Once, the essential question of temporality[28] is considered (Hay, 2002, 150-163) it becomes clear that NATO embarked on a series of sequential steps (Pierson, 2000b) to 'engage in a continuous process of reform, modernisation and transformation.'[29] Indeed, that 'gradual change can have transformative effects… [which] can be stimulated by endogenous as well as exogenous factors' is now accepted within an institutionalist theory of change (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, 112). Thereby, gradual institutional change is considered to be the product of an endogenous process, resulting from the interaction between the institution and its constituent actors.

This section has argued how change in NATO after the Cold War can be seen as an intentional endogenous led transformation that has fed back into and so shaped the structure of the international system, and specifically the European security structure. The argument made has shown that an institution adapts to a change in its external environment, the exogenous shock, by pursuing transformative endogenous change. Such a theory of change supports the view of the Alliance as a purposive institution that affects international security. An assumption has been made throughout this section, namely that NATO, as an institution, has changed. Given the extent of the shock to the international

[28] Temporality is used to refer to the traditional philosophical understanding of past, present and future. Whilst the work exploring our understanding of time and the relationship between past, present, and future, and earlier and later (the A and B series, see McTaggart, 1908) may well have merit, attempting to incorporate the model in this thesis would be overly complex, especially given the contested nature of the concept (see Cameron, 2015; Mozersky, 2015; Smith, 2011).
[29] 2010 Strategic Concept, para 6.

security system caused by the collapse of Soviet Union, post-Cold War era NATO was not in fact the same institution, but a new one, it never changed but was reborn.

Third Wave Institutionalism

Institutionalism has undergone three waves of development (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). The first wave, 'old institutionalism', focussed on the theoretical challenges from rational choice theory and behaviouralism, until the end of the 1970s. From the 1980s separate strands of institutionalism began to develop that have become best known as the 'Three New Institutionalisms' (Hall and Taylor, 1996). The three new institutionalisms are rational choice, historical and ideational.[30] However, the weakness associated with each strand has seen a third wave emerge, since the 2000s, whereby convergence has. As Weyland (2008, 312) argues historical institutionalism has lost its distinctiveness 'by placing its theoretical edifice on the foundation established by an internal rival [rational choice institutionalism]'. Weyland (2008, 312) also highlights that rational choice institutionalists have, in turn, accommodated 'historical analysis and began to draw on interpretivist thinking.' However, the fundamental assumption of actors rationally pursuing their preferences is maintained (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005). The problem according to Hall (2010, 205) is that though rational choice institutionalism develops persuasive explanations of how institutions operate that they do not 'yet carry over into an effective analysis of institutional change.' Therefore, in order to assert a perspective of change in NATO, consideration will be given to each strand of the 'new institutionalism' and change, before emphasising the advantages of rational choice institutionalism as the main explanatory strand within a converged third wave institutionalist approach, that acknowledges the merits of a historical or ideational institutionalist position (Koning, 2015).

[30] Hall and Taylor (1996) identify sociological institutionalism as the third strand, however, to maintain consistency with the thesis ideational has been used here.

Before moving on, a brief word is required on why the focus has been limited to just three main strands of institutionalist theories. Peters (2012, 174-5) analyses eight different strands of institutionalism and argues that, maintaining different strands of institutionalism is necessary due to differences in 'the degree to which institutions are assumed to be mutable or relatively fixed'. In other words, the ability to incorporate the transformation model put forward in the previous section. Given the exploration of change in this chapter such distinctions between strands of institutionalism appear important (Kingston and Caballero, 2009), however, on closer examination separating, for example, sociological institutionalism from constructivist institutionalism, has limited utility in furthering the understanding of NATO's transformation in this thesis. The eight strands that Peters (2012) identifies are minor variations on, and share the same core features of, the three strands of new institutionalism. Therefore, the separation of the new institutionalism is maintained as the original three as emphasised by Hall and Taylor (1996), though sociological institutionalism has been rebranded as ideational institutionalism to better reflect the full range of applicable theories.[31]

There are two criteria for analysing the three strands of institutionalism. First is their ability to explain endogenous and exogenous drivers of change. By focussing on the drivers of change an assessment can be made as to how well the case studies stand up to the theory of change put forward earlier on in this chapter. Second, the type of change that each strand of new institutionalism is able to explain is considered, and how that relates to the core concern of the thesis, NATO's ability to enact change in the context of emerging security challenges. Thereby, allowance is made for a strand of the new institutionalism to be the dominant explanatory factor within an overall convergent third wave institutionalist approach (Koning, 2015; van der Heijden, 2013).

[31] It should also be noted that Schimmelfenning (2016) argues in his analysis of NATO and institutional theories that historical institutionalism is a subsidiary strand of both rational choice and ideational institutionalism.

Rational Choice Institutionalism and Change

The analysis of rational choice institutionalism begins by exploring the first criterion, the ability to explain exogenous or endogenous as a driver of change, before moving on to examine the theory's utility in explaining an array of security challenges. Rational choice institutionalism is based on the core concept that, in an anarchical international environment, actors will seek to engage in utility maximisation according to their preferences (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 944-945; Keohane and Martin, 1995; Shepsle, 1989, 135). In relation to NATO's post-Cold War transformation this concept can be utilised in two ways. First, from the level of the individual allies, whereby the organisation adapted to the new post-Cold War security environment as the individual NATO members realised the Alliance remained useful, despite the removal of the existential threat, and, thus, had a preference for the Alliance to adapt to the new security environment[32]. Secondly, that NATO 'cannot be understood simply as [an] instrumental structure wielding material power' (Williams, 2007, 64), the Alliance is an actor in its own right within the international security environment. Indeed, confirmation of its actorness is reflected in NATO's 'determination to shape its security environment'.[33] In this understanding, the Alliance is a purposive institution constraining its members' behaviour and shaping their preferences with the ability to engage in a transformative process to ensure its future role.

Two observations follow from such a conceptualisation. First, that in a rational model of institutional analysis, 'institutions are almost infinitely mutable, simply through the selection of rules and structures' (Peters, 2012, 182). A rational choice institutional approach is, thereby, complementary to furthering the understanding of institutional change, as new

[32] The most prominent explanation of this phenomena relates to 'sunk costs' due to the level of investment in the existing institution (Keohane, 1984, 100-102) (also Wallander 2000)
[33] 1999 Strategic Concept, para 12.

rules and structures can be instigated to meet the institution's requirements. Second, that a rational choice institutional approach is capable of incorporating either an exogenous or endogenous explanation as a driver of institutional change. Therefore, rational choice institutionalism allows for analysis of NATO's transformation in the case studies that can be demonstrated, as well as maintaining the flexibility to posit a counter-explanation.

Rational choice institutionalism is able to provide a credible explanation as to how organisations respond to a comprehensive array of security challenges. As such the change in the nature of the threat in the post-Cold War security environment and the ability of NATO to counter a diversifying range of risks has been explained by the portability of 'institutional assets' (Wallander, 2000). Therefore, when an issue, such as enlargement, is considered it can be analysed not only via the lens of individual members' utility maximisation preferences but also by the ability of the institution itself to influence those preferences. The ability to influence individual choice redefines Keohane's (1984) sunk costs as institutional assets. A rational actor, thereby, will seek to protect their assets. An individual actor, therefore, is not acting rationally if they do not seek to protect their assets. A rational choice institutional approach, therefore, can be applied in analysis to a range of different security issues affecting NATO, as well as being able to consider the drivers of change with the Alliance.

Historical Institutionalism and Change

Historical institutionalism is primarily focussed on exogenous drivers of change. The nature of path-dependence and critical junctures inherently implies that change occurs in response to an exogenous shock that enables the notion of punctuated equilibrium to be developed. Therefore, a tendency to favour synchronic analysis, focussing on how an institution differs between two specific moments in time, or comparing the effect of an

event on the direction and extent of change, is privileged within a historical institutionalist approach (see Hay, 2002, 144-148). In order to carry out such synchronic analysis the institution being studied is effectively frozen in time, which ensures that the conception of institutions as static conservative entities is artificially reinforced.

The problem of a static conception within historical institutional approaches is attempted to be addressed by 'a *diachronic analysis* [that] *emphasises the process of change over time*'[34] (Hay, 2002, 148). Process tracing analysis, such as employed by Pierson (1996; 2004), does not displace the dominance of revolutionary, exogenous, change at the expense of evolutionary, endogenous change. Thus, a historical institutionalist approach has difficulty in offering explanations of institutional change that accommodate 'institutional dynamics that take place behind the surface' (Koning, 2015, 644). Hence, it is not well disposed to analysis of an institution where change is manifest based beyond formal institutional reform, and the greatest explanatory power of historical institutionalism espouses institutional continuity. However, the contribution of historical institutionalism to understanding institutional change is important as it highlights the problematic area of how to theorise change in institutions that utilise informal and gradual processes.

Ideational Institutionalism and Change

Ideational institutionalism reflects the premise that 'institutions confer identity' (Douglas, 1986, 55) and that the identities that individuals develop within an institution 'are tied to relations of power' (Williams, 2007, 68). Wendt (1994) emphasises the importance of endogenous drivers of change due to interaction at the systemic level which changes state

[34] Emphasis as original.

identities and interests. A central facet of ideational institutionalism is the logic of appropriateness, whereby the decision-making process is based on what is social acceptable as opposed to a rational cost-benefit analysis (March and Olsen, 1989). The logic of appropriateness has the benefit of enhancing the role of an institution as an actor in its own right, both in terms of the institutions self-perceived identity and the legitimacy conveyed upon it by outside parties (see Barnett and Levy, 1991; March and Olsen, 1989; 1998; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). The focus of ideational institutionalism is, therefore, on ideational change that privileges endogenous change.

Studies utilising a ideational institutionalist approach, in understanding NATO, thus, tend to focus on the Alliance as a security community[35] based on shared values (see Adler, 2008; Adler and Barnett, 1998; Gheciu, 2004; Gheciu, 2005; 2008; Kitchen, 2009; 2010). NATO Summit Declarations usually reference shared values and/or community early on.[36] Whilst such a conception fits well with exploring post-Cold War issues closely linked to the notion of community, such as enlargement, it is less flexible in offering explanation across the full spectrum of security challenges that NATO has faced.

Third Wave Institutionalism and Change

The essence of a third wave institutionalist approach is emphasised by Lowndes and Roberts (2013, 20) who utilise the argument of Hay (2002, 46-7) that

[35] Indeed, the very conception of a security community originated with analysis of NATO (Deutsch et al., 1957). A security community is a group of states who define their relations with each other based on the 'dependable expectations of peaceful change' (Adler and Barnett, 1998, 30).

[36] Examples from most recent Summit Declarations can be found in the Lisbon Summit Declaration para 1, the Chicago Summit Declaration para 3, the Wales Summit Declaration para 2, and the Warsaw Summit Declaration on Transatlantic Security para 1.

> theory is a guide to empirical exploration, a means of reflecting more or less abstractly upon complex processes of institutional evolution and transformation in order to highlight the key periods or phases of change which warrant closer empirical scrutiny.

To understand and generate meaningful empirical based analysis a pluralistic approach offers the potential, especially with regard to transformation, to generate compelling explanatory power (van der Heijden, 2013). In order to analyse the empirical evidence from the case studies, thereby, it is important to be guided by theory but not constrained by it, especially given that NATO is a complex institution where a singular approach is likely to be unsatisfactory in explanation.

A third wave institutionalist approach enables the benefits of the different strands of the new institutionalism to be blended together and develop markers by which the relationship between institutional theory and NATO's post-Cold War transformation can be understood and applied to the case studies. Furthermore, it enables the critique of Moran (2014) that the theoretical basis of institutional is often ignored when empirical arguments are pursued, due to the unsuitability of a specific strand of institutionalism to offer explanation in the real world. As such the relevance of the theoretical approach is how the existing institutional literature envisages the mechanisms for analysing institutional change, and how they can be combined together.

Wallander and Keohane (1999, 24) demonstrate that institutionalisation is a matter of degree and 'can be measured along three dimensions: commonality, specificity and differentiation'. Commonality refers to the shared expectations about appropriate behaviour; specificity is the degree to which specific and enduring rules exist and; differentiation relates to the extent to which different roles are assigned to different members. Webber et al. (2012, ch.3) posit that the ability to conduct operations is the acid-test of NATO's transformation. The degree of institutionalisation, therefore, is only part of the story, it has to have a deliverable end product. For institutionalisation to result in a

transformation that benefits operational parameters, the institutionalisation that has taken place has also to be effective. Young (1992, 163) argues that the effectiveness of institutions 'can be measured in terms of their success in the areas of implementation, compliance and persistence'. Implementation is the ability to address problems and enact policies; compliance refers to adherence to the core provisions and rules of the institution whilst; persistence relates to the capacity to adapt to change and survive in a changing environment.

Chapter 1 argued that the security environment in which NATO operates forces the Alliance to adapt to changing circumstances whilst also engaging in a transformative agenda that then further alters the environment in which it operates. In a similar vein, this thesis argues that an inter-relationship exists between institutionalisation, effectiveness and adaptation which when combined together provide a model for understanding transformation, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. For a transformation to have taken place then all three elements must be present, if one is lacking then the cycle, which is self-reinforcing, is incomplete. For example, if the institutionalisation, that resulted from the adaptation of the Alliance in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, is not effective then NATO has not transformed. As such the particular strand of institutionalisation, in the following section, requires a degree of flexibility to accommodate this model and ensure that a consistent basis for assessing the transformation of the Alliance with its new security tasks, the case studies.



Figure 2.1. Inter-relationship between components of transformation.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter the theoretical framework for understanding the post-Cold War transformation of NATO has been examined. The opening section analysed the merits of adopting an institutionalist approach against realism and established that institutionalism was better placed for an explanation of how NATO has transformed in the post-Cold War era. The theory of change developed an understanding that the Alliance is not only part of the international security environment, to which it adapts, but also a driver of change for the environment, its transformative effect. The analysis of what constituents an institution provided a necessary step before embarking on inquiry into the benefits of a rational choice, historical or ideational institutionalist approach.

It has been demonstrated that a third wave institutionalist approach, with a focus on rational choice institutionalism, is best suited towards understanding the case studies, and the full spectrum of security challenges that NATO has, is and may face in the future, security challenges within the post-Cold War security environment. The case studies –

collective defence, counter-insurgency and cyber security – reflect a diverse range of challenges to the Alliance. Figure 2.1 illustrates the transformational relationship between adaption, institutionalisation and effectiveness. The three case studies, therefore, establish whether adaptation has taken place before examining the level of institutionalisation and effectiveness that is evident. Institutionalisation is analysed in the context of the three markers, identified by Wallander and Keohane (1999), which are commonality, specificity, and differentiation. Whilst effectiveness is analysed in relation to the three markers, identified by Young (1992), which are implementation, compliance, and persistence. The case studies are divided into sections to examine each marker in turn and, thereby, enable analysis, from a common basis, as to whether NATO's response to the security challenges is indicative of a transformation.

Each marker's meaning can be summarised as:

- Commonality – shared expectations about appropriate behaviour.
- Specificity – degree to which specific and enduring rules exist.
- Differentiation – the extent to which different roles are assigned to different members.
- Implementation – ability to address problems and enact policies.
- Compliance - adherence to the core provisions and rules of the institution.
- Persistence – capacity to adapt to change and survive in a changing environment, especially the process of institutional learning.

Chapter 3: ISAF – The Transformation from Stabilisation to COIN

> *In the campaign against terrorist networks and other extremists, we know that direct military force will continue to have a role. But over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. What the Pentagon calls 'kinetic' operations should be subordinate to measures to promote participation in government, economic programs to spur development, and efforts to address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies and among the discontented from which the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideology.*
>
> Robert M. Gates, US Secretary of Defense, 15 July 2008.[1]

NATO's experience of counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, undertaken as part of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, provides a rich basis for examining the transformation model in greater detail. COIN is far more varied than conventional military operations, due to the inclusion of civilian-military interaction.[2] In Afghanistan, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) contained a COIN element – and that mission typified the challenges presented by COIN itself and, in a broader context, was illustrative of NATO's post-Cold War transformation. In this chapter, NATO's role in Afghanistan will be considered reference to the three pillars of transformation as shown in Figure 2.1. Thus, in terms of adaptation, the chapter will provide an overview of NATO's evolving mission in Afghanistan from stabilisation to counter-insurgency. Second, institutionalisation will be evidenced by reference to the three markers of commonality, specificity and differentiation. Third, effectiveness will be analysed by assessing implementation, compliance and persistence. But before getting into the substance of the chapter, it is necessary to provide a contextual background and definitions of essential terminology.

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[1] Quoted in *JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution,* page 4-1. Gates was United States Secretary of Defense between 18 Dec 2006 and 1 July 2011. It should also be noted that Gates was a Republican began under Bush (Republican) and continued under Obama (Democrat).

[2] See *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide, January 2009*.

Background

On 12th September 2001, NATO invoked Article V for the first time in its history. [3] Operation Eagle Assist saw NATO provide air defence cover over the United States, the first military operation mounted by the Alliance outside of Europe. Eagle Assist helped free up American resources to engage the Taliban and Al Qaeda[4] in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).[5] American combat operations began against the Taliban on 7th October 2001 with Kabul coming under American control by 13th November. The United States did not act unilaterally and built a coalition embracing sixty-nine different nations[6] . Although the Taliban was not militarily defeated and mainly fled to Pakistan,[7] a deal was struck in Bonn by Afghan representatives for the reconstruction of the country. The Bonn Agreement[8] established the need for the international community to provide security assistance to the Afghan Transitional Authority (TA). On 20th December 2001, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386[9] duly established ISAF, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to assist the TA 'in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas' for a period of six months. The geographical restrictions and the time limit of the mandate ensured that further resolutions would be required to update mission parameters as the security situation in the country developed, and to renew the mission, and its lead-nation, on a frequent basis.

[3] See *NATO Review: Invocation of Article V: Five Years On*, June 2006, for a detailed examination of the importance of Article V, both in the historical context and the decision to invoke post-9/11.
[4] Reference to the insurgency in Afghanistan includes both the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
[5] Rumsfeld (2011, Ch 28) reveals the original name was Operation Infinite Justice.
[6] Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs, 'Fact Sheet: International Contributions to the War Against Terrorism' 14th June 2002. Rumsfield (2011) specifically singles out the offers of assistance from Britain, Canada, Germany, Australia, Japan, France and Italy.
[7] Several major engagements continued after this point. For example, the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001 and Operation Anaconda in March 2002 (note this should not be confused with the Anaconda strategy employed by Gen Petraeus in 2009).
[8] *Agreement On Provisional Arrangements In Afghanistan Pending The Re-Establishment Of Permanent Government Institutions*, 2001.
[9] *UN Security Council Resolution 1386*, 2001.

UNSCR 1413[10] of 23rd May 2002 saw ISAF extended for a further six months with lead nation command switching from the United Kingdom[11] to Turkey.[12] On 27th November 2002 UNSCR 1444[13] extended ISAF for one year and welcomed joint German and Dutch lead nation command.[14] The United Nations mandated NATO, on 16th April 2003, to take the lead of the ISAF mission following a request from Germany, the Netherlands and Canada to 'provide continuity of command and control and [to] overcome the requirement to find a new lead nation for ISAF every six months'.[15] Initial deployment of NATO personnel and equipment began on 5th July 2003 with the Regional Headquarters of Allied Forces North Europe (AFNORTH) at Brunssum being designated the Joint Forces Command (JFC) HQ.[16] NATO assumed formal command of the ISAF mission on 11th August 2003.[17]

The ISAF mission was not the first out of area military operation undertaken by the Alliance. NATO had been responsible after December 1995 for the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia[18] that oversaw the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords. This operation transitioned to a smaller Stabilisation Force (SFOR)[19] in December 1996, under NATO Operation Joint Guard (subsequently Operation Joint Forge). That mission was successfully completed on 2nd December 2005.[20] In a similar vein UNSCR 1244[21] established Kosovo Force (KFOR)[22] with NATO assuming command on 12th June 1999 of a stabilisation mission aimed at keeping the peace in the erstwhile province of Serbia. That mission is ongoing to

[10] *UN Security Council Resolution 1413*, 2002
[11] Under the command of Maj Gen John McColl.
[12] Under the command of Maj Gen Hilmi Akin Zorlu.
[13] *UN Security Council Resolution 1444*, 2002.
[14] Under the command of Lt Gen Norbert van Heyst.
[15] *RHQ AFNORTH Operational Level HQ for ISAF*, Press Release #220503.
[16] *AFNORTH On Track With Deployment to Kabul*, Press Release #100703.
[17] Under the command of Lt Gen Götz Gliemeroth.
[18] The original IFOR website is available at http://www.nato.int/ifor/ifor.htm [accessed 30 Aug 2018].
[19] The original SFOR website is available at http://www.nato.int/sfor/index.htm [accessed 30 Aug 2018].
[20] The European Union took over responsibility with EUFOR, website available at http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php [accessed 30 Aug 2016].
[21] *UN Security Council Resolution 1244*, 1999.
[22] The KFOR mission is ongoing and is under the command of JFC Naples, website available at https://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor [accessed 30 Aug 2018].

this day. Thus, when NATO took over the ISAF mission in 2003 it had already spent some eight years orchestrating peace-support missions outside the territory of its members, on behalf of the United Nations. In both Bosnia and Kosovo NATO missions had been preceded by decisive aerial bombing campaigns. In neither case, however, had the Alliance been exposed to ground combat or COIN operations. The experience of the Alliance in the former Yugoslavia influenced the conduct of operations in Afghanistan, as it led to the development of the Comprehensive Approach.[23]

Afghanistan, however, was not the former Yugoslavia and substantive differences existed between that country and the Balkans. A so-called 'Bosnia-plus'[24] approach was, therefore, not suitable (Lindley-French, 2013). Most significantly, while operations in both the Balkans and Afghanistan were Peace Support Operations (PSO) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the process of the Dayton Accords and the Bonn Agreement were markedly different. At Dayton, all the parties with a stake in the conflict were represented and came to an agreement. At Bonn, by contrast, the Taliban was excluded. Had the movement been involved, it is plausible to argue that its commitment to insurgency, would have been blunted (as would the support of the Pashtun population). Anti-Kabul fighting would thus have been less intense and limited to individual warlords. However, the Taliban's exclusion meant NATO was not providing support of a comprehensive political framework – one in which all parties came together to agree a unified vision of Afghanistan's future.

Clarification of Terminology and Concepts

Before beginning the analysis, some clarity is required on the subject under examination. ISAF, and therefore NATO's role, was just one component of a wide-ranging response by interested powers to the situation in Afghanistan. The US, supported by the UK and others,

[23] The Comprehensive Approach will be explored in greater depth in the section on implementation.
[24] The notion of Bosnia Plus will be explored in greater depth in the following section on Institutionalisation.

maintained Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) from October 2001 until December 2014.[25] OEF ran alongside ISAF as a coalition counter-terrorism (CT) operation in Afghanistan. Not only did personnel switch between both OEF and ISAF suffering causalities in both, but after 2007 they shared the same commander. Trying to separate one from the other is consequently almost impossible. To minimise the crossover and confusion and to focus analysis on NATO's ISAF mission the use of official data and primary sources has been privileged as a starting point. Each of the three pillars of transformation - adaptation, institutionalisation, and effectiveness - will be examined in turn to understand how NATO matters as an institution. Each will consider the NATO position, that of the allies, as well as of key individuals to build an understanding across different levels of analysis.

To avoid conflation between CT and COIN it is necessary to define the differences between the two. Despite analysis of NATO's role in Afghanistan as CT (Rane, 2007) the NATO ISAF operation in Afghanistan was not a counter-terrorism one as such. NATO defines CT as 'all preventive, defensive and offensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property against terrorist threats and/or acts, to respond to terrorist acts. In the frame of the NATO Comprehensive Approach, this can be combined with or followed by measures enabling recovery after terrorist acts'.[26] AJP-3.4.4, the NATO COIN doctrine, defines an insurgency as 'the actions of an organised, often ideologically motivated group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focussed on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion.' It goes on to refer to COIN as 'the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities' which 'aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances'.[27] Terrorism may be a tactic utilised by an insurgency,

[25] Operation Enduring Freedom became Operation Freedom's Sentinel on 1st January 2015.
[26] *Military Committee Concept for Counter-Terrorism MC 0472/1,* 6th January 2016.
[27] *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, AJP-3.4.4,* para 0109. The origins of this definition can be seen in the five principles developed by Sir Robert Thompson (1972): 1) Clear political aim; 2) operate in accordance

and, as such, CT represents a tactical component of COIN. COIN, however, also has a wider spectrum of responses and failure to engage across it can mean any mission struggles to achieve its objectives (Noetzel and Schreer, 2009b). Boyle (2010) has, however, questioned the mutually compatibility of the counterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, and that despite doctrinal conflation, the two strategies should not be seen as interchangeable.

David Kilcullen (2006; 2009; 2010) has had a significant influence on our understanding of COIN. Kilcullen's thinking is cited in numerous government documents (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2011; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2011; Schnaubelt, 2009), NATO Parliamentary Assembly reports (Mikser, 2011; Nolin, 2011), any number of the Afghanistan Index Reports, and the broader academic literature (Betz and Cormack, 2009; S. Griffin, 2011; Horowitz and Shalmon, 2009; Strachan, 2010; Tan, 2014; Ucko, 2008).[28] In 2006, as NATO assumed security responsibility for all of Afghanistan and was adapting to the resurgent Taliban offensive, Kilcullen introduced a three-pillar model of counter-insurgency at a US Government Conference in Washington[29]. These three pillars, as depicted in Figure 3.1, are security, political and economic. Crucially, each is equally weighted and needs adequate support to the operational objectives to minimise an insurgency threat.

with the law; 3) have an overall plan; 4) priority is to defeat political subversion, not defeat guerrillas militarily; 5) during the military campaign secure own base areas first (see S. Griffin, 2011, 324, especially fn 31).

[28] This is only a representative example. The Afghanistan Index is available at https://www.brookings.edu/afghanistan-index/ [accessed 30 Aug 2018].

[29] Alternative models such as the twin pillar conception put forward by D'Souza (2008, 869) have had negligible traction with decision-makers.



Figure 3.1. Model of Counter-Insurgency (Kilcullen, 2006, 4).

The influence of Kilcullen's model is evident in various key NATO and Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)[30] documents. The Afghanistan Compact, for example, is a central document aimed at delivering the Afghan National Development Strategy.[31] The Compact 'identifies three critical and interdependent areas of pillars of activity'; security; governance, rule of law and human rights; economic and social development.[32] It further asserts that 'security cannot be provided by military means alone. It requires good governance, justice and the rule of law, reinforced by reconstruction and development'.[33] The ISAF Strategic Vision, adopted at the Bucharest Summit, 2008, makes the same point, stating that 'there can be no lasting security without development and no development without security'.[34] Furthermore, AJP-3.4.4. formally codifies the inseparable

[30] GoIRA is also seen as an abbreviation in documents, however, GIRoA is the officially recognised NATO abbreviation in AAP-15 and hence its use in this thesis.
[31] Adopted at the London Conference, 31st January – 1st February 2006.
[32] *The Afghanistan* Compact, 2006, page 2.
[33] Ibid., page 3..
[34] *ISAF's Strategic* Vision, 2008, para 6.

and intersecting relationships between the three pillars as shown in Figure 3.2 and defined earlier in this section.



Figure 3.2. The COIN Operational Environment.[35]

The nature of the conflict which NATO became engaged in Afghanistan was unique and the precedents established, in recent military operations, were not necessarily conducive towards pursuing counter-insurgency. During the 1990s, a distinct post-Cold War trend emerged of low-intensity conflict[36] (van Creveld, 1991) and with it a greater potential for insurgencies to develop. The changing nature of conflict was quickly reflected in doctrine among the main military powers. This, however, took place in the guise of Operations Other Than War, which meant that COIN was underdeveloped as a doctrine when combat operations got underway in Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11 (see Eikenberry, 2013; Galula,

[35] Page 2-1 https://publicintelligence.net/nato-allied-joint-doctrine-for-counterinsurgency/ [accessed 17 Sept 2016].

[36] Imagine a sliding scale between peace and total war, where total war involves the full utilisation of the resources of a nation in pursuit of fighting that war. Low intensity conflict will appear somewhere between the two ends of the spectrum, thought the actual intensity of fighting and causalities taken can still be high. Examples, would include the British action in Sierra Leone, 1999, and the United States in Somalia, 1993.

2006; Romjue, 1997)[37]. NATO's doctrinal development was based on the PSO experience in the Balkans with AJP-3.4.1 being ratified in 2001. [38] As already noted, however, IFOR, SFOR or KFOR were not counter-insurgency missions. In Afghanistan, therefore, the method of conducting operations, and the strategy, doctrine and tactics that support them, was substantially different to NATO's previous experience of PSO. NATO's role in ISAF has, therefore, to be considered a unique case and as such identifying benchmarks for assessment is ostensibly subjective.

Adaptation

The thesis takes as its starting assumption that in NATO adaptation has taken place.[39] To fully understand adaptation in the context of the ISAF mission – how command was exercised and how the purpose of the mission changed over time – it is essential to engage in a diachronic analysis.[40] Taking a mere snapshot of NATO, at different times, for example, March 2003 and comparing it to NATO in September 2003,[41] does not allow for sufficient reflection on the trajectory of change in the fluid security environment evidenced in Chapter 1. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to consider NATO's adaptation within Afghanistan across a broad period of time. NATO's role in Afghanistan has been broken down into two phases (see Grenier, 2015, 47; Rynning, 2012, Ch. 3). The first considers the expanding role of the ISAF mission, from April 2003 until it obtained security responsibility for the entire country in 2006, and the initial counter-insurgency phase up until the announcement, by President Obama, 27th March 2009, of a new strategy for Afghanistan

[37] A possible explanation for the lack of consideration of COIN in the 1990s is the observation by Boot (2013), drawing on historical examples, that most insurgencies lose.
[38] *Peace Support* Operations *AJP 3.4.*1, 2001.
[39] Not least as various official documents highlight the changing nature of the mission and the problems associated with it. For example, the House of Commons Defence Committee Report, *Operations in Afghanistan HC554*, July 2011.
[40] As demonstrated in Chapter 2.
[41] One month before the decision to place NATO in command of ISAF (April 2003) and one month after assuming formal command of the mission (August 2003).

and Pakistan (AfPak); the implementation of which led to a surge in troop numbers (Ahmad, 2010; Baker, 2009). The second phase concerns the struggle for detachment and the transition toward termination of the ISAF mission on 31st December 2014.[42] Thereafter, NATO in the guise of Operation Resolute Support, has moved away from COIN to support of Afghan security forces. That departure, therefore, takes the mission out of the frame of reference of this chapter.

Identifying the initial phase as distinct is uncontroversial as it represents the establishment of ISAF's countrywide mission and coincided with an upsurge of the Taliban insurgency from 2006. The delineation of the second and third time frames is more open to question. The surge was based on an assessment by the new ISAF Commander, General Stanley McChrystal. On 30th August 2009 McChrystal requested forty-four thousand extra US troops[43] plus ten thousand more from NATO members.[44] Importantly, the increase in troop numbers had transitional arrangements built into it the policy by the time it was announced in December 2009 which led to a commitment to begin a transition to Afghan leadership no later than July 2011.[45] As such the surge, which lasted for the period 2009 to 2011, is the beginning of the transitional arrangements and the strategy of detachment, especially given the diachronic nature of analysis being offered by this thesis.

[42] The ending of the ISAF mission did not end the involvement of NATO in Afghanistan as ISAF was succeeded by Resolute Support, which began on 1st January 2015, website available at http://www.rs.nato.int/ [accessed 30 Aug 2018].
[43] *COMISAF's Initial Assessment*, 30th August 2009.
[44] The extra NATO troops had already been suggested by McChrystal's predecessor General McKieran, see Daniel Nasaw and Peter Walker's 21st September 2009 article in The Guardian, 'White House says no decision made on more troops for Afghanistan'.
[45] *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US* Policy, 2017, page 26.

The Expansion of ISAF's role in Afghanistan

The principal basis for defining the criteria by which ISAF operated was the Military Technical Agreement (ISAF MTA),[46] derived from UNSCR 1328 and the Bonn Agreement. The MTA established tight geographic confines for ISAF, as illustrated in Figure 3.3, which defined the scope of ISAF as the 'Area of Responsibility (AOR) […] marked out on the map attached at Annex B'.[47] Furthermore, the ISAF MTA established that the mission was to assist the Interim Authority (IA) 'in the maintenance of the security in the area of responsibility'[48] but that the ultimate responsibility for 'the provision of security and law and order'[49] would fall on the IA. The potential for further expansion of the mission, however, was included within Article IV, which allowed the ISAF Commander 'the authority, without interference or permission, to do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the ISAF and its mission.'[50] It also noted that 'ISAF will have complete and unimpeded freedom of movement throughout the territory and airspace of Afghanistan'.[51]

[46] The MTA is more than the rules of engagement for NATO military operations, for instance, it defines the relationship between the Afghan provisional authorities and the Alliance with areas of responsibility demarcated.
[47] *ISAF* MTA, 2002, Article I Para 4g.
[48] *ISAF* MTA, 2002, Article I Para 2.
[49] *Ibid.,* Article III Para 1.
[50] *Ibid.,* Article IV Para 2.
[51] Ibid., Article IV Para 3.



Figure 3.3. ISAF Area of Operations – August 2003.[52]

Two connected observations are evident in relation to the ISAF MTA. First, was the contradiction between the IA for the responsibility for security and the unrestricted ability of the ISAF Commander to take whatever action s/he deemed necessary. Second, was the difference between the ISAF MTA and previous MTAs in the former Yugoslavia, such as the Kosovo Military Technical Agreement (KFOR MTA). When drawn up, the KFOR MTA was concerned primarily with a timeline for the withdrawal of Former Republic of Yugoslavia forces and, related, monitoring and ensuring compliance with that schedule. [53] Essentially,

[52] Ibid., Annex B
[53] *KFOR* MTA, 199, Appendix B Para 4a.

the KFOR MTA aimed at compliance by punishment and was a response to a clearly defined threat. The ISAF MTA provided for whatever the ISAF Commander deems necessary to ensure the security of the AOR, including operations outside of the AOR. The ISAF MTAs was thus a much broader document than the KFOR MTA. The ISAF MTA was without a defined threat or an accompanying defined escalatory response to a given threat. As such, it reflected the post-Cold War shift of NATO towards a risk management institution (Coker, 2002; Wallander and Keohane, 1999). Given these provisions, the expansion of the ISAF mission beyond its initial remit was inevitable if the security situation in Afghanistan happened to deteriorate.

The aim of operations in Afghanistan varied throughout the course of the conflict. The initial American Operation Enduring Freedom focussed on liberating Afghanistan from Taliban control to deny Al Qaeda sanctuary (Gerges, 2011; Innes, 2007). Removing the Taliban from power was a clear measurable military objective that was attained quickly and enabled the Bonn Agreement to be signed. Grenier (2015, 50) asserts that post-Bonn the operational environment in Afghanistan was geared towards 'long-term nation-building efforts' but that 'little strategic guidance' was provided on the new policy; this left American 'military and diplomatic officials to figure it out on their own'.

The inaugural NATO ISAF Commander, Lt Gen Götz Gliemeroth, asserted that 'the ISAF mission remains firmly anchored in the UN Security Council Resolutions and the Bonn Agreement'.[54] The expansion of the ISAF mission, thus depended on UNSCR. ISAF took over security responsibility for the whole of Afghanistan in incremental stages, as shown in Figure 3.4. The expansion began in the North in December 2003; expansions to the West, South and East of the country were subsequently completed by October 2006.[55] The broad

[54] *NATO Starts Deploying First Troops to Kabul,* Press Release #010703.
[55] The expansion took place in line with the Afghanistan Compact agreed in London in February 2006.

scope of the ISAF MTA enabled NATO to move into the South and East of Afghanistan, and to engage an evolving enemy outside the initial remit of stabilisation. The drivers behind the expansion stemmed from the IA, which had 'indicated a willingness to see a greater NATO involvement',[56] and seen as demonstrating 'NATO's long-term commitment to stability and security'.[57] NATO, therefore, anticipated a role in Afghanistan over a prolonged period.

Figure 3.4. ISAF Expansion 2003-2006.[58]

In practice, the expansion of the ISAF mission involved NATO assuming command and responsibility of the various Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and incorporating them into five Regional Command's (RC). Each RC corresponded to the respective stage of ISAF expansion, from the initial deployment to Kabul RC(C) through to RC(E) in the East. Figure

[56] *RHQ AFNORTH Operational Level HQ for ISAF*, Press Release #220503.

[57] *NATO Starts Deploying First Troops to Kabul*, Press Release #010703.

[58] Image reproduced from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/image_data/file/19995/ISAF_expansion_map_960x640.png [accessed 30 Aug 2018].

3.5 illustrates the location of the RCs and PRTs in January 2007 and the lead countries in each PRT. With the greatly increased scope of ISAF so the number of troops under ISAF command increased - from 5,000 in August 2003[59] to 35,460, with 37 member and partner nations, by January 2007.[60]

Figure 3.5. ISAF Regional Commands and PRT Locations - 29th January 2007.[61]

Towards the end of the expansion process it became evident that the Taliban was not a defeated entity but rather had regrouped. It was, moreover, responsible for an increasingly harmful insurgency. ISAF casualties rose from four in 2001 to one hundred and fifty four in 2006, with most of the increase occurring in RC(S) and RC(E) – eighty five and fifty seven respectively.[62] The ISAF mission thus shifted in priority from a focus on reconstruction towards COIN. That shift marked the next phase of NATO's transformation illustrating how it was able to adapt to an exogenous shock and so coordinate the first multi-national COIN

[59] *Afghan Index*, 23rd February 2005.
[60] *ISAF Placemat*, 29th January 2007.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Data originates from http://icasualties.org/oef/byprovince.aspx [accessed 30 Aug 2018].

mission in its history. This reorientation of the ISAF mission moved NATO from a support to a lead role in Afghanistan (see Rane, 2007).

The COIN aspect of the ISAF mission has attracted a high volume of comment and critique (see D'Souza, 2008; Kay and Khan, 2007; Orr, 2009). The purpose of this thesis is not to provide analysis of the success or failure of the COIN operation as such but rather to judge how far COIN is evidence of NATO transformation. Therefore, it is possible to view the COIN mission as a failure but the transformation a success, and vice-versa, or indeed, both as successes or failures. The transition of the Alliance into a lead role in an out-of-area counter-insurgency operation is significant, but it remains clear that NATO was not able to deal effectively with an insurgency as it expanded to take responsibility for security in the whole of Afghanistan. As D'Souza (2008, 856) has observed the 'absence of a unified COIN strategy, lack of coordination in aid distribution, and minimal measures to strengthen the role of the Afghan government remain[ed] the principal problems impeding the international effort'.[63]

The Alliance had to move beyond being a 'coalition enabler' to implementing 'procedures and capabilities that support accelerated decision cycles'.[64] How accelerated decision cycles can be implemented in an Alliance which has consensus at the core of its decision making process has yet to be resolved (W. Clark et al., 2016; Rumsfeld, 2011), and has led to analysis that consensus is a strategic liability, specifically in Afghanistan (Kay and Khan, 2007). That the Alliance only had a rudimentary CT operational policy and prior to 2008 no

[63] In late 2006, when NATO assumed responsibility for providing security and delivering the ISAF mission across the whole of Afghanistan, the primary public strategic document for guidance was *NATO's Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism*, endorsed at the Prague Summit, 2002. The issue of NATO doctrine, and the lack of a specific COIN doctrine, will be explored in greater depth in analysis of the effectiveness pillar. Classified documents, such as *MC 400/1*, *MC 400/2*, and *MC 400/3* would have provided guidance for the conduct of operations at this time.

[64] *NATO's Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism*, 2003.

COIN documents[65] (explored in greater depth below by reference to effectiveness) perhaps goes some way to explaining the initial problems the Alliance encountered when faced with a growing Taliban insurgency from late 2005 onwards.

The Struggle for Detachment

NATO's Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan, agreed at the Bucharest Summit, 2008, is a classified document which incorporates the principles of the Comprehensive Approach[66] into NATO's ISAF mission. 'According to State Department and NATO officials, [the] document provide[d] broader political objectives for the NATO alliance in Afghanistan and establishe[d] a framework for measuring those objectives'.[67] The political elements of the plan aligned with NATO's COIN doctrine, which states that a requirement for initiating a COIN mission is that 'a clearly defined and achievable political objective must be established'.[68] In Afghanistan, however, NATO entered the conflict by assuming a limited geographic role, based around Kabul, in a situation that was more focused on development and prior to the Taliban insurgency taking hold. The mission developed from the initial conception of 'the ISAF stability mission'.[69]

The 2011 House of Commons Defence Committee report into operations in Afghanistan highlighted the changing nature of the campaign objectives as being problematic, especially in RC(S).[70] A 2006 House of Commons report identified the purpose of the ISAF mission as

> Prevent[ing] Afghanistan reverting to [an] ungoverned space which could harbour terrorism; [to] build security and Government institutions so that the progress of

[65] *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency AJP-3.4.4* was introduced in November 2008 and updated in February 2011. This was not a unique position, at the start of 2006 even the United States had not updated its COIN doctrine since Vietnam (Barno, 2007).
[66] The Comprehensive Approach is examined in detail by the House of Commons Defence Committee 2010 report *HC 224 The Comprehensive* Approach and reference is also made in *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency AJP-3.4.4*, 2011, chapter 1.
[67] *Strategic Framework* – Afghanistan GAO-10-655R, 15th June 2010.
[68] *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency AJP-3.4.4*, para 0334 page 3-20.
[69] House of Commons Defence Committee 2007 Report *HC408 UK Operations in Afghanistan*, page 8.
[70] House of Commons Defence Committee Report, *Operations in Afghanistan HC554*, 2011.

> recent years becomes irreversible, and to enable eventual international disengagement; and, support efforts to counter the growth of narcotics production and trafficking.[71]

While a 2011 House of Commons report states that the ISAF mission,

> conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency; support growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable by the population.[72]

The 2006 statement of ISAF mission focused on what the international community thinks it could do to help Afghanistan, whilst the 2011 statement was much more about how the Afghans could be empowered to assume responsibility for their own security. As such it embraced McChrystal's initial assessment of 2009 and it appeared indicative of a unified approach.

Testimony provided by senior American figures, such as Robert Gates,[73] Ambassador Eikenberry,[74] and General Petraeus,[75] however, demonstrated that the United States saw operations in Afghanistan as focussed on the destruction of Al Qaeda which was to be 'achieved by removing the Taliban and denying shelter to Al Qaeda'.[76] Given that these statements were made after McChrystal's reinvigoration of COIN and the launch of Obama's AfPak strategy, questions remain regarding the degree of commonality, especially at the political level. The converse appears to be true at the operational level, with widespread understanding of the primary elements that a counter-insurgency mission required, and how the insurgency in Afghanistan differed from previous COIN experience.

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[71] House of Commons Defence Committee Report, *The UK Deployment to Afghanistan HC558*, 2006.
[72] House of Commons Defence Committee Report, *Operations in Afghanistan HC554*, 2011, page 16.
[73] *Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 3rd December 2009.
[74] *Statement of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 9th December 2009.
[75] *Statement of General David H. Petraeus Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 9th December 2009.
[76] *Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 3rd December 2009.

General McChrystal, in testimony on 8th December 2009 before the Senate, stated that unlike many historic insurgencies the Taliban did not have popular support, though he acknowledged the complex and resilient nature of the insurgency.[77] McChrystal's testimony implies that if popular support was present then the Taliban insurgency would have a greater chance of success, hence, ensuring that the Taliban did not gain popular support, or the perception of doing so, became central to the objectives of ISAF. Despite, the objectives of the ISAF mission, that NATO endorsed by assuming the lead role, being established prior to the implementation of the COIN mission, defined and achievable political objectives were not clear. A disconnect is evident between the political desire to ensure the destruction of Al Qaeda, military aspects of the COIN mission, and supporting the Afghan government via a political strategy of national reconciliation. This deficiency helps to explain why NATO had difficulty in engaging the transition process and detaching from combat operations.

The expanded role of the ISAF mission coupled with the changed nature of the conflict which led to a lack of clearly defined goals for the mission ensured that mission creep took hold (see Armstrong, 2006; Etzioni, 2011; Riley-Smith and Day, 2016). The original ISAF mission envisaged a limited role for combat troops with the focus on the promotion of security by stabilisation and implementing developmental goals, whilst the adaptation in COIN phase of the conflict placed greater emphasis on the military aspects of security provision (see Chaudhuri and Farrell, 2011; Eikenberry, 2013; S. Griffin, 2011; Noetzel and Schreer, 2009b; Schreer, 2012).

The essential document in understanding the adaptation made by NATO to the ISAF mission in order to enable detachment and the transition to Afghan National Security

[77] *Statement of General Stanley McChrystal Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee,* 8thDecember 2009.

Forces (ANSF) primacy is General McChrystal's[78] *COMISAF's Initial Assessment*, 30th August 2009. That document signified not only a change in strategy to defeat the insurgency but also established the importance of the ANSF assuming security responsibility. It, therefore, provided significant evidence of adaptation. McChrystal summarises the position,

> The key take way from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and way that we think and operate.
>
> NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) requires a new strategy that is credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans. This new strategy must also be properly resourced and executed through an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign that earns the support of the Afghan people and provides them with a secure environment.
>
> To execute the strategy, we must grow and improve the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and elevate the importance of governance. We must also prioritize resources to those areas where the population is threatened, gain the initiative from the insurgency, and signal unwavering commitment to see it through to success. Finally, we must redefine the nature of the fight, clearly understand the impacts and importance of time, and change our operational culture.[79]

When NATO assumed command of ISAF, in 2003, the mission was primarily focused on providing broad guidance to individual national operations engaged in stabilisation efforts across the country, and a small-scale security function around the capital Kabul. By early 2009 a sustained insurgency had taken hold with 'rising violence and sense of insecurity… fatalistic pessimism, as though the fight were over, the effort failed' (McChrystal, 2013, 632). The ISAF mission focus shifted away from stabilisation to COIN to fulfil the mandate of the UN to enhance the security of Afghanistan, and the legitimacy of the Afghan Government. How this adaptation - involving a full range of stakeholders, as depicted in Figure 3.6 - was possible will be explored in the next sections of institutionalisation and

[78] ISAF Commander 15th June to 2009 to 23rd June 2010 who resigned following critical remarks of the Obama administration published in Rolling Stone, 'The Runaway General', June 2010.
[79] *Ibid.*, page 1-1.

effectiveness. The intricacies of involving the different actors, as presented by General McChrystal and identified in Figure 3.6, provides significant explanatory power to understanding how the nature of the COIN mission had morphed away from military concerns.



Figure 3.6. Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics.[80]

[80] *Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan*, 2009. Briefing delivered by General McChrystal shortly after taking command of ISAF.

Institutionalisation

In this section the second pillar of the transformation model, institutionalisation, will be considered. The three markers – commonality, specificity and, differentiation – will each be analysed in turn. Commonality refers to shared expectations of appropriate behaviour, specificity examines the presence of specific and enduring rules, whilst differentiation refers to the ability of an organisation to allocate roles to different members (Wallander and Keohane, 1999, 24). Evidence in each of these markers supports a conclusion that the Alliance has undergone a process of institutionalisation consistent with the transformation model.

To fully explore the process of institutionalisation in ISAF's COIN mission, it is necessary to place the changes within the wider context of Alliance transformation, as demonstrated in Chapter 1. The Alliance-wide process of institutionalisation, in relation to the new post-Cold War security environment, began with the Rome Declaration,[81] 1991. It was reinforced at the Oslo Ministerial,[82] 1992, and gathered further momentum at the Madrid Summit in 1997.[83] This process saw an overhaul of NATO's command structure at the strategic level, with Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation replacing Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic.[84] The operational level, meanwhile, saw an overhaul of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), giving rise to the structure that was in place in 2006, as the ISAF mission expanded to the whole of Afghanistan. The streamlining of the Alliance's command structure, as analysed in Chapter 1, was designed to give NATO increased operational flexibility to meet its declared security

[81] *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, 1991.
[82] *Final Communique Foreign Ministers Meeting*, Oslo June 1992.
[83] The Summit website is available at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970708/home.htm [accessed 30 Aug 2018].
[84] The Command Structure had already slimmed down to two commands, from three, following the end of the Cold War.

functions, specifically crisis management, as formally confirmed in the 1999 Strategic Concept.[85] NATO's role in the ISAF mission, therefore, had to be justified in relation to 'enhanc[ing] the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area'.[86]

Commonality

The institutionalisation marker of commonality 'refers to the degree to which expectations about appropriate behaviour are shared by participants' (Wallander and Keohane, 1999, 24). The polar opposite to commonality is individuality (Gotti, 2009). If the member states of NATO lacked commonality then not only is the ability of the Alliance to generate consensus questionable, but so too is the ability of NATO to maintain unity of effort across the operational spectrum (D'Souza, 2008). The previous section on adaptation has illustrated how the nature of the ISAF mission changed over time. Under commonality, the, understanding of the COIN mission will be explored on two levels. The first concerns national perspectives and doctrinal developments. The second, is whether the NATO allies accepted that the ISAF mission contributed to security in the Euro-Atlantic area in strategic terms. Strategy refers to the approach adopted to achieve the objective, whilst doctrine concerns how the application of military force is utilised (Carr, 2000; Freedman, 2013; Kinross, 2004).

In this context commonality is evident between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. As Rid and Keaney (2010, 3) note, these countries have the 'most significant land forces in NATO' and provided the biggest contributions to ISAF, especially in the post-2009

[85] *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, 1999, para 10. Although this role begins with *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, 1991, it was not until the 1999 document that the security task becomes formally codified as an Alliance function, though it is *Active Engagement, Modern* Defence, 2010, page 7, that positions crisis management as a core task of the Alliance.

[86] *The Alliance's Strategic* Concept, 1999, para 10. Although, Afghanistan is not in the Euro-Atlantic area evidence will be provided that demonstrates the consensus opinion of the Alliance was that operations in Afghanistan would enhance Euro-Atlantic security.

environment. Furthermore, the United Kingdom, United States, and France are the NATO members with substantive prior experience of COIN operations. Germany, despite its military legacy does not have a history of COIN and is indicative of a contrary thinking within NATO about what ISAF entailed. Although Germany did contribute troop numbers on a par with France. The omission, of more active partners in actual operations, such as Canada,[87] Poland, or indeed non-members such as Australia, is, therefore, justified.

Reviewing the doctrinal developments and defence policies, the analysis shows that both American and British understanding of COIN, at the onset of the ISAF mission, were heavily influenced by Kitson (1971; 1977), Galula (2006), and Thompson (1972) (see Crane, 2010).[88] The British Army Field Manual[89] is clear that 'there has never been a purely military solution' and that the doctrinal 'constant is the fact that insurgency and counter insurgency are essentially about the battle to win and hold popular support, both at home and in the theatre of operations'. The clear linkage between Kitson (1971, 165), who stated 'the use of force will do more harm than good' unless it is clearly directed to the overall strategic aim of maintain popular support, and the influence on British thinking is evident.

The United States main doctrinal manual, for counter-insurgency, at the onset of the ISAF mission was *FM 3-0 Operations*.[90] Though as Crane (2010, 59) highlights the publication only devoted one page to counter-insurgency and the Army training schools had been instructed in the mid-1970s to throw away all counter-insurgency files after Vietnam Barno (2007). Thompson (1972, 111-114) introduced a four stage operational concept - clearing,

[87] Canada has very close parallels to the United States and United Kingdom in terms of commonality and doctrinal heritage.
[88] Conrad Crane was the lead author for the revised US Counterinsurgency manual released in December 2006.
[89] *Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines),* 2001, page B-3-1. The manual was updated in 2007 to include operations from Iraq and Afghanistan before a full rework for 2009.
[90] *FM 3-0 Operations,* 2001.

holding, winning, won - which along with the influence of Galula (2006), was tweaked to 'the current COIN strategy often referred to as "clear, hold, and build"'[91] that formed the basis of *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations* introduced by the US military in 2006.[92] NATO, in its inaugural 2008 COIN doctrine, added the additional layer of shape before clear, hold and build. The main military contributors to ISAF, the United States and the United Kingdom, therefore, can be shown to have commonality in understanding of what a COIN operation entailed, which influenced NATO doctrinal development.

The French approach to COIN drew on a different conceptualisation. Galliéni is the main doctrinal influence for the French (see de Durand, 2010). Galliéni's concept, is ostensibly similar to those already mentioned, and focused on garnering 'political support through social and administrative work at the local level [which] makes it possible to achieve enduring success at the tactical military level' (de Durand, 2010, 13). The operational principle for achieving the aim, however, differed as Galliéni advocated the concept of 'the oil spot, which consists of progressively gaining territory in the front only after organizing and administering it in the rear' (de Durand, 2010, 13). The French, therefore, did not conceptualise COIN as a sequential process, as evident in the doctrines adopted by the United States, the United Kingdom and, ultimately, NATO, but rather a dynamic, integrated approach in which different types of mission would operate simultaneously. In other words, shape, clear, hold and, build is happening at the same time, rather than in separate distinct phases of a COIN operation. Whilst the French conception had less of direct influence on NATO doctrinal development, it did influence early operations during the transition of ISAF from a stability to a COIN mission, most notably in the 'Platoon House'[93] strategy utilised by

[91] *Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,* 2008, page 6.
[92] *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations*, 2006. The updated British *Army Field Manual*, 2009, is also rooted in these same principles.

[93] Platoon House was a term introduced by a military spokesperson to describe small fortified bases that allowed the British to have a diverse presence across Helmand during *Operation Herrick,* notably in towns such

the British in Helmand, beginning with Operation Achilles and ending with the Battle of Musa Qala. Daniel Marston (2008) has argued that the primary reason for the British deviation from their own doctrine was due to political considerations[94] and 'there is a general consensus that the prosecution of the campaign in Helmand has not been ideal' (King, 2010).

The German position, supported by Italy and Spain, was that the focus of COIN should be on stabilisation operations and that the 'ISAF force posture should be based on a neutral military presence' (Noetzel, 2010, 46). Such an understanding of the ISAF mission was at odds with the United Kingdom, United States, and France, raising questions of whether a commonality of purpose within clearly defined mission parameters[95] was, in fact, evident. Lindley-French (2013, 121) has argued that this lack of a shared view in meant the European nations, apart from Britain, supplied minimal troops 'as an obligation to an ally rather than a NATO operation vital to their own security and defence'. In Lindley-French (2013, 121) view, operations in Afghanistan, until 2010, were viewed by the European powers as part of a 'Bosnia Plus' approach, in other words, primarily as a peace support operation backed up by the occasional deployment of military force for enforcement. Thus, a full-scale COIN operation was not in line with the expectations of certain European allies. Indeed 'France, Germany, and Spain, expressed concerns over the potential use of ISAF troops in combat situations rather than peacekeeping' (Youngs, 2005, 23). Therefore, despite the French understanding of the requirements of a COIN mission a degree of

as *Musa Qala* and *Sangin*. The effectiveness of this strategy has been questioned as it negated the ability of the British to concentrate force at a decisive point, whilst handing that advantage to the insurgents (See Egnell, 2011; Farrell, 2010; Farrell and Gordon, 2009; C. Griffin, 2013).

[94] On arriving in *Lashkar Gar*, April 2016, the governor of Helmand, Mohammed Daoud, presented the scenario of Taliban's advances throughout the region and immediate deployment was required to secure various settlements. As a result, the British force was thinly spread and ineffective (see King, 2010; Marston and Malkasian, 2008, Ch 12).

[95] *Peace Support* Operations *AJP-3.4.1*, 2001, para 0205, identifies the establishment of clear goals as key to mission success.

reluctance to participate in such a mission was evident. Though, as Noetzel (2010, 57) notes, in the case of Germany, despite the political focus of Germany on stabilisation,

> the deteriorating security situation is generating German counterinsurgency doctrine from the bottom up. Commanders returning from service in Afghanistan are pushing for the institutional army to deal with the new operational realities. As a result of this, gradually, there is a recognition that German politics will have to adapt the Bundeswehr to unconventional warfare.

NATO functions by developing formally declared positions, via the consensus of its member states. The formal position of the Alliance is expressed in Summit Declarations. The lack of any explicit mention of the COIN mission in the formal outcomes of the Riga Summit,[96] 2006, the Bucharest Summit,[97] the 2008, Strasbourg/Kehl Summit,[98] 2009, or the Lisbon Summit,[99] 2010, suggests that consensus was absent within the Alliance. Given the conflicting positions presented throughout this section it is unsurprising that consensus was lacking on the strategy to achieve the objectives of ISAF. What is evident is that consensus was reached on the importance of operations in Afghanistan for Euro-Atlantic security.

Despite this lack of consensus on COIN in formal summit declarations there is evidence of alignment with the principles of COIN. The previous section on adaptation established that the purpose of a COIN mission is 'to defeat insurgency' and address any core grievances' and consists of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil, and psychological components.[100] The Riga Summit Declaration[101] makes several statements

[96] The summit website is available at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2006/0611-riga/index.htm [accessed 30 Aug 2018].
[97] The summit website is available at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2008/0804-bucharest/index.html [accessed 30 Aug 2018].
[98] The summit website is available at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2009/0904-summit/index.html [accessed 30 Aug 2018].
[99] The summit website is available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/events_66529.htm?selectedLocale=en [accessed 30 Oct 2018].
[100] *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency AJP-3.4.4*, 2011, para 0109.
[101] *Riga Summit* Declaration, 2006, para 3 to 10.

that align with each of these components of a COIN mission. The Bucharest Summit Declaration[102] goes further and states that,

> Euro-Atlantic and wider international security is closely tied to Afghanistan's future as a peaceful, democratic state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism. For that reason, our UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, currently comprising 40 nations, is our top priority.

The Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration[103] states that NATO 'security is closely tied to Afghanistan's security and stability', with the Lisbon Summit Declaration[104] again stating that 'Afghanistan's security and stability are directly linked with our own security'. From the outset, therefore, of ISAF assuming responsibility for security in the entirety of Afghanistan, in 2006, and throughout the transition to a COIN mission and beyond, we can assert that at the doctrinal level the components of a COIN mission were understood - as declared consensus of the Alliance, even if not formally stated as being a COIN mission - and that the relationship between European security and Afghanistan's security was unequivocal.

Commonality at the strategic level of analysis refers to how well the individual participants in the ISAF mission understood the requirements of the mission. NATO had engaged in combat operations to support a UN mandate in the former Yugoslavia, however, the different nature of a COIN mission means that contributors to ISAF may not have fully understood what was expected, either in terms of the type of day to day operations, the troop requirements, or the expected casualty levels. How to explore these factors within commonality is open to challenge, especially given the change of mission parameters during the life cycle of the ISAF mission. To avoid substantive crossover, therefore,

[102] *Bucharest Summit* Declaration, 2008, para 6.
[103] *Strasbourg/Kehl Summit* Declaration, 2009, para 9.
[104] *Lisbon Summit* Declaration, 2010, para 4.

although areas such as troop commitments and caveats could be incorporated within the commonality marker, they have a much closer alignment with the effectiveness markers, where they will be the subject of inquiry. The substantive difference between NATO's ISAF and KFOR/SFOR/IFOR mission is that, although the force posture for the missions all involved deployment of the full spectrum of force capabilities, kinetic operations in the former Yugoslavia only involved aerial combat. ISAF, especially after the transition to a COIN mission involved ground forces as the primary combat element of the mission. COIN, furthermore 'is different from conventional combat'.[105]

Just as the Bucharest Summit provided key information regarding the strategic level, the same can said for the operational level. The Bucharest Summit, 2008, introduced the ISAF Strategic Vision[106] which provided an overall framework for COIN operations, and the Comprehensive Strategic Political Plan which provided 'broader political objectives for the NATO alliance in Afghanistan and establishes a framework for measuring those objectives'.[107] The specific operational plans that detailed the provision for COIN operations at this juncture were the NATO OPLAN (2005) and the ISAF OPLAN (2006).[108] Whilst the OPLAN documents remain classified the fact that they exist and were developed within the decision-making process at SHAPE is indicative of shared understanding, based on consensus, of the contributing nations to the requirements of a COIN mission. Such an interpretation is reinforced by publically available documents such as the *Tactical Directive*, December 2008, which stated that 'we are engaged in a counterinsurgency in an extremely demanding environment'.[109]

Despite differing national positions being evident, commonality has been demonstrated in

[105] *Tactical Directive*, 2009.
[106] *ISAF's Strategic Vision*, 2008.
[107] *The Strategic Framework for US Efforts in* Afghanistan, 2010, page 7.
[108] *The Strategic Framework for US Efforts in* Afghanistan, 2010, page 6-7.
[109] *Tactical* Directive, 2008, para 5.

understanding the importance of Afghanistan to Euro-Atlantic security. Furthermore, commonality of what a COIN mission entails has also been evidenced, although discrepancies exist between individual allies as to whether a COIN or stability mission was more appropriate to achieve peace and security in Afghanistan. The distinction between COIN and stabilisation, however, became a moot point after McChrystal's overhaul of COIN operations, in 2009, to include a much greater focus on non-military aspects of COIN. Following the shift in focus of COIN, commonality is evident in Alliance consensus exhibited in Summit Declarations. The *Lisbon Summit Declaration*, 2010, states that 'a new phase' is being entered in the ISAF mission and the 'process of transition to full Afghan security responsibility' is on track.[110] At the Chicago Summit, 2012, the declaration acknowledges that 'the irreversible transition of full security responsibility' is on track for completion by the end of 2014, with 75% of Afghanistan living 'in areas where the ANSF have taken the lead for security'.[111] The Chicago Summit also agreed that a continued training and assistance mission would continue after the end of the ISAF mission. The *Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan* affirmed the position of the Alliance to the ISAF successor mission, Resolute Support, an ongoing financial commitment to sustaining the ANSF, and the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership.[112] That NATO was able to incorporate different national positions, while developing consensus, is evidence of institutional commonality and the ability to engage in a transformative process.

Specificity

The institutional marker of specificity is the 'degree to which specific and enduring rules exist, governing practice of officials, obligations of states, [and] legitimate procedures for changing collective policy' (Wallander and Keohane, 1999, 24). Analysis of the degree of specificity in the transition of the ISAF mission from stabilisation to COIN, will focus on

[110] *Lisbon Summit* Declaration, 2010, para 4.
[111] *Chicago Summit Declaration*, 2012, para 5.
[112] *Wales Summit Declaration* on Afghanistan, 2014.

specific and enduring rules coupled with the obligations of states, consideration of how practice relates to COIN, and identifying the procedures for policy change.

NATO does not have any specific and enduring rules, as understood in the formal sense. The lack of a formal obligation to respond in Article V, only for an individual state to take 'such action as it deems necessary' which may or may not include the use of military force, exemplifies the point. The interpretation of Article V is specific, however, and has an unequivocal assumption that an attack on a NATO member will give rise to a unified military response. As such there is a clear distinction between Article V and Non-Article V Crisis Response Operations, even though both are governed by informal rules. There is no formal obligation for member states to participate in NA5CROs, defined as 'activities falling outside the scope of Article 5'.[113] The ISAF mission was undertaken as a NA5CRO and, therefore, the obligations of allies, are open to interpretation on a case by case basis.

NA5CROs have the potential to be involved in a wider range of operations, than a more military focussed Article V mission, including 'contributing to conflict prevention and resolution, and crisis management in the pursuit of declared Alliance objectives'.[114] The conduct of NA5CRO, however, 'may be as demanding and intense as Article 5 operations and could require the use of the complete array of the Alliance's assets and capabilities' hence 'the Alliance's ability to undertake NA5CROs must remain based on the same military capabilities required for Collective Defence operations'.[115] From NATO's perspective, therefore, the ability to conduct operations of differing scale and intensity exists with the organisational framework, which as part of an Allied Joint Publication represents the consensus view of the Alliance members.

The governing practice of officials relates to 'patterned actions that are embedded in

[113] *Non-Article V Crisis Response Operations AJP 3-4*, 2005, para 0102 b.1.
[114] *Ibid.*, para 0005.
[115] *Ibid.*, para 0006.

particular organized contexts and, as such, are articulated into specific types of action and are socially developed through learning and training' (Adler and Pouliot, 2011b, 5). The conceptual development of practice thus requires an action as a constitutive element of practice, and that the action undertaken is part of systemic organizational context, which may require learning and training, repeated over time and space (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a). With ISAF being the only instance of a multinational counterinsurgency operation taking place within an Alliance structure, the analysis has to focus on broader understandings of NATO, rather than specific practice within the temporal confines of the ISAF mission.

Officials, as COIN was led and most heavily influenced by the military on the ground, refers to the ISAF commanders. Limiting the analysis to the ISAF commanders allows for the mitigation of a number of potential spurious variables. After 2007 all the ISAF commanders were American, and thus had undergone the same general learning process - West Point, US Army War College and similar operational service experiences - that the differences between them may reflect change in the governing practice of NATO in response to the growing insurgency on the ground. Specifically, whether the ISAF commander was granted greater autonomy in order to influence operations on the ground.

To evidence specificity the intricacies of the governing practices of officials does not matter, if the ISAF commanders can all be shown to have been cut from the same cloth. All the ISAF commanders were the product of the Cold War. General Campbell, the latest to enter service, and the last commander of ISAF, began his Army career in 1979. At this time, and arguably still to the present day, the focus of understanding conflict and training the officer class, especially the command cadre - at West Point, Sandhurst, and the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr – was focussed on the Clausewitzian principle of applying superior firepower at the decisive point (Carr, 2000; F. Kaplan, 2013). Irregular warfare, or low-intensity conflict, was not taught in the military academies, did not exist in field manuals, was not practiced during drills or exercises (see van Creveld, 1991). Even

before the placement of an American general as ISAF commander, from 2007 onwards, therefore, the same core rationale and principles were being applied to the conduct of operations in Afghanistan. Although, F. Kaplan (2013) argues that the role of the commanders, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, was central to changing the American way of war, as Hastings (2012) emphasises the 'War Machine'[116] produced commanders as though off a production line.

NATO maintains a formal procedure for changing collective policy. At the strategic level the ability to change collective policy is reflected in the process of doctrine adoption and adjustment, highlighted in Chapter 1, and the formal codification of the consensus policy of the Alliance in Summit Declarations and other official documentation, such as the *ISAF Strategic Vision*.[117] The ISAF Strategic Vision delineates the transition, in terms of conceptual understanding of the Alliance members, from ISAF as a stabilisation mission to a counter-insurgency mission as it represents the consensus of member states, and de facto partners who chose to participate in ISAF. As such it establishes the general principles within which the countries participating in the ISAF mission would operate. Furthermore, The ISAF Strategic Vision reflects *MC 400/2, MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy*, particularly with regards to Essential Operational Capabilities.[118] MC 440/2 was the essential Alliance document for the imposition of military power.

As ISAF was a military operation if collective policy is interpreted more broadly as collective strategy then the role of the individual commander to initiate change is evident. McChrystal's Initial Assessment provides the best evidence of the ability to change how the Alliance approached the COIN component of the ISAF mission. McChrystal utilised lessons

[116] Taken from the title of 2017 film *War Machine* based on Hasting's book and produced by Netflix.
[117] *ISAF Strategic Vision,* 2008.
[118] *MC 400/2* remains a classified document but this statement with regards to its content is present in *Non-Article V Crisis Response Operations AJP 3-4,* 2005, para 0006.

learned from Operations in Iraq, under General Petraeus,[119] and implemented the Anaconda Strategy depicted in Figure 3.7. To complement the Initial Assessment and the Anaconda Strategy, McChrystal released *Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance*[120] to ensure that a standard approach to the conduct of operations was enforced throughout ISAF. On replacing McChrystal, Petraeus released a refined *Counterinsurgency Guidance*[121], which evidences the institutional role of the ISAF commander to change the nature of combat operations.

Figure 3.7. Anaconda Strategy vs Insurgents in Afghanistan.[122]

The objective behind this approach is evident in the revised *Tactical Directive*, issued in July 2009, and the explicit recognition that strategic victory would be achieved by separating 'insurgents from the centre of gravity – the people' and that NATO 'must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories – but suffering strategic defeats – by causing civilian casualties or

[119] Given the change in direction under McChrystal and the incorporation of Petraeus's model for COIN operations it is unsurprising that Petraeus succeeded McChrystal as ISAF Commander.
[120] *ISAF Commanders Counterinsurgency* Guidance, 2009.
[121] *COMISAF's Counterinsurgency* Guidance, 2010.
[122] available at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/6/6a/Anaconda_Strategy_vs_Insurgents_101020.jpg

excessive damage thus alienating the people'.[123] In other words, the focus on superior firepower, the product of practice, has been usurped.

Differentiation

The final marker of institutionalisation is differentiation - the ability of an organization to assign roles to its members. Indeed, the 'mark of an institution is that it organises and legitimises a division of responsibility, with different participants performing different functions' (Wallander and Keohane, 1999, 24). Mapping this conceptualisation onto ISAF the essential questions are: whether NATO directed its members towards a division of labour as a mission priority and, whether an adequate functional ability to organise that mission within the constraints of the national resources made available is evident. In the case of the ISAF mission, by exploring each question in turn, it is evident that NATO managed a diverse range of national interests and restrictions, caveats,[124] whilst maintaining the operational ability to conduct a COIN operation. That this is the case should not come as a surprise given the evidence of commonality earlier in this case study.

Substantive evidence of differentiation is found in NATO's use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the utilisation of the 'lead-nation' concept, whereby different countries assume the lead role in the provision of security tasks. Although, the use of PRTs for specific areas was already established prior to NATO assuming command responsibility of ISAF in 2003, the mechanism for expansion throughout the country was by incorporating regional PRTs into NATO's command framework (Farrell, 2017, 140-2). Furthermore, NATO maintained, and expanded, the PRT network throughout the ISAF mission, which reinforces the importance of non-military aspects of COIN and the objective – denying popular support to the Taliban – introduced by McChrystal.

[123] *Tactical Directive*, 2009.

[124] Whilst the existence of caveats is evidence of differentiation and managing resources, it is much more relevant to consider caveats within implementation than differentiation.

The Bonn Agreement, 2002, enshrined the 'lead-nation' concept that underpinned the strategic orientation of forces throughout the ISAF mission (Porter, 2015). The Agreement delineated five primary security roles that would be taken on by individual countries. The UK took responsibility for counter-narcotic efforts, the US for training the ANA, Germany for training the ANP, the Italians focused on judicial reform, whilst non-NATO member Japan agreed to lead efforts to disarm and reintegrate various Afghan militias. In operational terms, therefore, when NATO took over the ISAF mission in 2003, the allies already had organisational infrastructure, both military and civilian, in situ and were actively involved in carrying out security functions. As the ISAF mission expanded to assume greater security responsibility, the individual PRTs that each individual country had established were incorporated within the overall NATO command structure. Individual allies thus, had different security functions, within the ISAF mission, depending on where they were based and what parameters had been agreed for such deployment.

NATO went further and embraced the PRT system as a model for enhancing security in the whole country by developing new PRTs in regions where they were previously non-existent[125] The process of expansion involved the transition of the PRTs into NATOs command structure, as discussed in the adaptation section. Each PRT had a local command which was incorporated within a regional command structure, 'but' as the ISAF PRT Handbook explained even with a single command, achieving coherence among all 26 PRTs remain[ed] a challenge, if for no other reason than, as of March 2008, there are 14 different nations leading PRTs'.[126] At each level, local or regional, the allocation of tasks was via appointed national command responsibilities. Indeed, a 2008 report highlighted the

[125] A list of the PRTs in operation Nov 2010 is available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/prt/ [accessed 30 Aug 2018].
[126] *ISAF PRT Handbook Edition 4,* 2009, page 1.

'lack an overarching strategy, set of common objectives, and a common concept of operation and organizational structure', which was further compounded by a lack of agreed metrics for measuring success (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008, 5).[127]

The rationale for this diversity is to be found in the PRT Handbook, which emphasised that the individual nations responsible for running each PRT had operational flexibility to incorporate national requirements and adapt to the specific environments they confronted.[128] As such, no two PRTs were the same whether in terms of the number of personnel attached, the organisational structure, or the operational roles undertaken (Eronen, 2008, 14-23). Information on the internal structure of national PRTs is difficult to pin down and, hence, a comparative analysis is hard to find.[129] For the purpose of analysing institutionalisation, however, the substantive differences between national PRTs is tangential information. The fact that they operated within national parameters and had individual architecture is evidence of differentiation and NATO's institutional role in delivering the ISAF COIN mission.

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[127] The report examined PRTs both in Afghanistan and Iraq and presented these findings as general to both countries.

[128] *ISAF PRT Handbook Edition 4*, 2009.

[129] The notable exception is the United States, which has the most information easily accessible to the public, for example *Afghanistan PRT* Handbook, February 2011. With regards to funding, American PRTs were primarily supplied by Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) fund and tasks requiring attention were shared and assigned to different units or PRTs via the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE). A list of all projects, including cancelled projects, in RC(S) during the period 2008-2010, which shows how tasks were allocated is available at https://info.publicintelligence.net/RC-S.xls [accessed 30 Aug 2018]. A detailed example, A Nursing and Midwifery Institute in Kandahar at a cost of $2,696,000, of the process is available at https://projects.propublica.org/cerp/projects/651AE69F-DFA2-3175-CA4B3B17523BBDB2 [accessed 30 Aug 2018]. Furthermore, a report by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction identifies that during the period 2008-2010 $49 million, with almost $45 million of that allocated to roads, was allocated to 69 projects in Lagham Province, see *Commander's Emergency Response Program in Laghman Province Provided Some Benefits, but Oversight Weaknesses and Sustainment Concerns Led to Questionable Outcomes and Potential Waste*, 2011, page 4. The report also contains a detailed breakdown of projects undertaken, and ongoing, in the American led PRT. Although, funding was often mismanaged as highlighted by the Inspector General of the United States, see *Management Improvements Needed in Commander's Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan*, 2011.

The functional ability of the Alliance to organise the relevant national resources, including constraints, is provided by the ISAF command and control structure. Figure 3.8 shows the organisational structure of ISAF in 2008 which clearly indicates that at the tactical level the day to day running of operations in Afghanistan was subject to national chains of command. Farrell (2010, 584) highlights the diffuse nature of ISAF command as 'successive post-tour reports indicate that British task force commanders have never felt compelled to follow directives from COMISAF'. The picture that emerges is of NATO as an organisation seeking to provide strategic guidance at the political level, with only a minimal ability to influence day to day operations on the ground. Whilst such fluid command and control may well have impeded the effectiveness of operations it is evidence of differentiation. Furthermore, that the structure was able to change after 2009 and incorporate an Integrated Joint Command and the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A)[130] directly under COMISAF is evidence of institutionalisation more broadly.

[130] Endorsed on 12th June 2009 by the North Atlantic Council.



Figure 3.8. ISAF Organisational Structure 2008.[131]

Effectiveness

The final pillar in the transformation model is effectiveness. It is perhaps the most critical marker of transformation, for while adaption and institutionalisation may have taken place if effectiveness is not in evidence then the merits of pursuing the other two markers becomes questionable. Furthermore, effectiveness completes the transformation model and generates a positive feedback loop, which enables NATO to operate in an evolving security environment. As a military alliance, effectiveness, and the prospects for operational success are prevalent in Alliance thinking. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA), for example, concluded in 2004 that the principal consideration in expanding ISAF beyond the

[131] Taken from http://pom.peacebuild.ca/afghanistansource/orgchart_ISAF.jpg [accessed 30 Aug 2018].

area around Kabul was the likelihood of enhancing security and stability in the country, based on the success of ISAF so far.[132]

It is generally acknowledged that most insurgencies fail, primarily due to a loss of support from an alienated population, hence, the importance of the COIN strategy implemented by McChrystal to deny popular support to the insurgents (Boot, 2013). A number of studies have been undertaken that focus on measuring the effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations. A central aspect of each study, however, is that the measurements for the success of COIN are missing from doctrine and that conventional conflict measurements have been misappropriated when analysing an unconventional insurgency (see Fritz, 2008; Hayden, 2005; K. A. Johnson, 2009; Jones, 2006; Schroden, 2009). This inability to measure success can have a direct impact on the ability to alter policy and to apply lessons learned. Such practices are central to effectiveness. To ascertain the level of effectiveness of the COIN component of NATO's ISAF mission this section will analyse effectiveness in relation to three markers; implementation, compliance and persistence.

The evidence considered here suggests that NATO meets the criteria for effectiveness. Although, it should be noted that the degree of compliance with the ISAF mission differs according to how far individual allies were willing to embrace combat operations.

Implementation

A rich literature exists on how public policy is implemented, and the relationship between state and sub-state actors in the process (Howlett et al., 2009). The focus of the implementation debate can be split into three waves. The first focussed on failure to

[132] Lellouche, P. (2004) Operations in Afghanistan and the Expanding NATO Role. **158 DSC 04 E Rev. 1**,13th November, paras 15 to 21.

achieve intended objectives due to problems rooted in implementation (van Meter and van Horn, 1975); the second on the merits between top-down and bottom-up approaches, and the relationship to effectiveness (Lipsky, 2010; Sabatier, 1986); while the third wave examines implementation as a conscious choice of design to apply the institutional tools available (Barrett, 2004; Goggin et al., 1990).

Rosen (1991) argues that for change to occur in the implementation of a military mission, it can only be achieved from the top-down. Rosen's argument is based on Posen (1984) study of the sources of military doctrine in France, Britain, and Germany. The bottom-up approach is advanced by French (2011, Ch. 7) who describes the British Army as a forgetting organisation and that tactical adaption depends on battalion-level commanders. Farrell (2010) similar reflects on the ability of the differing units deployed to Afghanistan to adapt their core competencies to the environment in which they were operating. The challenge of the bottom-up advocates is that the military units deployed as part of ISAF adapted in spite of the lack of effective oversight by the NATO command structure. However, as J. A. Russell (2011) notes 'the process [of institutional change] began in what could be described as tactical, ad hoc adaption in which individual leaders reacted to local circumstances cycling through different ways of employing their units and equipment on the battlefield'. The absence of a COIN doctrine, or integrated command structure prior to 2009, did not hinder the adaption of conventional units to COIN. That the top-down approach lagged developments on the ground is unsurprising given Rosen (1991) observation that military innovation takes place during peacetime. That NATO developed doctrine, deployed an integrated command structure, and supported the reorientation of the strategic focus of the mission during an active insurgency, therefore, is abnormal, especially for a consensus-based organisation.

The ISAF mission in Afghanistan was carried out as a NA5CRO. The Riga Summit, 2006, saw NATO launch a new Comprehensive Approach (CA) strategy, which incorporated

NA5CROs, and aids the formulation of the COIN approach presented by McChrystal in Figure 3.6. NATO's website provides guidance by stating that 'the effective implementation of a comprehensive approach to crisis situations requires nations, international organisations and non-governmental organisations to contribute in a concerted effort'.[133] The overarching goal of the countries operating in Afghanistan was the defeat of Al Qaeda as a threat, and the removal of the Taliban from power in order to enhance security and prevent Al Qaeda from using Afghanistan as a base of operations. ISAF focussed on the later objective, as is evident from the NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting, on 8th December 2005, which provides the following security tasks for ISAF,

> Military:
>
> - Assisting the Afghan government in extending its authority across the country;
> - Conducting stability and security operations in co-ordination with the Afghan national security forces;
> - Assisting the Afghan government with the security sector reform process;
> - Mentoring and supporting the Afghan national army;
> - Supporting Afghan government programmes to disarm illegally armed groups.
>
> Supporting:
>
> - Afghan government and internationally-sanctioned counter-narcotics efforts within limits (NOT participating in poppy eradication or destruction of processing facilities or taking military action against narcotics producers);
> - On request, providing support to humanitarian assistance operations co-ordinated by Afghan government organisations.
> - Supporting the Afghan national police, within means and capabilities.[134]

These security tasks remained largely unaltered[135] for the duration of the ISAF mission and reflected the mandate of ISAF provided by UNSCR 1623.[136] UNSCR 1623 states,

> *Stressing also* the importance of extending central government authority to all parts of Afghanistan, of respect for democratic values, of full completion of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, of the disbandment of

[133] http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51633.htm [accessed 30 Aug 2018].
[134] *Revised Operational Plan for Expanding NATO's Mission in Afghanistan*, 18th January 2006.
[135] The exception being counter-narcotics where operations to eradicate poppy fields were taken, as discussed in Farmer, B. (2009) 'Britain to Continue Poppy Eradication in Afghanistan Despite US Reversal', The Daily Telegraph, 28th June.
[136] The initial mandate for ISAF was provided by UNSCR 1386 (2001) which since UNSCR 1444 (2002) had been renewed on a yearly basis. The yearly renewals continued until December 2014 when the ISAF mandate was formally removed by UNSCR 2189.

> illegal armed groups, of justice sector reform, of security sector reform including reconstitution of the Afghan National Army and Police, and of combating narcotics trade and production, and *recognizing* certain progress that has been made in these and other areas with the help of the international community.[137]

The substantive change that occurred in the implementation of ISAF objectives was the conceptualisation of how to achieve the security tasks. Prior to the incorporation of the CA, the focus for delivery of the ISAF mission separated security tasks into military and supporting activities, as evident in the initial objectives of 2005. This approach was deemed insufficient and the CA sought to bring closer integration between the military and non-military actors in Afghanistan. However, it was not until McChrystal's assessment that the principles of the CA were incorporated into 'a new strategy' described as 'credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans'.[138] Therefore, the assertion of Rosen (1991) that the primary driver of implementation, in a military situation, is supported by NATO's experience in Afghanistan.

The focus of implementation, thus shifted, post-2009, towards empowering the Afghans away from a tribal-based militia system of security to a centralised, and trained, army and police force. Popular support for the Taliban would, thereby, be limited. The Afghan militia numbered around 87,000 in September 2004 and had declined to 50,000 by December 2004. In the same period, there were only 4,500 ANA personnel on duty, out of a total trained number of 9,000. By the end of the ISAF mission, December 2014, the ANSF numbered around 330,000.[139] Just examining the raw numbers invokes a positive assessment of policy implementation after the parabolic shift following the 2009 strategic reorientation.

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[137] *UN Security Council Resolution 1623*, 2005. Emphasis as original.
[138] *COMISAF's Counterinsurgency* Guidance, 2010.
[139] Figures from *The Afghan* Index. Note that no claim is made as to the operational capability of the ANA, and the 2014 figures include Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior forces.

Prior to 2009 there was no effort to conduct stability and security operations in partnership with ANSF. Whilst this can be partly explained by the lack of training, a conscious choice was made to focus on the development of the ANSF in order to meet the stated ISAF objectives as part of the 2009 strategic reassessment process. Figure 3.9 shows the significant increases in partnership operations that enabled the majority of missions to be conducted under Afghan lead by 2013, a situation that was unthinkable prior to 2009. The success of this shift in focus can be clearly seen in the increase in the number of units ANA, and ANP, capable of operating independently in Figure 3.10, rising from 0 prior to 2011, to 35 by March 2013 for the ANA, and 141 for the ANP. Furthermore, the casualty levels indicated in Figure 3.11 demonstrates that the nature of operations that the ANSF took over were off a sufficient risk and not merely freeing up personnel behind the lines.

2007	2008	2009	2010	2012	2013
0%	0%	10%	70%	89%	25%

NOTE: 2012 number is a "past five months" figure ending March. During the same period, 42 percent of operations were Afghan led. By early 2013, 87% of all operations were Afghan led as the U.S. role quickly transitions to an advisory one with many units autonomous.

Figure 3.9. Afghan Army Unites Partnered with NATO Units.[140]

ANA

Army Kandaks	May-10	Jun-10	Aug-10	Sep-10	Nov-10	Jan-11	Feb-11	Apr-11	Jun-11	Aug-11	Oct-11	Dec-11	Feb-12	Oct-12	Mar-13
Unassessed	29	23	27	24	16	21	11	13	13	16	18	9	2	25	4
Newly Established	5	5	0	0	2	1	3	0	0	1	1	1	3	0	2
Developing	28	41	40	41	46	32	27	32	28	29	22	16	9	7	10
Effective w/ Assistance	24	37	40	39	35	58	64	55	61	58	56	63	55	22	16
Effective w/ Advisors	27	24	29	32	47	43	52	56	55	56	60	68	74	72	99
Independent w/ Advisors	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	7	13	20	35

ANP

Total Force	Apr-11	Aug-11	Jan-12	Oct-12	Mar-13
Unassessed	6	38	62	131	55
Newly Established	3	3	16	6	11
Developing	45	27	36	31	37
Effective w/ Assistance	79	70	102	61	91
Effective w/ Advisors	70	80	180	130	193
Independent	0	0	39	49	141

NOTE: In January 2011, there were 155 ratable Army Kandaks, 101 were rated in the top-3 tiers of readiness. By early 2012, there were 168 Army Kandaks with 127 rated in the top-3 tiers and 11 rated independent.

These assessments did cover all units through 2011. The "effective w/ assistance" category includes units with different levels of readiness.

Figure 3.10. Assessment Levels of Afghan National Security Forces.[141]

[140] Taken from *The Afghan Index*, 29th October 2014.
[141] Taken from *The Afghan Index*, 29th October 2014.

ANNUAL ESTIMATED TOTALS

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011**	2012**	2013***	2014*-*	2015
ANA	209	226	282	519	550	1,200	4,700	4,380	7,000
ANP	803	880	646	961	1,400	2,200			

Total ANSF Killed (2001-Feb 2014): 13,729 | **Total ANSF Wounded (2001-Feb 2014):** 16,511

NOTE: Figures from 2007 through mid-2009 provided by NATO-ISAF and differ from those published in a January 2009 report released by the U.S. Department of Defense. This report estimated 332 ANA fatalities and 692 ANP fatalities for 2007, with 2008 figures shown only through October 2008. Numbers for the second half of 2009 are estimated based on information from several sources. **2011 and 2012 (through end November) numbers are estimates based off of shorter reporting periods in each year. 2012 numbers are based off reports of monthly averages through November. An article by Rod Nordland in the New York Times on April 20, 2013 quoted an Afghan Ministry of Defense official noted that 1,183 ANA soldiers were killed in the year ending March 20, 2013 compared to 841 in the year ending the same date prior. ***According to the Afghan Defense Ministry, 276 soldiers were killed March 21 to June 11. We have used the average per day during that period to come up with a yearly estimate. War totals through March 2013 include the entire war as reported by Rod Nordland in the New York Times on March 3, 2014. *_* Through late October.

Figure 3.11. ANA and ANP Fatalities, January 2007-2015.[142]

Compliance

Consideration of the strategic triumvirate of ways, means and ends provides a framework for analysing the compliance of member states in achieving the ISAF objectives (Freedman, 2013). The mandate for ISAF was clear that a mission broader than a conventional military campaign was required. Furthermore, the importance of COIN was enhanced by UNSCR 1776[143] and 1833[144] (Sperling and Webber, 2018). Kay and Khan (2007, 163) argue that when NATO assumed security responsibility for the whole of Afghanistan in 2006 that 'expectations of success were not realistic'. NATO, moreover, had no prior institutional experience of COIN operations.[145] While Robert Gates (2014, 218) states that NATO did not embark on 'a fully-resourced counterinsurgency' operation until McChrystal became COMISAF in 2009. In strategic terms the means were insufficient to meet the ends. The question, thereby, in relation to compliance is whether the member states supplied adequate resources, both in terms personnel, finances, and the types of operations participated in.

[142] Taken from *The Afghan Index*, 31st October 2016.
[143] *UN Security Council Resolution 1676*, 2007.
[144] *UN Security Council Resolution 1833*, 2009.
[145] NATO had drawn up a COIN plan to assist in maintain public order during the 1967 coup in Greece, but the plan was not enacted. See (Couloubmis, 1983, 51).

As already stated, the ISAF mission was undertaken as a NA5CRO, which 'may be conducted by NATO in any part of the world'.[146] NATO doctrine states the problem explicitly, 'one principal difference between Article 5 operations and NA5CROs is that there is no formal obligation for NATO nations to take part in a NA5CRO'.[147] This lack of a formal obligation to participate or to pre-determine the nature of participation became the basis for caveats whereby individual allies chose how, where and when their troops would be deployed within Afghanistan. Informal obligations, however, may exist. The existence of caveats, and the maintenance of national command structures, however, is not evidence of non-compliance as the institutional rules accept the ability of individual member states to opt in or out of NA5CRO.

The highest number of troops deployed to ISAF was circa 132,000 in mid-2011.[148] The overall change in number of troops deployed during the ISAF mission is illustrated in Figure 3.12. To provide some comparison, circa 617,000 troops made up the coalition during the Gulf War, 1991 and IFOR peaked circa 55,000. NATO fatalities from combat operations in the former Yugoslavia were negligible,[149] and amounted to just circa 200 in the Gulf War. By contrast, during ISAF combat operations, 2003-2014, 3,438 fatalities were recorded (Sperling and Webber, 2018). Although this number is substantially higher than recent Western experience of combat operations it should be realised that the fatality figure from Afghanistan represents 2.6 per cent of the maximum troop deployment.[150]

[146] *Non-Article V Crisis Response Operations AJP 3-4(A)*, 2010, 1-1.
[147] *Non-Article V Crisis Response Operations AJP 3-4*, 2005, 1-1.
[148] *ISAF Placemat*, 6th June 2011.
[149] Bowman, S. (2003) 'Bosnia: US Military Operations'. **CRS Issue Brief IB93056**. 8th July.
[150] For comparison the equivalent figure for Vietnam was 10.8%.



Figure 3.12. ISAF Troop Numbers 2003-2014.[151]

The deployment of troops to Afghanistan is complicated by the dual approach of individual countries. Many, especially the United States, were engaged in OEF, the counter-terrorism military operation, as well as ISAF. The existence of different operations has led to claims of American disinterest towards ISAF and that OEF was the primary American mission (Goldgeier, 2010, 20). Such claims, however, are not sustainable given that 'Washington has suggested that ISAF and the counter-insurgency operations be integrated under a single NATO command' (Youngs, 2005, 23). Such a desire clearly indicated that the United States had a desire for ISAF to have a substantially wider remit than a 'Bosnia Plus' approach, 'although the mechanics for achieving that [proved] contentious' (Youngs, 2005, 23). Figure 3.13 illustrates that the United States placed the majority of its forces in Afghanistan under the operational command of ISAF, with the distinction especially marked after the surge in troop numbers announced in December 2009. Figure 3.14 emphatically

[151] Data derived from *The Afghan Index*, 2003 to 2005, the NATO website, 2005 to 2007, and *ISAF Placemats* from 2007.

illustrates the commitment of the United States to the ISAF mission with the United States supplying an initial 40 per cent of ISAF troops which rose to the 70 per cent mark after the 2009 surge. As a point of reference, during the IFOR mission, in 1995, the percentage of total troops supplied by the United States was 27.61 per cent.[152] As Sperling and Webber (2018) highlight, the European allies provided a greater percentage of the troops to operations with the European theatre, IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR, while the United States provided a greater proportion to NATO operations outside of Europe, as can be seen in Figure 3.15.



Figure 3.13. US Troop Commitments to Afghanistan.[153]

[152] Assumes a platoon to consist of 40 personnel.
[153] Data derived from *The New York Times*, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/10/01/world/middleeast/afghanistan-policy.html, *The Afghan Index*, and *ISAF Placemats*.



Figure 3.14. Troop Commitments to ISAF expressed as a % of total ISAF Troop Number.[154]

	Operations			Risk
	Out of area*	**Europe****	**Combined**	**ISAF only**
United States	1.32	.34	.97	1.11
NATO Europe and Canada	.71	1.28	1.02	.82
Cold War members	.65	1.25	1.00	.86
Post-Cold War accession states	1.06	1.37	1.28	.52
Canada	.62	.17	.46	1.73
France	.48	1.49	.97	.80
Germany	.52	.97	.76	.28
Italy	.57	1.35	.96	.38
Netherlands	.60	1.07	.85	.55
Poland	1.99	1.63	1.97	.52
Spain	.39	1.07	.72	.71
Turkey	1.36	1.36	.94	1.28
UK	1.40	1.52	1.55	.86

Figure 3.15. NATO Operations: Participation and Risk, 1996-2014 (Sperling and Webber, 2018).[155]

[154] Data derived from *ISAF Placemats*.

[155] 'if the index value is below 1, it indicates varying degrees of free-riding; a value above 1 indicates that a state is punching at or above its weight' (Sperling and Webber, 2018).

* ISAF (2002-2014); Operation Artemis (EU) (2003); EUFOR DR Congo (2006); EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008-2009); EUFOR CAR Bangui (2014-2015).

** IFOR (1996-1997); SFOR (2003-2005); KFOR (1999-2014); Operation Concordia (EU) (2003); EUFOR Althea (2005-2014).

Suggestions that the European member states of NATO were 'free-riding' and not adequately 'burden-sharing' during the conflict in Afghanistan can also be partly refuted by an analysis of the risk involved for the troops deployed. Sperling and Webber (2018)provide evidence that 88% of the 3,348 fatalities in combat operations came from three countries, Britain, Canada and America, with the Americans accounting for 70 per cent. The implication is that whilst troop deployment involved all NATO members some were prepared to accept a higher level of risk than others.[156] Again, as shown in Figure 3.14, Sperling and Webber (2018) demonstrate that there was

> a stark intra-European divide between risk-accepting and risk-avoiding member states: British, Danish, Estonian, French and Norwegian forces absorbed a disproportionately high number of casualties as a share of deployed non-US NATO armed forces: along with Canada they accounted for 74 per cent of that sub-set of combat deaths, but only 47 per cent of the total troops deployed.

The risk-aversion of a number of European NATO member states 'had the same practical effect as having fewer forces deployed and hampered operational activity' (Cook, 2008, para 31). In 2008, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly reported that 62 caveats had been put in place relating to ISAF, although 17 were resolved 45 remained in place (Cook, 2008, para 31). The caveats included geographic limits, restriction to daytime operations, refusal to transport ANSF personnel in helicopters, non-engagement in certain types of operation, and enforced consultation with national capitals prior to tactical decisions (Morelli and Belkin, 2009, 6) . However, 'officials state that the most damaging caveats remain those that are not declared; these can emerge when, for example, a commander on the ground attempts to move a given set of national forces only to be refused unexpectedly' (Cook, 2008, para 33).

[156] Michael Walzer emphasises, within the context of Just War Theory, that the willingness to accept risk, and the level of risk, is an inherently political decision, that may not be justifiable to the member states population, available at https://youtu.be/XqmnxhESrM?t=4m50s [accessed 30 Aug 2018].

A recurring theme in the United States, both during and after the conflict, is that a reason behind the problems in Afghanistan was a focus on Iraq at the expense of Afghanistan.[157] For example, as Mr Faleomavaega[158] stated in questioning Secretary Gates during 2009,

> there is a sense of negligence that we had given because we were focused on Iraq and the problems that we have encountered there in that terrible conflict. What is your sense on this, Secretary Gates? Is there some truth in President Karzai's sense of frustration that after 6 or 7 years' absence all of a sudden we refocused, now suggesting Afghanistan is a very important issue for us to consider as far as our national security is concerned?[159]

The data appears to confirm this focus on Iraq over Afghanistan. Figure 3.16 shows the relative commitment in terms of raw troop numbers but the shift towards Afghanistan post the 2009 AfPak Strategy and McChrystal's COMISAF Assessment. The indication is that Afghanistan was not initially the main focus of American military efforts, hence the lack of ability to provide sufficient troops. Theo Farrell (2010) demonstrates that the problem was not just confined to the Americans but also the British (see also Farrell and Gordon, 2009). The initial commitment of British troops to Afghanistan was dictated by what was available. As such the initial three deployments into Helmand were light brigades as the medium and heavy brigades were committed to Iraq (Farrell, 2010, 574). American Department of Defense data provides a similar picture with the percentage of American reserve forces committed to Afghanistan decreasing from 21 per cent in 2008 to 17 per cent in 2011.[160]

[157] See *Statement of Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 3rd December 2009 and Robert Gates (2014) autobiography.
[158] Representative for American Samoa
[159] *Statement of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 3rd December 2009.
[160] Similarly, reserve percentages in Iraq increased from 18% in 2008 to 26% in 2011.



Figure 3.16. American Troops Deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan 2008-2013.[161]

Monetary commitment follows a similar pattern to troop commitments. There is an obvious correlation between the more troops deployed in theatre and the greater expense incurred. Figure 3.17 shows that American Department of Defense expenditure was lower, over the entire period of ISAF, in Afghanistan than in Iraq and that it is only from 2011 that expenditure in Afghanistan overtook expenditure in Iraq. A similar picture of increased military spending in Afghan operations is evident from the United Kingdom, with expenditure quadrupling between 2006/7 and 2011/12, as seen in Figure 3.18.

[161] Data derived from the US *Department of Defense Personnel and Workforce Reports*.

(FY2007-FY2015; in millions of FY2017 dollars)

		FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	FY2011	FY2012	FY2013	FY2014	FY2015	Total
Iraq Theater	Iraq	$14,685.56	$17,987.49	$10,580.81	$7,878.74	$5,222.69	$617.71	$537.31	$77.62	$249.39	$57,587.93
	Bahrain	$588.93	$1,333.27	$2,190.98	$609.37	$526.26	$338.40	$883.97	$212.81	$551.41	$6,683.98
	Kuwait	$4,983.13	$4,934.01	$5,821.30	$5,050.40	$3,983.48	$2,612.30	$3,139.88	$1,793.63	$2,004.14	$32,318.13
	Qatar	$323.46	$469.24	$886.45	$351.45	$840.67	$870.86	$432.20	$175.28	$324.56	$4,349.61
	Saudi Arabia	$210.60	$375.76	$989.33	$806.44	$309.49	$570.03	$964.00	$1,255.52	$2,093.57	$5,481.17
	Turkey	$375.63	$192.94	$311.55	$142.84	$185.75	$286.12	$191.61	$184.99	$203.56	$1,871.42
	UAE	$261.33	$1,326.57	$305.78	$2,662.15	$1,060.54	$1,467.74	$2,281.36	$1,757.48	$1,306.55	$11,122.94
	Oman	$94.29	$107.54	$85.31	$125.88	$142.16	$214.68	$228.80	$106.60	$124.73	$1,105.28
	Jordan	$83.85	$92.30	$14.81	$13.77	$40.01	$54.17	$177.08	$168.23	$203.89	$644.21
	Total Iraq Theater	**$21,606.77**	**$26,819.14**	**$21,186.33**	**$17,641.03**	**$12,311.04**	**$7,032.01**	**$8,836.20**	**$5,732.15**	**$6,842.88**	**$121,164.67**
Afghanistan Theater	Afghanistan	$3,800.69	$6,893.02	$8,200.70	$13,079.75	$18,149.95	$19,426.34	$15,003.74	$6,176.47	$3,274.96	$90,730.66
	Kazakhstan	$6.06	$30.07	$48.07	$66.29	$75.27	$78.52	$93.56	$57.51	$67.42	$455.34
	Kyrgyzstan	$426.99	$20.29	$374.47	$134.14	$906.81	$1,988.82	$2,022.96	$684.07	-$1.85	$6,558.54
	Pakistan	$74.48	$234.86	$253.93	$179.50	$65.08	$17.30	-$3.65	$23.91	$74.88	$845.42
	Tajikistan	$0.00	$0.01	$1.09	$3.80	$3.55	$8.87	$9.25	$7.49	$6.99	$34.06
	Turkmenistan	$0.45	$19.30	$9.24	$24.21	$10.45	$4.44	$13.97	$1.48	$0.15	$83.54
	Uzbekistan	$13.94	$16.06	$9.90	$22.73	$16.44	$23.82	$19.09	$22.16	$32.22	$144.16
	Total Afghanistan Theater	**$4,322.61**	**$7,213.62**	**$8,897.40**	**$13,510.41**	**$19,227.54**	**$21,548.12**	**$17,158.92**	**$6,973.08**	**$3,347.67**	**$98,851.71**
Total Iraq and Afghanistan		**$25,929.39**	**$34,032.76**	**$30,083.73**	**$31,151.45**	**$31,538.59**	**$28,580.13**	**$25,995.11**	**$12,705.23**	**$10,190.55**	**$220,016.38**

Sources: Federal Procurement Data System, as of June 30, 2016 for FY2007-FY2015 data; CRS adjustments for inflation using deflators for converting into FY2017 dollars derived from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2017*, "Department of Defense Deflators – TOA By Category 'Total Non-Pay,'" Table 5-5, p. 58-59, March 2016.

Notes: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Figure 3.17. Department of Defense Obligations in Iraq & Afghanistan 2007-2016.[162]



Figure 3.18. Net costs of UK Military Operations in Afghanistan 2001-2013.[163]

[162] Peters, H., Schwartz M., Kapp, L. (2017) 'Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2017'. **CRS Report R44116.** 28th April. Note that this data includes expenditure on private military contractors and also Operation Enduring Freedom.

[163] Berman, G. (2017) 'The Cost of International Military Operations', **House of Commons Library SN/SG/3139**. 5th July.

The overall picture presented by the evidence is that the campaign in Afghanistan was under-resourced, both in terms of personnel and expenditure, prior to the strategic reorientation in 2009. The lack of compliance in the early stages of ISAF would have had an impact on the ability of NATO to implement its mission objectives and offers an explanation as to the problems behind the delivery of the mission. Whilst it is true that some member states, notably Canada and Denmark, along with partners Australia and Georgia, were prepared to contribute troops to high risk frontline insurgency engagements the lack of will to countenance casualties, in the Alliance as a whole, imperilled the prospects of ISAF success.

Persistence

The implementation section has shown that although NATO introduced a COIN doctrine in 2008 it did not represent a significant departure from the pre-existing historical understanding of COIN operations. A report to Congress, in August 2008, on progress in Afghanistan emphasised the point by stating that 'the current COIN strategy is often referred to as "clear, hold, and build"',[164] which is reinforced by American COIN Doctrine[165] and the British Army Field Manual[166] in effect at the time. The solution presented, increased resources, would have had only limited effect if not accompanied by a change in how COIN was implemented. Michèle Flournoy[167] in response to a question as to whether the American AfPak Strategy[168] represented a shift from COIN to CT states that following consultations with NATO,

[164] *Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, August 2008, page 6.
[165] *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations*, 2006.
[166] *Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency – Army Code 71876*, 2009, which places the task of securing the population and neutralising the insurgent above other aspects of COIN.
[167] US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy between 9th Feb 2009 and 8th Feb 2012.
[168] Launched 27 March 2009 with the *White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan*, also referred to as the Riedel Review.

> what we're doing is stepping up to more fully resource a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan that is designed to first reverse Taliban gains and secure the population, particularly in the most contested areas of the south and east.[169]

The statement is revealing as it implies that COIN operations prior to March 2009 had not been adequately resourced, either in terms of funding or personnel, and that greater resources were viewed as the principal solution to tacking the growing insurgency. Robert Gates (2014, 218) states the objective explicitly; 'a fully-resourced counterinsurgency campaign will enable us to regain the initiative and defend our vital interests'. The critical importance of the Regional Commands, RC(S) – includes Helmand, and Kandahar – and RC(E) – the area around Kabul – were clearly recognised by Flournoy's statement and, further, supported by relative troop deployments. In June 2009 ISAF consisted of 61,130 troops in theatre, of whom circa 27,880 were deployed to RC(S) and circa 19,645 to RC(E).[170] The dominance of RC(S) and RC(E) is confirmed as just under 78 per cent of total troops under ISAF were committed to these two commands.

Problems of ISAF where not solely limited to resources, as Gates (2014, 217) states it was not possible to get the 'command problems in Afghanistan fully fixed until 2010.' Although overlap and command confusion between OEF and ISAF undoubtedly occurred - on strategic, operational, and tactical levels - a conscious effort was made, from the outset of the ISAF mission, to minimise the negative effects of dual operations, especially in Southern[171] and Eastern Afghanistan. On 8th December 2005, NATO Foreign Ministers updated the Operational Plan for Afghanistan and specifically referenced the relationship between the two by stating that,

> ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the ongoing US-led military operation in Afghanistan, will continue to have separate mandates and missions. ISAF will

[169] Press conference for Reidel Review, 27 March 2009.
[170] *ISAF Placemat*, 15th June 2009.
[171] The Taliban stronghold and place of origin in 1994 had been the Southern province of Kandahar.

> continue to focus on its stabilisation and security mission whilst OEF will continue to carry out its counter-terrorism mission.
>
> Clear command arrangements will coordinate, and where necessary, deconflict efforts within the two missions as agreed under the auspices of the operational plan.[172]

Leadership is an important factor in COIN operations and particularly in changing operational tack (Dunn, 2007; Sullivan, 2007). McChrystal, in 2009, changed the nature of the conflict and instigated a shift in the focus of COIN away from the primacy of military operations. As Gates (2014, 226) recalls,

> McChrystal said that a new campaign strategy was needed, one that focused on protecting the population rather than on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces. He talked about changing the operational culture to interact more closely with the population. He emphasized the urgency of the situation.

The updated NATO COIN doctrine of 2011 formally acknowledged that the changed nature of COIN,

> requires the measured application of offensive, defensive, stability and enabling tasks, cognizant of the effect one type of activity may have on the relative success of another. Stability tasks must be planned for and resourced prior to the commencement of any campaign as they represent an inevitable phase at a relatively early stage of any campaign, and its success will often require substantial lead time.[173]

The result of the strategic alteration to the COIN mission was an increase in transition to ANSF and a delegitimising of the insurgents, which resulted in NATO being able to end the ISAF mission in December 2014. By introducing the COIN doctrine in 2008, and adapting it in 2011 with lessons learned, NATO has illustrated that the Alliance had the capacity to effectively enact policy to address operational problems, therefore, the criteria for effectiveness are satisfied.

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[172] *Revised Operational Plan for NATO is expanding mission in Afghanistan*, 8th December 2005.
[173] *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency AJP-3.4.4*, 2011, para 0122.

NATO developed three specific areas to improve the mission delivery following the 2009 strategic reorientation, which provide evidence of lessons learnt. First, the establishment of the ISAF COIN Advisory & Assistance Team (CAAT). Second, development of campaign assessment metrics to measure the success of the mission. Third, a greater awareness of the importance of strategic communications in helping to garner the support of the local population.

A briefing on CAAT, delivered on 29th October 2009, identified three problems with the delivery of COIN. First, differing levels of COIN training and expertise of units arriving in theatre. Second, the lack of unity of effort, not just between civilian and military elements, but also between the different RCs, and amongst NATO allies and partners, operating in theatre. Third, the lack of effective measurability of the implementation of COIN best practices as set out by COMISAF. CAAT was implemented to alleviate these problems by ensuring that COMISAFs intent is being operationalised and COIN best practices, and lessons learned, were adequately implemented throughout ISAF partners in theatre. Figure 3.19, illustrates the wide-range of stakeholders in the delivery of an effective COIN mission.

UNCLASSIFIED

Network of Partners



Figure 3.19. COIN Stakeholders.[174]

The improved model for assessing the progress of the campaign are shown in Figure 3.20. The process of providing campaign assessment operated on four levels; weekly Assessment Reports, monthly SHAPE Metric reports which provided raw data, a Quarterly Campaign Assessment, and a Periodic Mission Review. Each of these elements had a specific task and function with the overall goal of providing effective measurement of campaign objectives. The Periodic Mission Review sought to provide information relating to the strategic direction of ISAF for use at the highest political level, whilst at the other end of the spectrum the Assessment Reports provided information for local commanders to disseminate to the troops on the ground to enhance their situational awareness. Until this mechanism was enacted, the ability of NATO to provide effective analysis and ensure that pertinent information reached the troops on the ground was lacking and so impacted the unity of effort and allowed discrepancies between national commands to arise.

[174] ISAF COIN Advisory & Assistance Team (CAAT), 29th October 2009, slide 11.



Figure 3.20. Campaign Assessment.[175]

Strategic communications provide a central element of a COIN strategy. As Crane (2007) asserts, isolating insurgents from the population and enhancing legitimacy is key to an effective COIN campaign. Developing strategic communications to deliver this objective is crucial. Figure 3.21 illustrates the scope of the audience that NATO sought to engage. Furthermore, the presentation identifies that the key to future success is the ability to work with the Afghan Government, reinforcing the population-centric approach, installed with McChrystal's *COMISAF Assessment*, 2009, and reflects the level of strategic reorientation of the COIN mission.

[175] *ISAF – The Operational Level View*, 2010 briefing at JFC Brunssum, slide 6.



Figure 3.21. ISAF Audience for Strategic Communications.[176]

NATO has shown persistence in the development of the ISAF mission throughout the course of the campaign, that is ongoing to this day.[177] The ability to develop, and enhance, methods of operation in theatre, whilst subject to political pressures, is a challenging endeavour. The institutional apparatus of NATO to lead a consensus based Alliance and a series of partner countries towards a unified approach is testimony to the Alliance's ability to engage in a transformational agenda.

[176] *ISAF Strategic Communication Master Class*, 2011, delivered by Brigadier Iain Harrison, slide 9.
[177] On 3rd September 2018, UK Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson referred to Islamic State in Afghanistan having direct links to British Terrorists, see Lucy Fisher's 2018 article in *The Times*, 'ISIS Fighters have 'direct-link' to UK Terror Cells', which helps to explain the calls from President Trump for a greater troop presence on the ground, see 'Hundreds More Troops Planned for Afghanistan', *The Times*, 18th May 2018.

Chapter Summary

The adaption of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan took place across three distinct phases of operation. Each phase required substantive differences, in operational and planning terms, from the preceding phase. The ability of an institution to manage and implement such changes during an operational mission provides a clear sign of flexibility and institutional suppleness whilst maintaining command and control. That NATO could implement such change is even more impressive given, not just the twenty-eight individual member states of the Alliance but the variety of partner nations that were incorporated into delivering the ISAF mission.

NATO not only adapted but also institutionalised the delivery of the COIN mission in Afghanistan. A series of procedures and practices were put in place that developed a new security function for the Alliance. Despite criticism of the time lag before implementation and accusations of some allies not paying sufficient attention to Afghanistan until the insurgency had taken hold, it is unrealistic for an organisation to be expected to address challenges immediately. Mechanisms for incorporating different national positions and requirements for deployment were, however, incorporated into the institutional architecture of the ISAF mission.

The effectiveness of ISAF is more open to challenge, given the protracted nature of the conflict. When the evidence is considered, however, NATO can be shown to have incorporated the lessons learned during the conflict and enhanced the implementation of the mission. Compliance is problematic to assess due to the lack of a formal expectation of compliance with a NA5CRO, and whilst the United States and the United Kingdom took on the bulk of the responsibility for combat operations in the most challenging areas, the other participants in ISAF performed a range of different functions that enabled the US and the

UK to concentrate more fully on suppressing the insurgency. Furthermore, following the strategic reorientation of COIN in 2009 the realisation that the military aspect is just one endeavour of a successful COIN strategy helps to mitigate this challenge.

When all three of the transformational pillars transformational pillars of adaption, institutionalisation, and effectiveness are considered, in combination, there is adequate evidence to assert that NATO matters as an institution.

Chapter 4: The Return of Collective Defence

> Diplomacy is doomed to fail if it is not backed by a powerful politico-military instrument. Of course, NATO needs the political will of its members to act. However, once the political will to act is there, what alternatives for effective implementation do we have, except NATO? Which other institution can offer the integrated structure and the politico-military consultation mechanisms?
>
> Manfred Wörner, Secretary-General of NATO, 10th September 1993.[1]

Collective defence has been the unifying basis of NATO since its foundation in 1949. The end of the Cold War and the, perceived, decline of Russia as a threat to the Alliance saw collective defence, during the 1990s, diminish from the Alliance's *raison d'être* to just one of the Alliance's several security tasks.[2] The Wales Summit, 2014, has seen the return of collective defence to the primary security task of the Alliance as a direct response to the increase of Russia as a strategic competitor. The purpose of this chapter is to explore how NATO has undergone this process of change. The transformational model of the thesis, with its three pillars of adaptation, institutionalisation, and effectiveness, is used to analyse the mechanisms by which the Alliance has effected this change. Before moving on to explore these themes, some contextual background needs to be provided, as well as clarification of key concepts and terms.

Background

The end of the Cold War heralded the dawn of 'a new world order' where, according to President George H.W. Bush, 'diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind – peace and security, freedom, and the rule of

[1] Speech to the 1993 Annual Conference of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Brussels.
[2] The 2010 Strategic Concepts identifies the security tasks of the Alliance as collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, with the 1991 and 1999 versions also including cooperation, dialogue, and partnership. See also Paulauskas (2016).

law'.[3] Whilst this vision of a new international system can be used to examine a variety of NATO policies during the 1990s it had a particular, and under-appreciated, impact on deterrence.[4] Deterrence, building on the discussion in Chapter 1, is based on the latent use of military force. The unipolar system of American hegemony, led to substantive discussion on how to apply force in the post-Cold War order (Art & Waltz, 1999; Brands, 2000; George, 1991; Lauren, Craig & George, 2007; Smith, 2006; Wintz, 2010). Changing conceptions of the use of force, in turn, had an effect on the credibility of deterrence. NATO, therefore, lost its political will for collective defence not only due to the removal of the unifying threat but changed perceptions surrounding the nature of conflict. As Noetzel & Schreer (2009, 215) assert 'collective defense and the principles of alliance solidarity [were] no longer at the forefront of many allies considerations'.

During the 1990s debate, among the member states, focussed on what the future role of the Alliance should be, if indeed it should have one, in light of the declined Soviet threat (Asmus, Kugler & Larrabee, 1993; Duffield, 1994; McInnes, 1994; Mearsheimer, 1990; Wörner, 1994). The focal point of the debate was centred on the role of the Alliance as a provider of security, and whether this should be out-of-area (Daadler & Goldgeier, 2006; Kitchen, 2010; Medcalf, 2008; Michta & Hilde, 2014; Rynning, 2007). Laugen (1999) argues that NATO's response to the collapse of Yugoslavia and the ensuing conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo was reactionary and lacked strategic thinking. The Alliance, therefore, had developed an out-of-area role not out of strategic desire, but rather as a desire to maintain influence, both as an Alliance (Rynning, 2005) and between the member states (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009). Indeed, Noetzel & Schreer (2009) demonstrate distinct tiers within NATO - reformers, status-quo, and reversal. Reformers see 'NATO's interests best served through

[3] President George Bush before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 29 January 1991.
[4] For example, presentation by Ryan Henry, US Principal Under Secretary for Defense Policy 2003 to 2008, December 2005.

continued integration into US grand strategic considerations', the status-quo tier is sceptical about the global NATO concept and mindful of policies which 'might alienate major powers such as Russia and China', whilst the reversal tier 'favours an alliance still focused on article 5' (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009, p. 216).

The removal of the unifying Soviet threat and changing conceptions of the use of force shifted political attention towards a diverse range of security tasks, which have required different force postures among NATO armed forces. For NATO to re-assert its collective defence role, post the Wales Summit 2014, it, therefore, had to ensure that the measures employed were compatible with current force postures, or convince member states to change their individual national security planning, whilst balancing the differing security concerns and conception of the Alliance's purpose within the individual member states.

Clarification of terms and concepts

In order to understand NATO's shift to the primacy of collective defence[5] it is necessary to provide conceptual clarity on the *modus operandi* of the Alliance. In essence, the question to be resolved is the relationship between deterrence, including defence, and dissuasion (Manz, 1971; Segell, 2008). Despite the inherent differences between these concepts they are traditionally explored, in relation to NATO, within a collective defence framework. Collective defence within NATO, however, has always involved more than defence as a purely military concern, therefore, collective defence is more concerned with the provision of security, via deterrence, than with purely defence. Collective security, however, has specific meaning within the NATO context, both in academic and practitioner circles (Brenner, 1998; Joffe, 1992; Negretto, 1993; Stern, 2005; Yost, 1998a; b). Collective

[5] *The Wales Summit Declaration*, 2014, *The Warsaw Summit Declaration*, 2016, *The Brussels Summit Declaration*, 2018, make the refocus of collective defence as the primary task of the Alliance clear.

defence, therefore, will be maintained as the over-arching term for NATO's security provisions, and this section seeks to unpick the key components of defence, deterrence, and dissuasion in turn.

In simple terms, defence relates to the ability to protect oneself from attack. The notion of defence implies that military force is strong enough to withstand aggression such that the attacker suffers 'staggering losses' that force him to quit (Ginsburgh, 1942, 1). The concept of defence is, therefore, equivalent to deterrence by punishment (Lowther, 2012; Morgan, 2012, 86-7). The theory is that if the defence is in the ascendancy then peace and cooperation will follow, whereas if offence is the ascendancy then war and conflict can be expected (Akavia, 1991; Butfoy, 1997; Jervis, 1978; Lynn-Jones, 1995). Despite attempts to rejuvenate the viability of defence theory, specifically in relation to technological change, (Agrell, 1987; Biddle, 2001), the diffusion of threats, especially the amorphous nature and problems of attribution, and the decline in the primacy of the state as the dominant provider of force, renders a defensive strategy, or deterrence by punishment insufficient. Naturally, a military force capable of mounting a defence that could repel an attack also has a deterrent effect (Colby & Solomon, 2015).

Jervis (1979) identifies three distinct waves of deterrence theory development, which are based on the notion of symmetrical mutual deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons. Conventional deterrence featured infrequently (Huntingdon, 1983; Mearsheimer, 1985), and consideration of deterrence against asymmetrical threats is not evident prior to Knopf (2010) emphasises a fourth wave in deterrence theory. Deterrence, however, has a historic problem for assessing success. Is the inaction of a competitor a sign of deterrent success, or simply inaction, or inaction waiting for a better strategic situation that's conducive to the goals being sought (Freedman, 2013, p. 158-9). Therefore, it is impossible to definitively stated whether or not deterrence has succeeded, even if it is suspected to have.

Deterrence, in essence, is about coercion in that the objective is to cause an adversary to alter their desired course of action (Freedman, 2004). The methods utilised can either be denial or punishment (Mueller, 1998). Deterrence by denial not only incorporates traditional military defence, but also offensive-defence whereby potential sources of aggressive action are targeted. Deterrence by punishment, however, involves a pre-ordained response to an aggressive action. If consideration is given to the security concerns present today, then it should be apparent that no-one model is sufficient, on its own merits, to deter a course of action across the full spectrum. For example, both denial and punishment could be applicable to either the nuclear or conventional military sphere, but do they apply equally to terrorism (Gearson, 2012; Wilner, 2011), for example, to human trafficking or piracy? It is important to realise that military force, however, is 'only one tool, albeit an important one, in a nation's ability to deter'.[6] For example, economic means can be utilised either as a denial or punishment deterrent strategy. Although, the impact of non-military deterrence measures, such as sanctions, is questionable, in relation to nation-states, they still form part of the toolkit available (Bailey, 2014; Pape, 1997; 1998). Deterrence, therefore, remains primarily about the application of military power, although other options are potentially available depending on the exact nature of the prevalent situation. As Lauren, Craig & George (2007, 177) emphasise, deterrence 'attempts not to destroy an opponent or to physically restrain them, but to affect their motivation or *will*'.

Dissuasion has been closely linked with deterrence by denial in strategic thinking (Davis, 2014; Manz, 1971). This aligns with the emphasis on non-military measures inherent in Lauren, Craig & George (2007) definition in the preceding paragraph. Whilst such conceptions may be appropriate linguistically, they do not reflect how dissuasion is in

[6] House of Commons Defence Committee (2014) Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century. 11th March, para 4.

usage today. As Segell (2008, 1) asserts deterrence is concerned with actual capabilities that an adversary has, whereas, dissuasion seeks to deal with adversaries, potential or real, before they have developed the 'capability to pose a danger'. Dissuasion is pro-active in nature, whilst deterrence is reactive. With consideration to the expression of 'determination to shape [NATO's] security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area' from the 1999 Strategic Concept[7], then the ability of the Alliance to act as a purposive institution and actively shape the security landscape should be judged more on its ability to dissuade action than to deter it.

NATO has, since the Harmel Report, consistently applied a mixture of deterrence and détente in relations with the Soviet Union, and Russia, via a series of dual, political and military, approaches. For example, in 1979 Double-Track saw not only the modernisation of intermediate nuclear forces but also moves towards arms control.[8] Similarly after the Cold War ended, a dual approach was adopted to strengthen diplomatic ties with Russia whilst enlarging the Alliance (Binnendijik & Kugler, 2003). In 2016, current Secretary-General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg emphasised the continued importance of deterrence and dialogue.[9]

Collective defence, therefore, is the umbrella term that is applied to the trinity of defence, deterrence, and dialogue, with the goal that the member states 'can enjoy a collective level of security far higher than they could achieve alone.'[10] Whilst, overlap exists between the trinity, specifically in deciding whether measures are political or military, where possible this section seeks to identify which strand of collective defence is being applied. Collective defence, however, is not a static concept and to remain effective it needs to maintain

[7] *The Alliance's Strategic Concept,* 24th April 1999, para 12.
[8] *Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers*, 12th December 1979.
[9] AP (2016) NATO Agrees on "Dual Track Approach" with Russia. 16th November.
[10] *AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine*, December 2010, 2-2.

flexibility to respond to differing threats, as and when they may appear. Given that the underlying premise of deterrence is the rationality of the opposing actor, analysis of collective defence, therefore, must be considered in relation to the threat which is sought to be mitigated, even if the assumption of rationality does not always stand up to scrutiny (Jervis, Lebow & Stein, 1989).

The Brussels Summit Declaration, 2018, makes it clear that 'Russia's aggressive actions, including the threat and use of force to attain political goals, challenge the Alliance and are undermining Euro-Atlantic security.'[11] The nature of the threat is further clarified due to 'hybrid challenges, including disinformation campaigns and malicious cyber activities' and specifically cites the example of NATO's newest member, Montenegro.[12] The use of 'hybrid warfare' by Russia is a particular concern that NATO needs to respond to.[13] Hybrid warfare has been used in this thesis due its common usage,[14] however the term remains problematic and is far from universally accepted (McDermott, 2016; Panait, 2015). Ionita (2014) questions whether the notion of hybrid conflict is something new. The conceptual origins can be traced back to the 1980s and the emergence of Fourth Generation Warfare in the United States (Lind et al., 1989; Toffler & Toffler, 1993). The Iraq War, 2003, saw a significant increase in attention to the concept (Echevarria, 2005; Hammes, 2004) with Lind (2004, 13) declaring that 'the state loses its monopoly on war'. The Fourth Generation concept, however, maintained the role of irregular forces as an offshoot of core military strategy. The hybrid concept places the use of irregular forces as the core of strategy (Giles, 2016; Hoffman, 2007; Miller, 2015). As such the notion of hybrid warfare is a different phenomenon and needs clarity in its own right.

[11] *The Brussels Summit Declaration*, 2018, para 2 and 4-9.
[12] Ibid., para 2.
[13] For example, see Davis, J. (2015) Continued Evolution of Hybrid Threats, *The Three Swords*, Issue 28.
[14] The author has a personal preference for threshold operations but using the term in this thesis would add an unnecessary level of confusion to a complex topic.

Hybrid warfare remains a contested term. As *NATO Review* notes, 'when any threat or use of force is defined as hybrid, the term loses its value and causes confusion instead of clarifying the "reality" of modern warfare'.[15] Indeed, Monaghan (2016) argues that the focus should move away from the hybrid nature of Russia's actions in Ukraine, to their improved mobilisation and increased firepower. In essence, Monaghan is arguing that the attempts to define a clear concept are problematic and analysis should concentrate on the attributes of modern warfare. As such this thesis is not seeking to provide a conclusive definition of hybrid warfare but rather identify the core attributes attributed to operations on the threshold between war and peace, so that collective defence can be analysed in a relevant context.[16] The core attributes of hybrid warfare include; a high degree of unity of effort, flexibility, the use of advanced weapons and disruptive technology, the erosion of the battlefield as a clearly defined space, the involvement of state, non-state, and quasi-state actors, the blend of regular and irregular forces, and the engagement in simultaneous operations (dervied from Bartles, 2016; Hoffman, 2007; Miller, 2015; Monaghan, 2016; Zenko, 2010).

NATO has three specific vulnerabilities that could be exploited. First, as a military alliance, NATO requires capabilities, to enable a range of options for strategic planning. Second, the posture of the Alliance has to be credible, the political will, or at least the perception of the political will, of the member states has to match, or exceed, the force posture being exhibited. Third, cohesion is vital for a collective entity of twenty-nine member states. An example of the challenge in relation to capability and credibility is the new Russian tank, the *T-14 Armata* which has an *Active Protection System*. If the *T-14* proves able to withstand

[15] van Puyvelde, D. (2016) Hybrid War – Does it Even Exist? *NATO Review*.
[16] Such an attributional based approach has been used in the similar problematic definition of transnational organised crime (See Abadinsky, 2013, Ch 1).

the weaponry of NATO forces, then NATO would be in a capability deficit and subsequently impact the credibility of the Alliance.[17] Likewise, given the earlier discussion on the changing perception of the willingness to deploy military force, if political will to put ground forces at risk is lacking, then the credibility of the Alliance force posture is damaged. It is the same area of political will were Russia seeks to challenge the members of the Alliance and erode confidence, thereby, challenging the cohesion of the Alliance, as it has broadly sought to do since the early 1950s.

Adaptation

NATO's adaption, in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea, and continued influence with the Donbass separatists in Ukraine, is of substantive interest as it represents a conscious institutional choice on behalf of the Alliance in response to an exogenous shock. NATO did not have to take any direct military response, and indeed had chosen not to with other Russian regional conflicts, most notably during the Russo-Georgian conflict, 2008, and Moscow's support for autonomous rule in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. By reorienting itself back toward collective defence, and away from the crisis management and cooperative security tasks developed in post-Cold War Strategic Concepts, the Alliance was positing Russian belligerence as an existential threat. It is significant, that not only had post-Cold War documents avoided explicitly naming Russia as a threat, but that such a decisive move in the wake of the Crimea crisis was made in support of a non-member (Sperling & Webber, 2016).

The section will proceed by exploring each of the following areas in turn that illustrate the adaptation undertaken by NATO. First, what makes the Ukraine case different to previous

[17] Marcus, J. (2017) Should Russia's New Armata T-14 Tanks Worry NATO? *BBC,* 30th May.

Russian actions in the former Soviet Union? Second, is the speed of NATO's strategic shift unprecedented? Third, whether defining Russia as an existential threat was a matter of institutional choice or necessity. Subsequent sections on institutionalisation and effectiveness, will then focus on the mechanisms put in place at the Wales 2014 and Warsaw 2016 Summits.

Russia's Sphere of Influence – Why is Ukraine Different?

Since the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has faced a number of challenges to its power and influence among the former Soviet Republics. The resulting disputes fall into three categories; disputes between Russia and former Soviet Republics, disputes between former Soviet Republics not directly involving Russia, and internal Russian disputes. In order to establish the argument that the Ukraine crisis is different to the previous expressions of Russian power in its near abroad an overview of events in each sub-section is provided.

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, a significant potential problem for European security, between 1990 and 2001, stemmed from relations between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine had retained control of the Black Sea fleet, due to location of the naval base of Sevastopol in Crimea, and it was not until the Black Sea Accords of 1997[18] that the issue was resolved and control of the fleet was returned to Russia (Sherr, 1997). Concerns over nuclear weapons' proliferation raised substantive questions as to how to approach the presence of nuclear missiles and silos in Ukraine (Pikayev, 1994). Again, agreement was reached, at Budapest on 5th December 1994,[19] for Ukraine to cede control of the nuclear

[18] Gordon, M. (1997) Russia and Ukraine Finally Reach Accord on Black Sea Fleet, *The New York Times*, 29th May.

[19] *Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, 5th December 1994, signed in Budapest by the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia.

stockpiles on its territory to Russia. The primary rationale for the decision involved debt relief on Ukraine's energy, specifically gas, deficit to Russia (Balmaceda, 2008). Russia sees Ukraine as firmly within its sphere of influence and a primary motivation behind the intervention in Crimea, and the Ukraine, was to prevent closer integration with the European Union and NATO (Wood et al., 2016).

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a problematic decade for the former Soviet Republics. However, despite the various disputes amongst the newly independent countries, such as Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan (see Cornell, 2017), it is Russia that remains the most important regional and global actor, therefore, the focus of threats to European security is limited to Russia in this thesis.

Russia has faced a number of internal challenges as it has sought to reform and develop itself in the post-communist era. First, the rebellion in Chechnya, 1994 to 1996, presented a challenge to the legitimacy of the new Russian state (Russell, 2007). The Chechens sought to break away from Russia and establish an independent, Islamic based, republic. Apart from the direct challenge to Moscow, Grozny, the Chechen capital, held significant geo-strategic interests. Grozny is the major oil pipeline crossroads, with routes linking Moscow and the Middle East as well as the newly tapped reserves in the Caspian Sea. The conflict did not pose a significant challenge to Moscow, though deficiencies in the Russian military, and also conflict management were evident (Menon & Fuller, 2000). There was also an Islamic insurgency in Dagestan, which borders Chechnya at the end of the twentieth century, however, this did not reach the same intensity as in Chechnya (Ware & Kisriev, 2009). Although a second Chechen conflict broke out, between 1999 and 2009 (Kramer, 2005; Lyall, 2010; O'Loughlin & Witmer, 2012), it was at a lower intensity than the first Chechen war. A further low-intensity conflict broke out in Ingushetia, from 2007 to 2015, but neither conflict presented a significant challenge to the power and authority of the

Russian state. Energy disputes continued to have an influence on relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics, and Russia was continually able to exploit its dominant position (Gheorghe & Muresan, 2011; Mankoff, 2009).

The conflict between Russian and Georgia[20] saw direct military involvement in a former Soviet republic, an independent country, for the first time since the end of the Cold War (Cornell & Starr, 2009). The regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with Russian backing, declared themselves independent republics and 'many western analysts would agree that some kind of watershed ha[d] been crossed' (Allison, 2008, 1145). The similarities between Georgia and Ukraine are further confirmed by the Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3rd April 2008, which placed both countries on a seeming path to membership of NATO.

> NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. *We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.* Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations… MAP [Membership Action Plan] is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. *Today we make clear that we support these countries' applications for MAP.* Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia. [21]

Indeed 72.5% of Georgians had backed NATO membership during a January 2008 non-binding referendum.[22] Georgia, was an active PfP participant and supplied combat troops to ISAF in Afghanistan, with minimal caveats on their use. The situation, therefore, is that a future member of the Alliance, that has actively engaged in Alliance operations, has its sovereignty infringed, yet the decision of the Alliance is one of negligible response. An explanation is the lack of consensus on how to respond based on a feeling amongst some

[20] House of Commons Defence Committee (2009) Russia: A New Confrontation? 30th June, section 3.
[21] My emphasis. *Bucharest Summit Declaration*, 2008, para 23.
[22] Georgians back NATO Membership in Referendum, *Sputnik,* 11th January 2008.

member states that Russia's 'zone of privileged interest'[23] had been breached (German, 2017; Wolff, 2015). Karagiannis (2014) argues that the main rationale behind Russian action in both Georgia and Ukraine was to prevent NATO enlargement. However, Karagiannis (2014) brings to light the more important difference between Russian actions in Georgia and Ukraine. The operations in Crimea and the Donbass region of Ukraine illustrate enhanced Russian military capability. The response of NATO, therefore, cannot be considered outside of the threat that is presented to it. As evidenced in the clarification of terminology section, deterrence is only relevant in relation to a specific threat. The difference between Ukraine, and previous Russian belligerence, is, therefore, that the threat vector, and associated perception of relative strength and vulnerability, had changed sufficiently to warrant a NATO response.

Speed of Strategic Shift

On the 18th March 2014 the Agreement on the Accession of Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation was signed,[24] following twenty-four days of separatist activity. Following the annexation of Crimea, the Donbass – Donetsk and Luhansk - region of Ukraine saw pro-Russian demonstrations, which by early April 2014 had developed into an outright conflict involving paramilitaries and special forces. The NATO's Wales Summit, took place on 5th September 2014, so within six months of Crimea being annexed the Alliance had instigated a significant strategic shift and specifically identified Russia as the existential threat that the Alliance was geared to protect against. This section will explore whether the speed of NATO's adaption was unusually quick given its consensus based decision-making process.

[23] Interview by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on 31st August 2008 to Channel One, Rossia, NTV.
[24] President of Russia (2014) *Agreement on the Accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation Signed*, 18th March.

Michel (2014) asserts that a defining characteristic of NATO's 'consensus rule' is the lack of manoeuvre or initiative afforded to the International Staff, particularly the Secretary General of NATO. He goes on to illustrate the various institutional mechanisms for invoking a change in policy, via written submissions through to committees and working groups (also see Michel, 2006). As a consequence, changes in strategic direction in NATO happen gradually as part of an established institutional process that is specifically designed to incorporate the potential differing viewpoints of individual allies that allow for compromise and understanding to be reached.

The basis of consensus, as the primary method of decision making, had been challenged since the early 2000s, especially following operations in Afghanistan (Michel, 2003; Morelli & Belkin, 2009; Noetzel & Schreer, 2009; 2012). Furthermore, Hendrickson (2006) posits that the role of the Secretary General has been increasingly important in enabling the post-Cold War transformation of the Alliance. Whilst the Secretary General of NATO has always had an ability to shift discourse in response to security challenges (see Dingott Alkopher, 2016), the implication of Hendrickson (2006) argument is of an institutional change that has shifted more power to the Secretary General, which Noetzel & Schreer (2012) posit has increased since the Lisbon Summit, November 2010.

Analysis of the Lisbon Summit indicates that the principal concern was the extent to which Russia presented a threat, in the wake of its military intervention in Georgia, to the former Soviet Republics that were now members of NATO.[25] To make a determination of threats to the Alliance, the incoming Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, organised a Group of Experts to develop the basis of a new Strategic Concept. The outcome was 'NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement'[26] which advised that the new Strategic Concept

[25] Commentary (2010) Reforming NATO at the Lisbon Summit, 19th November, RUSI.
[26] *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*. 17th May 2010, p. 10.

'should reaffirm NATO's desire to help build a cooperative Euro-Atlantic security order which includes security cooperation with Russia before going on to state that 'NATO should pursue a policy of engagement with Russia while reassuring all Allies that their security and interests will be defended'. In spite of Russia's actions in Georgia, therefore, the approach remained in line with the dual approach established post-Cold War (Binnendijik & Kugler, 2003).

In terms of speed of decision-making, the important analysis is not the outcome of the decision but rather the length of time that was taken. The Strategic Concept, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, launched at the Lisbon Summit, November 2010, was the culmination of an institutional process, which lasted just over two years - the event, Russian military action in Georgia, March 2008; the response, instigated at Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, April 2009, which led to the Group of Experts, September 2009, producing a report, May 2010, that became; the consensus, new Strategic Concept, November 2010. In other words, two and half years to formally conclude that no substantive change had occurred. By contrast, the timeframe for decisive action, and the formal proclamation of Russia as an existential threat, in response to events in the Crimea and the Donbass, within three months at the Defence Ministers meeting in June 2014. Therefore, the speed of NATO's response to Russia was unprecedented in the post-Cold War era.

From Cooperation to Competition

The relative importance of Russia and Ukraine is reflected in NATO's institutional response. In 1997, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed on 27th May,[27] which was succeeded by the NATO-Russia Council in 2002. Ukraine was also granted special status, in relation to

[27] *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation*. 27th May 1997.

NATO, with the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Commission on 9th July 2002. No other former Soviet Republics received such special recognition. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that NATO's perception was that Russia and Ukraine were both important regional actors, with the ability to balance each other.

Binnendijik & Kugler (2003) demonstrate that NATO's approach during this period was to embrace Russia as a friend, membership was even mooted,[28] whilst seeking to stabilise the former communist countries of Eastern Europe by drawing them into the Western community. NATO, first, established the Partnership for Peace programme, and then began the Alliance enlargement process at the Madrid Summit in 1997, as discussed in Chapter 1. Russia joined the PfP and was active in some NATO operations with the NATO-Russia Council acting as a forum was to enhance dialogue. The potential for a souring of relations, however, became evident during the conflict in Kosovo, 1999, and the race for Pristina airport.[29] However, the significant change in relations occurred with the Russo-Georgian conflict over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in August 2008.

During the Cold War the Soviet Union provided the existential threat that defined NATO's relationship with the international security environment. The 1990s are broadly categorised as NATO defining a role for itself, following the removal of the existential threat with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia was weak politically, militarily, and economically during the first ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relative to NATO its power and influence was substantially diminished in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe. The 2000s saw a gradual increase in Russian relative power as the Kremlin continued the process of reform, despite the significant economic collapse of 1997 (Pryde,

[28] Davydov, Y. (2000) Should NATO Join Russia? *NATO Office of Information and Press*.
[29] Watt, N. (1999) Race for Pristina, *The Guardian*, 12th June.

2003). Despite, the severe tension between NATO and Russia after the conflict in Georgia,[30] including the temporary suspension of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC),[31] the cooperative posture was maintained.[32] Yet the events in Crimea and the Ukraine, during 2014 caused Russia to be labelled as a strategic competitor to NATO.[33] The changes between 2008 and 2014, therefore, are of significance in understanding the shift of NATO, and the adaptation to the changed security environment, in its view of Russia from being a co-operator to a competitor.

A wargame conducted by the US Army War College, in May 2015, as a response to the changed international security environment highlights an important conception of Russia within the United States, as seen in Figure 4.1. The conception depicts the cogs of the great Russian Bear all trying to turn in a certain direction with only the West offering significant opposition.[34] Furthermore, Figure 4.1 depicts a large 'Domestic Support' cog being coloured both red and blue, in other words an area of competition that is central to both NATO and Russia. For NATO-Russia relations this understanding effectively means that a common basis for interpretation of actions is missing, and distrust is central to the relationship.

[30] Traynor, I. and Harding, L. (2008) Russia Warned: Withdraw from Georgia or Else, *The Guardian*, 18th August.
[31] House of Commons Defence Committee (2009) *Russia: A New Confrontation?* 30th June, para 98.
[32] Available via https://web.archive.org/web/20110721225418/http://www.nato-russia-council.info/ [accessed 26 Mar 2019].
[33] MacAskill, E. (2016) UK Defence Secretary tells US only NATO can Deter Russia, *The* Guardian, 3rd December. Ackerman, S. and Gambino, L. (2017) Russia is Trying to Smash NATO, James Mattis Says in Confirmation Hearing, *The Guardian*, 12th January.
[34] The smaller blue cogs which are hard to read are 'Oligarchs Exports $$$' and the 'middle class'.



Figure 4.1. The Russian System (Frear, Kearns & Kulesa, 2015, 2).

The major change for Russia during the period, following the election of Vladimir Putin, was the substantial, and prolonged, increase in defence spending as shown in Figure 2. It should be noted, that the percentage of GDP spent on defence remained around the 4 per cent mark throughout the period and the increased spending is based on improvements in the Russian economy. Furthermore, even in austere times and declining expenditure, the defence spending of the European NATO members is still at least two and half times ($250 billion) higher than Russia during the period.[35] The important aspect of increased Russian military expenditure is not the level of money spent, but what it has been spent on, including next generation weaponry, such as the aforementioned *T-14 Amarta* tank, which increases the ability of Russia to threaten NATO.

[35] *The Secretary General's Annual Report 2014*.

Figure 4.2. Russian Military Expenditure from 1993 to 2010.[36]

NATO policy since 2014 embraces a 3-D approach to relations with Russia, defence, deterrence, and dialogue.[37] Such a distinction maps onto the conceptual exploration of collective defence earlier in this chapter, which identifies defence, deterrence, and dissuasion as constituent parts. Sarah MacIntosh, the UK Ambassador to NATO emphasised, in 2017, that 'NATO needs to do more' in relation to a Russian regime that has 'chosen to be a strategic competitor'. For NATO, the problem is 'how to live next door to a neighbour that has made that choice'.[38] Significant mutual security concerns remain, which can be alleviated via transparency and risk-reduction measures. As such, the primary

[36] Reproduced from http://static1.businessinsider.com/image/549893856bb3f7ea3e525c39-1200-924/2-102.png [accessed 26 Mar 2019].
[37] Comments by Sarah MacIntosh, UK Ambassador to NATO. *NATO's Contribution to European Security*, RUSI, 21st April 2017.
[38] *Ibid.*

aspect for enhanced security and stability, in MacIntosh's view, is the dissuasion aspect of the collective defence trinity.

The international security environment has changed markedly since Russian intervention in Crimea and Ukraine. The Alliance, has adapted to the changed international security environment via a series of measures that represent a mixture of institutional choice and necessity. A clearly defined threat is beneficial for an Alliance to galvanise its members from apathy towards a common purpose and enhanced credibility, whilst the potential risk to cohesion from allowing a multi-tier NATO to embed enables arguments of necessity. The next sections, on the remaining pillars of the transformational model, will explore the institutional changes that NATO has enacted and gauge their effectiveness.

Institutionalisation

The extent of institutionalisation of NATO's collective defence policy will be evidenced by reference to the three markers introduced earlier in the thesis – commonality, specificity and differentiation. Commonality reflects the allies' shared understanding of what collective defence entails, specificity the presence of rules, and differentiation the role of NATO in assigning different roles to individual members (Wallander & Keohane, 1999, 24). Each of the markers will be analysed by reference to the air, land, sea, nuclear, and hybrid dimension of collective defence. The evidence provided demonstrates that the Alliance has undertaken an institutional process as part of the transformational model.

Commonality

NATO is a diverse range of twenty-nine member states, each of which has distinct security priorities. Noetzel & Schreer (2009, 216) noted before the Crimea crisis that there 'no longer exists a solid consensus within the alliance about the hierarchy of roles the organization is

[meant] to perform'. The increased belligerence of Russia has enabled NATO to establish commonality and develop an institutional response based on consensus. Such an outcome has been made possible by the internal functions of the Alliance that enable different national perspectives to be considered and a collective policy, of overall mutual interest, to be put forward.

The Wales Summit, 2014, recognised that a break had taken place in the international security environment and also that change in response was needed for the Alliance to be able to continue to meet its collective defence task.[39] The Summit Declaration acknowledged that 'a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security' has been reached.[40] The pivotal moment being Russia's annexation of Crimea that ensured 'NATO unambiguously adopted language and policies that positioned Russia as a clear threat' (Sperling & Webber, 2016, 20). If commonality is not evident then such a drastic move could lead to the fracturing of the Alliance, or become a definitive multi-tier Alliance, as argued by Noetzel & Schreer (2009). Alternatively, the presence of commonality, and the refocussing of attention on collective defence, could enhance the cohesion and credibility of the Alliance. The reality of the situation is that a single tier Alliance acting as a cohesive entity deters Russian action, within its historic sphere of influence, whilst a multi-tier Alliance presents the opportunity for confrontation in the Baltic States[41] or the Balkans.[42] As such, identifying the extent of NATO unity is central to determining commonality.

In order to analyse the extent of commonality, the members of NATO have been divided into three categories, western (including the United States and Canada), eastern, and

[39] *Ibid.*
[40] *Wales Summit* Declaration, para 1.
[41] Comments by Kadri Liik, Senior Policy Fellow ECFR. *How to Secure Eastern Europe*, Chatham House, 31st January 2017.

southern. With the exception of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, who could conceivable be placed in either Eastern or Southern groups, the separation should be uncontroversial and can be seen in Figure 4.3. Each category will be examined in turn using national statements.



Figure 4.3. NATO European Members Separated into Western, Eastern and Southern.

The western bloc is dominated by the United States, and also includes other Alliance senior members – France, Germany and the United Kingdom. On 17th March 2014 Barack Obama stated the desire 'to isolate Russia for its actions [in Crimea] and to reassure our allies and partners'[43], before launching sanctions, 20th March 2014, 'to impose additional costs on Russia'.[44] Therefore, within two days of Russia annexing Crimea, 18th March 2014,[45] the most significant contributor to NATO was positioning Russia as a strategic competitor.

[43] The White House (2014) *Statement by the President on Ukraine*, 17th March.
[44] The White House (2014) *Statement by the President on Ukraine*, 20th March.
[45] President of Russia (2014) *Agreement on the Accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation Signed*, 18th March.

Similarly, the United Kingdom acknowledged that 'events in Crimea and Ukraine represent a "game changer" for UK defence policy',[46] with Foreign Secretary William Hague denouncing Russia's actions as a 'land grab' and that 'the international community should consider a new relationship with Moscow', including sanctions and expelling Russia form the G8.[47] French President, François Hollande, 20th March 2014, described the situation as 'unacceptable' and that the international community was 'required to act' and supported the imposition of sanctions.[48] Germany was, however, less inclined to support sanctions,[49] despite German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, stating that Crimea's declaration of independence, from Ukraine, was against international law, as was the annexation of Crimea.[50] Similar statements against Russian actions in Ukraine where forthcoming from Spain,[51], Norway,[52] Denmark,[53] and Canada.[54] The statements vary in the scale of their condemnation of Russia, with the strongest – the United States, United Kingdom and France – seeking an immediate response and shift in strategic thinking, to less strident approaches, referring to international law, such as those by Germany.

The central bloc of countries, as depicted in Figure 4.3, was equally forthcoming in their expressions against the Russian intervention. The Prime Ministers of the Visegrád countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – issued a joint statement declaring that Russia's action 'represents a serious escalation' that 'create[s] a dangerous new reality

[46] House of Commons Defence Committee (2014) *Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part Two-NATO*, 22nd July, introduction - para 2.
[47] Watt, N. (2014) Ukraine: UK to Push for Tougher Sanctions Against Russia over Crimea, *The Guardian*, 18th March.
[48] Embassy of France in London (2014) *Ukraine – Statement by M. François Hollande, President of the Republic, on arrival at the European Council*, 20th March.
[49] (2017) Merkel Sharpens Attack on US Sanctions Against Russia, *The Financial Times*, 16th June.
[50] AFP (2014) Merkel: Crimea Grab 'Against International Law', 18th March.
[51] Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (2014) *Situación en Ucrania*, Comunicado 061, 1st March.
[52] Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014) Norway Condemns Russian Military Escalation in Crimea, 2nd March.
[53] Nielsen, L. B. (2014) Lidegaard: Rusland har invaderet Ukraine, 2nd March.
[54] Global Affairs Canada (2014) *Baird Promotes Territorial Integrity and National Unity in Ukraine*, 28th February.

in Europe' and drew parallels with the Soviet Union's military interventions in their own countries in 1958, 1968 and 1981.[55] The Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement referring to an act of 'open aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine' which 'undermines the fundamental principles of international law'[56]. Latvian Foreign Minister, Edgars Rinkëvics, stated that the 'scenario resembles the occupation of the Baltic states' and the Lithuanian President, Dalia Grybauskaite argued that the potential domino effect would occur without action.[57] Estonian President, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, stated that the annexation of Crimea 'may have far-reaching implications for generations' referencing the importance of the US nuclear guarantee exercised through NATO.[58] The central states, therefore, having been under Soviet control during the Cold War, were unequivocal in their condemnation or Russia's action and keen to paint Russia as a significant, and recurring, security threat to European and international order.

The southern members of the Alliance were more reserved in their statements. Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi called on 'Russia to immediately withdraw its armed forces' and viewed 'the political-diplomatic channel as the only way to resolve the crisis'.[59] Slovenia advocated avoiding conflict and offered to act as a mediator on behalf of the European Union.[60] Montenegro, although not yet a member of NATO, condemned the 'aggression of Russian armed forces'.[61] While Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, drew on history

[55] Available via https://web.archive.org/web/20140307215429/http://www.kormany.hu:80/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/statement-of-the-prime-ministers-of-the-visegrad-countries-on-ukraine [accessed 26 Mar 2019].
[56] *Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia*, 28th August 2014.
[57] Seputyte, M. and Eglitis, A. (2014) US Fighters Circle Baltics as Putin Fans Fear of Russia, *Bloomberg*, 7th March.
[58] Kramer, D. J. (2014) A Conversation with Estonia's President: "We Have Allowed Aggression to Stand", *The American Interest*, 22nd December.
[59] Ministero degli Affair Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale (2014) Ucraina: Mogherini al CAE – Vertice straordinario a Bruxelles, "soluzione politica solo attraverso dailogo", 3rd March.
[60] Available via http://www.sta.si/vest.php?id=1985289&s=s [accessed 26 Mar 2019].
[61] B92 (2014) Crna Gora osudila "rusku agresiju", 5th March.

to highlight the importance 'for our Tatar compatriots'.[62] Greece, meanwhile, refused to sign joint statements on Russia and threatened to veto EU sanctions.[63] The southern members of NATO, therefore, presented views most distant to a reinvigoration of collective defence, broadly favouring a more conciliatory approach based on dialogue, crucially with the European Union at the forefront.

Right from the outset the potential influence of national positions, and political will, varied. NATO acknowledged that it faced 'a new security landscape because of Russia's illegal aggression against Ukraine'[64] and that 'Russia's actions threaten[ed] the stability and security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area'.[65] The NATO Defence Ministers' meeting of3rd June 2014 focussed on 'strengthening collective defence. Readiness. And resources'.[66] Therefore, the strategic priority of the Alliance in response to Russia's action was established within three months of Russia's annexation of Crimea. As Sperling & Webber (2016, 20) observe 'that reorientation… was unprecedented in its decisiveness'.

Consequently, a consensus on a firm response was reached at the Wales Summit some three months' later. Not only was Russia specifically named as a security threat[67] but the challenges highlighted in the June Defence Ministers' meeting were addressed. Collective defence was to be advanced via the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), which included the Enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF). [68] The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), 'a new Allied joint force that will be able to deploy within a few days'[69] was

[62] Available via https://web.archive.org/web/20140305062424/http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/163800/turkey-closely-following-developments-in-crimea.html [accessed 26 Mar 2019].
[63] Buchanan, R. T. (2015) Greece Threatens EU Veto over Russian Sanctions, *The Independent*, 29th January.
[64] Rasmussen, A. F. (2014) *Doorstep Statement in advance of meetings of NATO Defence Ministers*, 3rd June.
[65] Rasmussen, A. F. (2014) *Public Opening Remarks at North Atlantic Council*, 3rd June.
[66] *Ibid*.
[67] *Wales Summit Declaration*, 5th September 2014, para 1 and 16.
[68] *Ibid.*, para 6 to 8.
[69] *Ibid.*, para 8.

introduced alongside command and control improvements, and other initiatives under Smart Defence to improve readiness. Whilst the defence spending pledge, all member nations committed to spending a minimum of two per cent of GDP on defence with twenty per cent on major equipment,[70] sought to reverse 'the trend of declining defence budgets… to further a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities'.[71]

The Warsaw Summit, 9th July 2016, was no less forceful in declaring that 'Russia's actions, including provocative military activities in the periphery of NATO territory and its demonstrated willingness to attain political goals by threat and use of force, are a source of regional instability'.[72] The Communique then goes on to devote fifteen paragraphs referring to 'Russia's destabilising actions'[73], and is unequivocal that 'Russia bears full responsibility'[74] for the deterioration of human rights in Crimea, and 'significant responsibility… [for the] destabilisation of eastern Ukraine'[75] and disregard of the Minsk Agreements. Therefore, despite national reticence in public statements of some NATO members, the common position agreed, and maintained, by the Alliance has been clear throughout. There can be no doubt that commonality is evident, and the importance of collective defence and the deterrence of Russia is unambiguous.

Specificity

The institutional marker of specificity refers to the presence of specific and enduring rules. NATO, as an institution, has limited formal rules relating to policy and strategy, as determined by the North Atlantic Treaty in relation to Article IV and Article V consultations. Decisions are made on the basis of consensus, which allows for a degree of flexibility in

[70] *Ibid.*, para 14.
[71] *Ibid.*, para 14.
[72] *Warsaw Summit Communique*, 9th July 2016, para 5.
[73] *Ibid.*, para 10.
[74] *Ibid.*, para 17.
[75] *Ibid.*, para 19

response to a changing international security environment. Article V, the bedrock of the Alliance and collective defence, only requires an individual member state to take 'such action as it deems necessary'.[76] Even an institutional process, such as enlargement, has 'no formal application procedure at the beginning of the enlargement process. Candidates are invited by the organization' (Schimmelfenning, 2003, 113). The lack of formal rules means that there is no expulsion clause, no means to impose sanctions upon members, no body established to investigate the behaviour of members or formally tasked with arbitration. Instead, the Alliance relies on a series of informal rules, based on convention, that create an expectation of compliance, and the rationality of the member states to embrace the benefits of mutual cooperation (Pouliot, 2016, Ch. 4).

The central debate, and frequently recurring issue among allies, is that of burden-sharing and free-riding, with some American commentators referring to the burden-sharing unicorn.[77] President Trump explicitly identified the problem as ingrained in the defence expenditure of the NATO members, when he stated that 'our Allies are not paying their fair share'.[78] Trump's statement, however, does not represent a significant divergence in American thinking. In February 2014 - before the crisis in Crimea unfolded, the Wales Summit Defence Spending Pledge, and collective defence returned to the focus of NATO - American Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel stated that 'if the alliance is to remain effective, adaptable, and relevant, rebalancing NATO's burden-sharing and capabilities is mandatory - not elective' and that 'America's contributions in NATO remain starkly disproportionate, so adjustments in the U.S. defense budget cannot become an excuse for further cuts in European defense spending'.[79] Therefore, conformity to the two percent defence spending pledge, introduced at the Wales Summit, is, therefore, central to specificity. It must be

[76] *The North Atlantic Treaty*, 4th April 1949.
[77] Carpenter, T. G. (2016) Trump Chases the NATO Burden-Sharing Unicorn, *The National Interest*, 4th May.
[78] Beckwith, R. T. (2016) Read Donald Trump's 'America First' Foreign Policy Speech, *Time*, 27th April.
[79] Burns, R. (2014) Hagel says Europeans Should Step up NATO Support, *Associated Press*, 26th February.

noted that, simply spending two percent of GDP on defence does not provide the whole picture, as different methods of national calculation and what is classified as defence spending skews the data. Indeed, Lord Robertson has argued that the member states should publish specifics on what their defence budget has been spent on.[80]

President Trump has continually targeted NATO, and the apparent commitment of its members to the provision of security, during his campaign and once in office. In May 2017, at the NATO heads of state meeting in Brussels, President Trump referred to the 'chronic underpayments' of twenty-three of the, then, twenty-eight members, and his choice of words leaves the American commitment to Article V, and collective defence, open to question.[81] Defence spending is thus central to the collective defence posture of the Alliance, both in terms of credibility and cohesion. The situation is not necessarily as clear cut as President Trump presents, however, as budgetary cycles take time to come into effect, differences between what individual countries incorporate as defence expenditure and the lack of consensus on calculating defence expenditure in NATO, and what the expenditure has been on, being of relevance. Looking at the raw data, see Figure 4.4, Trump's statement is factually accurate but, as Figure 4.5 illustrates, the majority of countries – except Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States – have increased their percentage of GDP spend in real terms since 2014. Although as seen in Figure 4.3, the recent increases do not address the real decline since 2010.

[80] Lord Robertson (2019) *The Transatlantic Relationship*, Chatham House, 30th January.
[81] Shear, M., Landler, M., and Kanter, J. (2017) In NATO Speech, Trump is Vague About Mutual Defense Pledge, *The New York Times*, 25th May.



Figure 4.4. Defence Expenditure as a share of GDP (%) in 2014 and estimated in 2017.[82]

Constant 2010 prices and exchange rates

NATO Europe	**274,592**	**265,810**	**260,703**	**257,595**	**254,115**	**255,507**	**264,680**	**274,458**
Albania	186	187	184	177	172	152	149	172
Belgium	5,245	5,137	5,118	4,985	4,889	4,693	4,757	4,735
Bulgaria *	832	681	691	757	695	689	723	911
Croatia	920	952	891	847	808	800	741	785
Czech Republic	2,660	2,258	2,207	2,138	2,035	2,323	2,217	2,515
Denmark	4,504	4,197	4,328	3,968	3,794	3,754	4,005	4,115
Estonia	332	352	415	424	446	477	505	516
France	51,971	50,439	50,721	50,711	50,096	49,619	50,376	51,067
Germany	46,255	45,378	46,675	43,783	43,188	43,755	45,175	47,036
Greece	7,902	6,482	5,782	5,401	5,420	5,664	5,821	5,720
Hungary	1,351	1,393	1,354	1,266	1,203	1,330	1,510	1,593
Italy	28,656	27,746	25,853	24,536	22,130	20,840	23,323	23,715
Latvia	251	256	232	251	258	295	415	507
Lithuania	326	312	309	323	385	507	678	830
Luxembourg	248	211	206	214	227	267	255	301
Montenegro	74	75	69	63	66	64	69	80
Netherlands	11,220	10,670	10,367	9,747	9,766	9,791	10,225	10,610
Norway	6,499	6,530	6,556	6,659	6,947	6,833	7,281	7,576
Poland	8,493	8,667	8,904	8,910	9,927	12,346	11,440	11,919
Portugal	3,540	3,489	3,155	3,203	2,929	3,022	2,949	3,099
Romania	2,086	2,180	2,090	2,264	2,460	2,755	2,801	4,194
Slovak Republic	1,138	999	1,022	934	964	1,143	1,170	1,283
Slovenia	772	627	552	494	471	460	514	533
Spain	14,743	13,319	14,327	12,519	12,569	13,153	11,820	13,884
Turkey	14,134	13,982	14,237	14,803	14,886	15,080	16,449	17,546
United Kingdom	60,329	59,368	54,530	58,283	57,451	55,760	59,381	59,218
North America	**739,113**	**746,272**	**704,783**	**661,961**	**629,175**	**615,210**	**630,029**	**640,336**
Canada	18,690	20,504	18,557	17,158	18,015	21,633	21,652	24,307
United States	720,423	725,768	686,226	644,803	611,159	593,577	608,377	616,029
NATO Total	**1,013,705**	**1,012,082**	**965,485**	**919,556**	**883,290**	**870,717**	**894,709**	**914,795**

Figure 4.5. Defence Expenditure (Million US dollar) from 2010 to 2017.[83]

In order to account for variations over three years since the Wales Summit, with few countries consistently growing defence expenditure, in terms of GDP, since 2014 in real

[82] *Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2010-2017)*, 29th June 2017.
[83] *Ibid.* Note that 2017 is an estimated figure.

terms, the percentage increase has been averaged across the period, and is visualised in Figure 4.6.



Figure 4.6. Average Annual Change in GDP (%) Defence Expenditures from 2014 to 2017.[84]

Combining the information from the figures above a clear picture is evident. The central members[85] of NATO have been substantially more proactive in increasing their defence expenditure since the Wales Summit. The southern member states, especially, have been lacking. Greece, for example, has decreased its real spend from $7.9 billion in 2010 to $5.7 billion in 2017, despite recording an increase in GDP expenditure to 2.3 per cent. Italy presents a similar picture with a decline in real defence expenditure yet a rise in GDP share. Greece, and Italy, therefore, are meeting its NATO target despite falling defence expenditure. The western members also follow a similar trend. The essential point here is national priorities and choice. The central members have made defence a national priority and are keen to ensure that their defence posture is increased. The southern members have

[84] Authors calculations derived from the *Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2010-2017)*, 29th June 2017, table 3.

[85] The same division as in the section on commonality has been utilised.

differing national, and security, priorities, whilst the western members have, on the whole, more substantive defence budgets, and a sustained history of defence procurement leading to a relatively high standard of equipment. Without the immediacy of the threat it appears that the member states of NATO are not prepared to fully embrace the requisite defence expenditure and are more inclined to make a token gesture.

The implication of the analysis is that the defence capabilities of some member states, especially the United States, are more of a public good, and woven into the institutional fabric of the Alliance, than those of other countries. However, when a security threat emerges, the countries most affected by a given change in the international security environment, will respond rationally by increasing their defence expenditure, as a matter of national priority, accordingly.

In terms of specificity, the actual enforcement of institutional rules is not vital, rather it is the presence of specific and enduring rules. Despite the lack of formal institutional rules, the acceptance of informal rules is sufficient to meet the institutional marker of specificity. Given that the member states have on the whole, see Figure 4, increased their defence expenditure since the Wales Summit 2014, and the defence spending pledge, it can be asserted that the rule is accepted and present. Thereby, demonstrating specific institutional functionality underpinning NATO's return to the primacy of its collective defence security task.

Differentiation

Wallander & Keohane (1999, 24) suggest one important hallmark of an institution is its ability to organise a legitimate division of responsibility that leads to differing roles for the members of the institution. In regard to collect defence it is evident that some NATO members have specific roles and take leadership in certain areas, despite the expectation

that all members contribute to collective defence.[86] Differentiation in the NATO is ingrained via the Smart Defense Initiative, a concept based on specialisation and cooperation that evolved out of the Lisbon Summit, 2010. After exploring Smart Defense, analysis of the traditional military domains of air, land, sea, and nuclear, will be utilised to show the extent of differentiation.[87]

NATO's website declares that 'Smart Defence is a cooperative way of generating modern defence capabilities that the Alliance needs, in a more cost-effective, effective and coherent manner.'[88] The driving rationale for this mechanism of ensuring NATO capabilities, was the period of austerity following the 2008 financial crisis and the desire for a more 'equitable sharing of the defence burden'.[89] The Initiative was launched by then Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in 2011 when he stated that the goal of Smart Defense was 'ensuring greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility'.[90] Rasmussen, identifies three consequences that Smart Defense is supposed to address. First, a divided Europe, which is reliant on a core of nations – France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – to provide European security, which would result in a weakening in Alliance solidarity and the principles of collective defence as the lesser nations become increasingly unable to provide military power. Second, a weaker Europe, whereby the capability gap in the ability of the European powers to provide military power is diminished, leaving the crisis management role of NATO unfulfillable. Third, weakening the transatlantic bond, due to an increasing reliance on the United States to underpin European Security and

[86] It should be noted that the United States contributes to almost every facet of NATO.
[87] The fifth domain of warfare, cyber, is explored on its own merit in the subsequent chapter.
[88] NATO website topic on Smart Defence available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-BB3604C0-B321A386/natolive/topics_84268.htm [accessed 26 Mar 2019].
[89] *Ibid.*
[90] Rasmussen, A. F. (2011) Building Security in an Age of Austerity, *Keynote speech to the Munich Security Conference*, 4th February.

the removal of the European members of NATO as defense partners to a status of being a defence burden. The solution was Smart Defense and Rasmussen went on to state that;

> The era of one-size-fits-all defence cooperation is over. What matters is to deliver capabilities that allow us to operate successfully at 28. Smart Defence can do just that. It can help nations meet two challenges they face today: how to get more security for the limited resources they devote to defence, and how to invest enough to prepare for the future.[91]

Henius & MacDonald (2012, 5), however, observe that 'Smart Defence… appears as little more than a new attempt to implement an old idea… [and] Smart Defence remains a rather vague concept'. Indeed, no formal definition of Smart Defence is provided in *AAP-06 Glossary of Terms & Definitions*. The vagueness of concept enables Richter & Webb (2014) to argue that the focus on capabilities is misplaced and that concentration on interoperability of support functions would be more likely to achieve tangible outcomes. Whilst Giegerich (2012, 69) acknowledges that Smart Defence is easy to criticise for both the reasons above, but that neither of the criticisms offers an effective solution for the problem of 'how to make better use of scarce resources in the context of greater uncertainty'.

The Warsaw Summit represented a return to deterrence, 'based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities'.[92] The nuclear commitment to NATO is provided substantially by the United States,[93] as is the ballistic missile defence shield. On the land, as seen in Figure 4.7, the application of the Framework Nation Concept sees the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the United States assume a lead role in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland respectively. Furthermore, each contributing country operates

[91] *Ibid.*
[92] *The Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security*, 9th July 2016, para 3.
[93] The United Kingdom and France's nuclear weapons sit outside the integrated NATO command structure, as seen during the 1980s debates regarding the INF Treaty, though the UK does make a limited amount available to NATO.

in individual countries, with a structure fluid enough to enable Denmark to replace France in Estonia in 2018, whilst France switches its deployment to Lithuania.



Figure 4.7. Enhanced Forward Presence 2017.[94]

The upcoming section on compliance highlights the deployments to the Baltic Air Policing mission, but in terms of differentiation established since the Crimean Crisis it can be seen that command and contributions have been distributed amongst the Allies. Poland twice, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Hungary, Belgium, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, and the United States have all shared command responsibilities.[95] This represents over one third of the Alliance in a command position in a vital collective defence security role within a three-year period. Whilst at sea, the Allied Maritime Command, headquartered in Northwood, England, overseas coordination of four maritime groups. Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG1) and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group One (SNMCMG1) operate primarily in the Balkans under Norwegian and Latvian command respectively. Whilst

[94] Reproduced from https://i0.wp.com/steigan.no/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/nato-baltikum.jpg?resize=700%2C403 [accessed 26 Mar 2019].
[95] See the Allied Air Command website for further information.

Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2) and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group Two (SNMCMG2) are primarily concerned with operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Although both groups are under British command, a diverse range of participants, including Albanian, French, German, Greek, and Turkish ships, is indicative of differentiation. Furthermore, the Alliance's maritime counter-terrorism mission, Operation Sea Guard, in the Western Mediterranean, is led by a French flagship.[96]

Despite efforts to proactively differentiate responsibility via the Smart Defence Initiative the task allocation of the Alliance accommodates national security priorities. As such, despite the commonality demonstrated, the underlying national differences in approaches to Russia after the annexation of Crimea, may well influence the effectiveness of the collective defence measures introduced by the Alliance. However, by enabling the southern nations, primarily Greece and Turkey, to focus on maritime security in and around their territorial waters, whilst the more Northern members provide the air and land aspects of the Alliance's deterrence posture, it is clear that NATO is providing differentiation, even if this may ultimately raise concerns regarding Alliance cohesion (Breach, 2017; Keller, 2017).

Effectiveness

The final pillar of the transformational model to be analysed in this chapter is effectiveness. The effectiveness of an institution in enacting its policies is closely tied to how purposeful that institution might be. If ineffective then questions regarding the validity of the institution in question will undoubtedly arise. NATO, as a military alliance, would face critical challenges if its core provision of collective defence was not met. Proceeding from these

[96] See the Allied Maritime Command website for further information.

observations, the analysis below will be by reference to the markers of implementation, compliance, and persistence.

Implementation

Analysis of implementation, with regards to collective defence, falls into two categories. First, how effective has the Alliance been in instigating its proactive Smart Defense concept. Second, how far has the Alliance been successful in implementing the reactive measures introduced at the Wales and Warsaw Summits. The findings of this section will provide an insight into the ability of NATO to act as a purposeful institution.

In analysing the implementation of Smart Defence, NATO has identified two different strands; multinational cooperation on strategic projects, and multinational projects, the former being orchestrated by NATO and the later supported.[97] It should be noted that a number of the projects mentioned were in the planning or underway prior to the announcement of the Smart Defense Initiative. The strategic projects include NATO's missile defence capability, the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) programme, NATO Air Policing, and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR). The multinational projects have primarily a tactical effect, which so far NATO has completed approximately a third of the Tier 1 projects that have been instigated.[98] Given the focus of this chapter is on collective defence analysis will be limited to the strategic projects, as they have direct implications for the deterrence posture of the Alliance.

The NATO missile defence system originated with a feasibility study after the 2002 Prague Summit before full endorsement at the Lisbon Summit 2010, and the declaration of initial

[97] Multinational Projects. Media Backgrounder, October 2013.
[98] Presentation by Dragomir Draganov (2016) NATO Cyber Defence (CD) Capability: The Role of Smart Defence, NATO Cyber Defence Smart Defence Projects Conference, Lisbon, 28th April, p. 3.

operational capacity in July 2016. During the operationalisation ceremony for the Aegis missile defence system, Jens Stoltenberg highlighted the nations involved in the successful delivery of the missile defence programme – the United States, Romania, Poland, Spain, Turkey, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom – and stated that 'missile defence is an important tool for NATO's core task of collective defence.'[99]

AGS is on course to be operational during 2017-18 and will 'give commanders a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground' in real-time.[100] The project consists of an air segment, five RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 40,[101] a ground segment, providing data processing and C2ISR systems, and a Core support segment at the main AGD base in Signoella, Italy, which also serves as a base for the JISR programme. Whilst all members of the Alliance have contributed to the project via common funding arrangements. Fifteen-member states – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United States - or over half the Alliance, have been involved in contributing to specific components of the project.

The Air Policing role is well-established in NATO and has been operational since 2003. As it is discussed in the section on compliance, analysis will turn to the JISR programme. JISR 'is the synchronization and integration of Operations and Intelligence capabilities and activities, geared to providing timely information to support decisions' and the process is illustrated in Figure 4.8.[102] Initial operational capability was declared for JISR on 10th

[99] *Defending our Nations from Ballistic Missile Threats*. 12th May 2016.
[100] Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS). Factsheet, July 2016.
[101] *First NATO AGS Aircraft Gets Off the Ground*. 20th December 2015.
[102] NATO Communications and Information Agency, available at https://www.ncia.nato.int/Our-Work/Pages/Joint-Intelligence-Surveillance-and-Reconnaissance.aspx [accessed 26 Mar 2019].

February 2016[103] following the completion of a feasibility study by the NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre, which identifies the importance of commonality and integration for successful project delivery.[104]

Figure 4.8. Joint ISR Process.

The four strategic projects, as part of the Smart Defence Initiative, therefore, have all been successfully delivered and all aid the collective defence posture of the Alliance by enhancing deterrence. The Baltic Air Policing role provides intelligence and monitoring of any potential intrusions and activity, which then co-ordinates, as part of the JISR process, with other assets available to SACEUR. The ability to provide real-time information to SACEUR does aid decisions on the battlefield, which operates as deterrence by denial, as it denies the enemy the ability to operate freely. Whilst, the advent of missile defence across Eastern Europe has a significant deterrent effect as the potential nullification, or at least diminution, of the potency of Russia's nuclear arsenal presents the Alliance with a potential first-strike capability, and the ability to realistically deter a conventional assault with nuclear weapons due the increased potential for operation with impunity.

[103] *Statement by Defence Ministers on the Declaration of the Initial Operational Capability for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*, Brussels, 10th February 2016.
[104] Joint Air Power Competence Centre (2015) NATO/Multinational joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Unit: A Feasibility Study, Kalkar: JAPCC, pp. 54-6.

The measures highlighted as part of the Smart Defence Initiative were already in development prior to the annexation of Crimea and hostility in the Donbass, in early 2014, and, therefore, are indicative of a purposive Alliance (Flockhart, 2016, 156). This section will now identify the measures adopted at the Wales Summit, and Warsaw Summit and analyse how well they have been implemented.

The Wales Summit had two key aspects, in relation to collective defence, the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and the Defence Spending Pledge, as discussed in the section on specificity. The RAP consists of assurance measures and adaptation measures. Assurance measures were introduced during May 2014, as part of the Alliance's immediate response to the Crimean crisis – primarily increased Air Policing and deployments for exercises. These involved a series of measures to reassure the eastern members of the Alliance that Article V would be upheld and that every member of the Alliance was considered equal. [105] Whether this assurance activity acted as a meaningful deterrent to potential future Russian action is debatable,[106] hence the need for more robust measure to be introduced at the Warsaw Summit, 2016. The Adaptation Measures, meanwhile, have included:[107]

- Enhancing the NRF
- Establishment of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) Spearhead force as part of the NRF
- Improved command and control in the eastern members of the Alliance, via NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs)
- Improved readiness and capabilities at the Multinational Corps Northeast HQ in Szczecin, Poland
- Enhancing NATO's Standing Naval Forces
- Infrastructure investment to improve airfields and ports to aid the reinforcement of Eastern Allies and minimise the impact of A2/AD operations
- More exercises focused on crisis management and collective defence

[105] NATO's Readiness Action Plan. Factsheet, February 2015.
[106] Volker, K. (2014) Where's NATO's Strong Response to Russia's Invasion of Crimea, *Foreign Policy*, 18th March.
[107] http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_02/20150205_1502-Factsheet-RAP-en.pdf

The RAP received a positive endorsement as early as the Defence Ministers Meeting, 5th February 2015, which declared that 'the implementation of the Plan is well underway, and we have achieved considerable progress since the Wales Summit'.[108] Progress appears to have continued. The Multinational Corps Northeast HQ, following exercise Saber Strike 2017, confirmed, on 24th June, 'its 24/7 readiness to command and control NATO high-readiness forces if deployed to north-Eastern Europe'.[109] On the maritime front, Exercise Noble Mariner 16, October 2016, was designed to confirm that the maritime components of the NRF had sufficient interoperability, readiness and capabilities. Prior to 2015, and the launch of increased transparency, NATO and SHAPE kept no formal records of exercises. Comparing the quantity of exercises pre-Wales to post-Wales, therefore, is problematic. The NATO Readiness Action Plan Factsheet, May 2015, however, asserts that the Alliance has 'conducted more exercises focused on crisis management and collective defence',[110] with 'over 100 of the nearly 300 exercises… in support of NATO's assurance measures'.[111] 2016 saw a similar number of large scale exercises.[112] NATO, therefore, is able to provide a positive assessment of the RAP, and that collective defence has been enhanced.

The positive endorsement of the RAP by NATO is problematic. Breach (2017) argues that the logic behind a token military response to deter a cross-domain coercive strategy is flawed. Grygiel & Mitchell (2016, 127) posit that the RAP had 'more of a rhetorical than practical impact.' Whilst Arnold (2016) acknowledges the limited scale of the RAP, but argues that the strategic benefits outweigh the flaws; specifically a deterrence benefit, a defence benefit, the benefit of depth, and a deliverables benefit. The RAP does enhance deterrence and defence, even if only in a limited capacity, it does add greater strategic

[108] *Statement by the NATO Defence Ministers on the Readiness Action Plan*, Brussels, 5th February 2015, para 3.
[109] See the certification statement provided by the Multinational Corps Northeast, 14th June 2017, available at https://mncne.pl/247-readiness/ [accessed 26 Mar 2019].
[110] NATO's Readiness Action Plan. Factsheet, May 2015, p. 2.
[111] NATO's Readiness Action Plan. Factsheet, July 2016.
[112] Key NATO & Allied Exercises. Factsheet, June 2016.

depth by enhancing the ability to operate on multiple fronts simultaneously,[113] and the evidence shows it has been delivered. The argument of Arnold (2016) and NATO, therefore, is that the symbolic step of the RAP is more important than its actual military capability, which in line with Breach (2017) raises the question as to whether the RAP is a military response. As such the RAP is less about credibility, it is unable to militarily deter Russia, and more concerned with Alliance cohesion, it develops a consensus for action. The evolution of the NRF follows a similar trend.

The NRF was initially established in 2003, as a crisis management mechanism not focussed on collective defence, and is made up of land, maritime, air, special operations, logistics, and CBRN elements. Full Operating Capacity (FOC) was declared at the Riga Summit, 2006, but had to be rescinded within a year, due to Allied commitments not being fulfilled and the credibility of the force remained problematic (Abts, 2015; Ringsmose, 2009). After the Wales Summit the NRF was reoriented toward collective defence roles, rebranded as the Enhanced NRF, and reconstituted into four parts; command and control, VJTF, Initial Follow on Forces Group (IFFG), and Response Forces Pool (RFP). The VJTF intends to deploy military force within 48 hours, which is then supported by high-readiness IFFG over the following six months, with the RFP operates in the six-month to one year time frame, mainly based on the old NRF framework. The VJTF was declared operational at the Warsaw Summit alongside the Enhanced NRF. The Warsaw Summit also saw the first six NFIUs – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania - declared operational, with Hungary and Slovakia activated during 2017.

The evidence shows that, in a short space of time, NATO has been able to decide a shift in strategic direction, develop a plan of action, and implement the changes.

[113] *Secretary General's Annual Report 2011*.

Compliance

NATO was formed on the basis of collective defence and Article V. It is, therefore, a logical assumption to make that a significant degree of compliance would exist for measures determined to enhance the collective defence capability of the Alliance. However, given the different national perspectives highlighted in the section on commonality, debate between southern and eastern member nations of NATO as to priorities, and the best possible means of enhancing security the actual situation is far more complex. Potential differences also exist across the different spheres of the military spectrum, so whilst compliance may exist in terms of aerial defence, whether the same is true of land deployments, and potential nuclear forces and ballistic missile defence, can be questioned. Such questions will be explored throughout this section, which will breakdown collective defence in the constitute parts of defence, deterrence and dissuasion, as outlined in the clarification of terminology section.

The ability of the Alliance to offer defence against Russian aggression towards a member state is a question that has recurred since the annexation of Crimea.[114] In February 2016, the Atlantic Council, an influential American think tank, concluded that NATO was unable to fight and win a war against Russia, primarily due to insufficient defence expenditure (di Paolo et al., 2016). An attempt to redress this balance can be seen in the Wales Summit Declaration, which reinforced the commitment for NATO members to spend, at least, 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence to help meet NATO Capability Targets and address existing capability shortfalls.[115] Given that NATO prioritises deterrence, as its primary collective defence strategic mechanism, the implication is that communal acceptance, of the inability to defend on purely military terms, is evident.

[114] For example, Camilla Turner's 20th February 2015 article, Britain Cannot Defend Itself Against Putin's Military Might, *The Telegraph* and Jamie Grierson in *The Guardian* on 17th September 2016, UK Armed Forces 'Could Not Withstand Attack by Major Power like Russia'.
[115] Wales Summit Declaration, para 14.

There is a limited debate on the permanent stationing of forces in Europe, promoted by former SACEUR, General Philip Breedlove.[116] Breedlove argues that 'permanently stationed forces are a force multiplier that rotational deployments can never match'[117] and this view has been reinforced by General Wesley Clark, a predecessor to Breedlove, and also General Richard Sherriff, DSACEUR under Breedlove (see Clark et al., 2016). The desire for increased military capability is not limited to former SACEURs. Ambassador Jüri Luik,[118] has stated the major challenge facing the Alliance is the restoration of collective defence in practice and ensuring capabilities are 'real and usable not just symbolic'. Kiesewetter & Zielke (2016), however, disagree and argue that permanent forces in Eastern Europe would not enhance security. The debate, therefore, is not one actually focussed on defence, but rather defence is a new vehicle for exploring the established analysis on burden-sharing and a multi-tier NATO (Hallams & Schreer, 2012; Hillison, 2014; Marton & Hynek, 2012; Noetzel & Schreer, 2009).[119] The opinion that NATO is unable to defend against a Russian attack is representative of the Alliance and emphasises the importance of deterrence and dissuasion.

Separating deterrence and dissuasion is problematic, and somewhat artificial, as the actions of a military Alliance are likely to involve a military element even when those actions are substantially political in origin. Strengthening deterrence has been a central focus of NATO Defence Minister meetings during 2017 and is demonstrated by press conferences by Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO.[120] The Alliance talks of 'full-spectrum

[116] Senate Armed Services Committee, *Statement of General Philip Breedlove*, Commander US Forces Europe, 30th April 2015.
[117] *Ibid.*, p.3.
[118] Former Estonian Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council. Comments from presentation given at RUSI 20th June 2016.
[119] Jens Stoltenberg 25th May 2017 *Doorstep Statement ahead of meeting of NATO Heads of State*, Brussels.
[120] Jens Stoltenberg's 16th February 2017 *Press Conference following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, Brussels.

deterrence'[121] which implies that all member states are equally committed to deterrence across the domains of warfare - air, land, sea, nuclear, cyber, and space – as well as the hybrid challenges that transcend traditional boundaries. It would be over-simplistic, however, to assert compliance on the basis of achievement of communal NATO objectives, as it marginalises potential differences between member states, and within the individual domains. To reflect compliance, across different aspects of deterrence, analysis of allied contributions will be assessed.

As in the section on commonality the members of NATO have been separated into western, eastern, and southern blocs, as depicted in Figure 4.1. Contributors to the Baltic Air Policing Mission, Figure 4.9, reveal some interesting potential differences within the differing members of the Alliance. The fact that the majority of contributors have been participating since before the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 implies a high degree of institutionalisation, effectiveness, and compliance, amongst the participating countries. The participation, however, does not appear to have had substantive support from the southern member states of NATO.[122] By visualising the number of times individual countries have participated in deployments to the Baltic Air Policing Mission, Figures 4.10 and 4.11, the discrepancy becomes more apparent.[123] Indeed it becomes clear that the substantive burden has been carried by the western member states and Poland. For example, the Turkish and Romanian contingents, seen in Figure 4.11, where in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Despite the recent involvement of the Italian Air Force it does not appear that the Southern members of NATO have the same desire to contribute to deterrence as the rest of the Alliance in the aerial domain.

[121] For example, Jens Stoltenberg 29th June 2017 *Doorstep statement ahead of the NATO Defence Ministers Meeting* in Brussels and Grand, C. (2016) Nuclear Deterrence and the Alliance in the 21st Century, *NATO Review*, 4th July.
[122] It should be noted that Croatia and Albania joined NATO in 2009. Montenegro joined in 2017.
[123] On 28th April 2014 the mission was reorganised from a rolling, overlapping, deployment schedule to fixed cycles of approximately six months.



Figure 4.9. Baltic Air Policing Contributors.



Figure 4.10. Number of Deployments to Baltic Air Policing Mission, 2003 to 2014.



Figure 4.11. Number of Deployments to Baltic Air Policing Mission, 2014 to 2017.

On examining the deployments to the Enhanced Forward Presence, the flagship statement from the Warsaw Summit 2016, the situation does not appear significantly different. As seen in Figure 4.12, Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria remain non-committal, and the lack of contribution from Croatia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary is significant.[124] A possible explanation is the divergence in approaches with Greece and Slovakia, especially, keen advocates of sanctions as opposed to potential military escalation, although major companies in Hungary and Greece have opposed continued sanctions (Larrabee et al., 2017). A further potential explanation is the reliance of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Greece on Russian gas imports, as seen in Figure 4.13. As such, whilst broad commonality exists with declarations, based on consensus, of support for full spectrum deterrence the means of achieving deterrence is divided, with some countries

[124] It should be noted that the *Joint Communique of the Visegrad Group Ministers of Defence*, 2nd February 2017, states that the Czech Republic will be deploying troops to Lithuania during Quarter 1 2017, Sloavkia to Latvia during Quarter 2 2017, and Hungary to Estonia during Quarter 3 2017.

favouring more dissuasive measures. Even more importantly they do not appear to be prepared to commit resources to actions with which they are uncomfortable. In many ways, it could be argued that the allies are continuing the opt-in opt-out approach to NATO evident in the ISAF mission, and compliance has not been enhanced by the return to collective defence. Just as the degree of compliance within the ISAF mission was affected by the member states individual security concerns, not every member of NATO regards Russia as a threat to the same degree. The member states are, therefore, acting rationally according to their own security interests, despite the apparent commonality evidenced earlier, otherwise they would surely have to act.



Figure 4.12. Enhanced Forward Presence.[125]

[125] NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence. Factsheet May 2017.



Figure 4.13. European Natural Gas Imports.

The conclusion, based on the evidence, section is that, from examining contributions to collective defence operations, and resource allocation that as a collective entity the NATO members have been compliant with the provisions of Wales and Warsaw Summits. A substantive question remains as to whether they have been meaningfully compliant. The evidence here is more variable, especially with regard to the southern members of the Alliance, as set out above. The geographic factor, however, is a red herring as Keller (2017) posits the challenge to NATO is more conceptual. One suspects that achieving consensus on meaningful compliance is substantially more elusive than mere compliance.

Persistence

Collective defence is not new to NATO. Indeed, it has been the bedrock of the Alliance since its foundation in 1949. NATO has a high degree of 'muscle memory'[126] with regards to collective defence. Persistence, therefore, is inherent in NATO's collective defence task. The significant driver of persistence is the continued exercise programme, that the partners and members of NATO partake in, and the application of lessons learned. Previous sections have already established the broad trend with NATO exercises. In this section, reference to the TRIDENT JUNCTURE exercise series, specifically TRIDENT JUNCTURE-15, will be used to demonstrate persistence.

TRIDENT JUNCTURE, is an annual exercise series that was specifically introduced to 'certify command and control elements of the NATO Response Force'.[127] NATO adopts a naming policy for its exercises, with the first letters of each word providing the command authority and the elements involved respectively. TRIDENT JUNCTURE, therefore, is identified as a joint exercise under Allied Command Transformation (ACT), which has significance as ACT is not responsible for collective defence, rather Allied Command Operations (ACO). TRIDENT JUNCTURE is the main mechanism for the Alliance to demonstrate 'its readiness, flexibility and capability to respond to threats from a range of areas'.[128] The exercise each year has a different focus, dependant on the security situation at the time. As such the scope and scale of the exercise has relevance when viewed within the political situation in the international security environment. Large scale exercises take around two years to plan (Yaman & Hahn, 2015, 3).

[126] The Economist (2014) NATO Flexes its Muscle Memory, 30th August.
[127] Kucukaksoy, I. (2014) Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 14 Concludes, *Joint Warfare Centre*, 17th November.
[128] Naval Today (n.d.) NATO Ready for Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2016.

TRIDENT JUNCTURE-14, during November 2014, involved one thousand four hundred and fifty-five personnel from thirty-three nations. The aim was to certify the Joint Force Command (JFC) at Naples as the command and control facility for the NRF, and the exercise 'tested NATO's ability to coordinate and execute a NATO-led Article 5 Collective Defence operation in a multinational environment'.[129] The exercise is mainly office based as it is testing a range of command and control process.[130] In other words, whilst the exercise performs a vital task and enhances the overall military capability to defend, there is no overt display of military power to deter or dissuade a potential aggressor.

TRIDENT JUNCTURE-15, on the other hand, in October and November 2015, was NATO's largest exercise for over a decade with more than thirty-six thousand personnel from every member nation and nine partners.[131] TRIDENT JUNCTURE-15 acted to certify the shift in command and control from JFC Naples to JFC Brunssum and was designed 'to test the new NATO Command Structure like never before, and to challenge the NRF concept'.[132] TRIDENT JUNCTURE-15 also tested the new VJTF, introduced at the Wales Summit, and practised JISR. TRIDENT JUNCTURE-14 involved tinkering behind the scenes,[133] whereas TRIDENT JUNCTURE-15 was an overt display of military capability designed to enhance the credibility of NATO's deterrence posture and demonstrate Alliance cohesion.[134] Given

[129] Kucukaksoy, I. (2014) Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 14 Concludes, *Joint Warfare Centre*, 17th November.
[130] The series of pictures contained within the album published by the Joint Headquarters at Naples confirms this, available at https://www.flickr.com/photos/jfcnapleshq/sets/72157646852899283/ [accessed 26 Mar 2019].
[131] Thirty-seven nations contributed in total see the infographic available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_10/20151021_151021-tj15-infograph.pdf [accessed 26 Mar 2019].
[132] See Hans-Lothar Domröse's focus on connected forces in STEDFAST JAZZ 13 and TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 in *The Three Swords*, Issue 26, p. 9. Command and control for the NRF rotates between JFC Naples and JFC Brunssum on an annual basis. The choice of Brunssum, on the Dutch-German border near Maastricht, to act as command and control for the largest Alliance exercise in over a decade is a political message to dissuade Russia from further hostilities.
[133] See Inci Kucukaksoy's review of Trident Juncture 14 in *The Three* Swords, Issue 27, November 2014, pp. 21-23.
[134] NATO refers to such exercises as LIVEEX, as opposed to CAX or C.X, which are designated command and control exercises.

the approximate two-year timetable to schedule a large-scale exercise, NATO would have to have begun the process as an almost instant response to Russia's actions in Crimea. Thereby demonstrating an ability to utilise institutional apparatus and mechanisms to respond to developments in the international security environment.

Exercises, for NATO, however, are not just political tools. Each individual exercise follows a prescribed planning process and maintains a focus on developing 'activities' in order to meet 'deliverables' as set out in the *Bi-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive(CT&ED) 075-003*, published in October 2013, with a sample from TRIDENT exercises published in Appendix E.[135] Figure 4.14 provides an illustration of the NATO exercise process, which depicts each of the four stages of an exercise, and the specific phases of the operational stage. For the persistence marker of an effective institution, the key element of this process is Phase IV, Assessment, and Stage 4, Analysis & Reporting. It is these elements that allow NATO as an organisation to enact a directive, test the directive, and then adapt the directive as necessary, before starting the cycle again. The process is identified as lessons learned.

[135] See *BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive (CT&ED) 075-003*, October 2013, Appendix E. For a detailed look at the planning behind TRIDENT JUNCTURE-15 see Markus Schiller's 2015 special report in the NATO Joint Warfare Centre Magazine, *The Three Swords Issue 29*, pp. 67-73.

Figure 4.14. NATO Exercise Process: Stages and Phases.[136]

In 2002, the Alliance formed the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), which demonstrates the central importance of the lessons learned process to NATO. The process of lessons learned, as depicted in Figure 4.15, therefore is institutionalised within NATO, with clear criteria to be met. Indeed, *AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations* states that 'the purpose of a Lessons Learned procedure is to learn efficiently from experience and to provide validated justifications for amending the existing way of doing things' and that 'the establishment of a lessons learned capability aims at enabling continuous improvement across the Alliance. The effectiveness of a JF [Joint Force] will be enhanced by such a capability'.[137] Such a clear statement makes the relevance of exercises and lessons learned to persistence and the overall pillar of effectiveness self-explanatory.

[136] *BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive (CT&ED) 075-003*, October 2013, p. 2-1. See the November 2015 edition of the *NATO Legal Gazette*, Issue 36, for further guidance.
[137] *AJP-3 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations Edition C Version 1*, para 0454 and 0453



Figure 4.15. NATO Lessons Learned Process.[138]

TRIDENT JUNCTURE-16 was on a similar scale and scope to TRIDENT-JUNCTURE-15. A much larger exercise, TRIDENT JUNCTURE-18, is scheduled to return in 2018, which is arguably a response to the Russian ZAPAD-17 exercise.[139] Indeed, the issue of exercise escalation is potentially serious (Frear, Kearns & Kulesa, 2015), though potentially overstated as it enhances credibility by demonstrating that NATO's reorientation towards collective defence. Russia has run the ZAPAD series every four years since 1999,[140] and as Sperling & Webber (2016, 20) observe the 2009 and 2013[141] iterations 'caused alarm in Poland and the Baltic States but did not lead the US and the major European allies to shift NATO toward countering Moscow'. The exercises are routinely observed, including by

[138] The NATO Lessons Learned Handbook (2016), 3rd edition, p. 11.
[139] See Ewan MacAskill 24th August 2017 Guardian article, Russia Readies for Huge Military Exercises as Tensions with West Simmer.
[140] The ZAPAD series itself was an old Soviet exercise that regularly ran throughout the Cold War.
[141] The culmination of ZAPAD-13 was a simulated nuclear strike on Warsaw.

Russia on NATO exercises,[142] and vice-versa,[143] though not always without controversy.[144] Analysis of ZAPAD-17 has demonstrated that the number of troops involved has been exaggerated by the Western media,[145] and that the scope of operations undertaken sought to enhance 'Russia's strategic deterrence and coercive capabilities'.[146] Following the TRIDENT JUNCTURE, and other, exercises Russia is similarly aware of NATO's capabilities, and the potential for irrational action is minimal.

Chapter Summary

The transformation that NATO has undertaken in response to the increased belligerence of Russia on the eastern perimeter of the Alliance emphasises the purposive nature of the institution. NATO has demonstrated itself to be agile and able to change in response to an evolving international security environment. Furthermore, the Alliance has demonstrated a capacity to enact change endogenously by instigating a number of initiatives, such as Smart Defence, prior to the exogenous shock or Russia's involvement in Crimea and Ukraine. The capacity to enact policies endogenously, that alter the environment of the institution, is a hallmark of a purposive institution. As such, this chapter has shown the institutional effect of the Alliance, and how it enhances the security of the member states and, more broadly, the Euro-Atlantic area.

[142] *NATO Opens Trident Juncture Exercise to International Observers*. 29th October 2015.
[143] See Julian Barnes's 20th August 2017 Wall Street Journal article, NATO will send Three Observes to Russian Military Exercise.
[144] See Daniel Boffey's 6th September 2017 Guardian article, NATO Accuses Russia of Blocking Observation of Massive War Games
[145] See Igor Sutyagin (2017*) Zapad-2017: Why Do the Numbers Matter?* 12th September, for the importance of numbers of troops in military exercise monitoring.
[146] See Mathieu Boulègue (2017) *Five Things to Know About the Zapad-2017 Military Exercise*, 25th September.

Chapter 5: NATO and Cyber-Security

> According to our latest surveys, there were an average of 500 threatening cyberattacks per month on NATO facilities over the past year, which required intense intervention from our experts - an increase of 60 percent over 2015 Most of these attacks are not by private individuals but are sponsored by state institutions of other countries.
>
> Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary-General of NATO, January 2017.[1]

Ever since cyber-security was incorporated as an area of NATO concern at the Prague Summit, in 2002, the importance of the threat to, and the response from, the Alliance has been increasing. In the above quote, Jens Stoltenberg, explicitly states that the problem is one of foreign governments choosing to make actions in cyberspace an expression of national power seeking to further national interests. Stoltenberg, speaking to *De Bild* in 2016, stated the result of such challenges means that 'NATO will have to adjust to' the increasing prevalence of cyber-attacks in everyday life 'and defend cyberspace just as decisively as sea, land, and air'.[2] Cyberspace has now become the 'fourth domain of operational leadership' for NATO.[3]

Stoltenberg's concept, when analysed, is a narrow one that constrains cyberspace to state-based responses and militarises the threat. Arguably, military problems have traditional been a more comfortable area for NATO than political, or societal problems. Military operations within cyberspace, however, only form part of the area of concern for NATO.

[1] Quoted in Schiltz, C. (2017) Cyberangriffe können Bündnisfall nach Artikel 5 auslösen, *De Welt*, 19th January.
[2] Kautz, H. (2016) Wie viel Angst müssen wir vor Putin haben?, *De Bild*, 17th June.
[3] Stoltenberg refers to the fourth domain of operational leadership in the *De Bild* interview, in reference to where NATO has operational input even though Space is, widely, considered the fourth domain of warfare and cyber the fifth. The development of Space as an operational domain is underdeveloped in the United States, and other NATO members, though Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of US Pacific Command (PACOM) has argued before congress for increased funding, see Hirsch, S. (2018) US Must Accept Space as Key Battleground, PACOM Commander Tells Congress, *Air Force Magazine*, 14th February. Potential synergy exists between space and cyberspace (Livingstone and Lewis, 2016; Valeri, 2013) and, hence, the delineation between the fourth and fifth domain may become increasingly blurred.

Fourth Generation Warfare, or New Generation Warfare,[4] involves a deliberate blurring of the lines of conflict and operates on the threshold between war and peace. The fundamental question that underpins this case study is what is NATO's role in this new paradigm of warfare. Furthermore, how has the Alliance developed its role in practice. In this case study, the nature of the transformation that NATO has undertaken will be analysed in line with the three pillars of the transformation model; adaptation, institutionalisation, and effectiveness. A substantive difference to the two previous cases is the lack of a definitive exogenous shock that has provided the impetus for transformation.[5] However, it is necessary to begin with emphasising the background context of the debate, and a clarification of core terms and concepts.[6]

Background

In order to enable the upcoming arguments in this chapter have validity it is important to establish the raw facts, before exploring the differing conceptual interpretations that exist around them. For NATO, how it has developed its cyber-security policy, posture, and,

[4] New Generation Warfare is the Russian terminology encapsulated by the 'Gerasimov doctrine'. The term 'Gerasimov doctrine' is considered problematic, as arguably Gerasimov's predecessor as Chief of the General Staff, Makarov, had more of a substantive influence on the 'doctrine's' development, and the process is evolutionary rather than a revolutionary one that can be attributed to a specific individual. Furthermore, the idea of doctrine in Russia reflects the overall notion of how to fight a war in the future, thereby the 'Gerasimov doctrine' would be the only way that Russia could fight a war, as opposed to a potential way. In this light, the 'Gerasimov doctrine' is neither a doctrine or can be accurately attributed to a particular influence of Gerasimov, outside of his emphasis on scientific principles, https://vpk-news.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf [accessed 26 Feb 2019]. New Generation Warfare, despite some differences is broadly the same as the American Fourth Generation Warfare, and this thesis will maintain reference to later throughout.

[5] Even if one was to take the view that the development of ARPANET in the 1980s, the increase in cyber espionage in the 1990s, Estonia 2007, Georgia 2009, Olympic Games & Stuxnet in 2009/10, or the recent Russian meddling in domestic elections as an exogenous shock, no one incident has the same level of effect and influence, i.e. definitive, as 9/11 or the invasion in Crimea, from the previous two case studies. As such the case study represents NATO's transformation in the absence of a definitive exogenous shock, rather a series of smaller shocks which have gradually led to a fundamental change in the nature of warfare.

[6] The clarification of core terms and concepts is a highly contested area with differing conceptions of cyberspace, cyber-attack, and cyber-weapons, being used to underpin different academic arguments, especially given the evolutionary nature of the debate. There is a degree of intellectual tweaking of concepts to enable positions to be taken that support the individual authors arguments being made.

ultimately, incorporated within collective defence and Article V, is rooted in just what the internet is and how it works. This background section aims to provide clarity of what the internet is, and second, how the internet works.

When the term 'the internet' is used widespread conflation with the World Wide Web (www) is embedded. Although, this conflation will form the basis for discussion of the conception of the internet and cyberspace, for now, to introduce the background, the internet's development is the post-Second World War exploits that lead to www. being established by Sir Tim Berners Lee, at CERN, in the 1980s. The internet began with the development of electronic computers in the 1950s, and the exploration of establishing network capability by the United States, United Kingdom, and France. However, it was the development of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) by the United States' Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in the 1960s, that established the framework for the www. Without getting overly technical, Robert E. Kahn and Vinton Cerf, whilst working at DARPA on developing the ARPANET, in 1974, established the Transmission Control Program which was subsequently divided into Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP). TCP/IP is the basis of how the www. acquires information via four layers; link layer, internet layer, transport layer, and application layer.[7] Whilst it is not necessary to fully understand the intricacies of TCP/IP, the essential point is that the primary concern is with the flow of information not with the security of that information. The lack of early concern with security is the fundamental design flaw that underpins the majority of challenges which are presented today within the cyber environment.

[7] See the Requirements for Internet Hosts – Communication layers report from the Internet Engineering Task Force in 1989.

Although the intricacies of the operation of the www. are not necessary, a basic understanding of how the www. operates and acquires data will enhance the conceptual clarity of the arguments being made. Figure 5.1, provides a visualisation of the workings of the www. Person A, requests information, for example from news.bbc.co.uk, the web-browser, via Hypertext Transfer Protocol (http), translates this into a request from the Domain Name Server (DNS), for the four-digit IP address for the destination, in the BBC example this is 212.58.226.75, the information is returned to your computer. The router then establishes the best route from person A's device to the destination site, to get the requested information, and back to person A's device, to display the requested information, as displayed in Figure 5.2. This is not a direct journey, rather one that takes place via a series of nodes along the way. In other words, data is passing through a series of intermediary points before arriving at its destination, processing the request and then relying the response.



Figure 5.1. How the Internet Works.[8]

[8] Image replicated from https://s.hswstatic.com/gif/internet-diagram.gif [accessed 26 Feb 2019].



Figure 5.2. Internet Routing.[9]

The internet, therefore, is a communication system which operates following principles that data back to Roman times, if not earlier. *Cursus Publicus*, was the Roman communication network. Information was handed to a courier at Point A and the message would be relayed to the destination, Point Z. Along the way the courier would stop off at various Points, B, C, etc., for rest and to change horses. For speed the message was sometimes handed over to a different courier to continue to the next point. As technology progressed this same basic communication network, data passing through nodes, underpins the use of beacons,[10]

[9] Replicated from https://ssl-proxy-updated.herokuapp.com/b685e88821462df9844dc3af09568287f050e178/687474703a2f2f7777772e7634632e6f72672f73697465732f64656661756c742f66696c65732f7374796c65732f6c617267652f7075626c69632f62617369635f5443502e706e67/ [accessed 26 Feb 2019].

[10] For example, the Brecon Beacons is named after the beacons that were lit to warn of approaching raiders and, perhaps, the most famous use of beacons was to warn of the approach of the Spanish Armada in 1588.

semaphore, and the telegram, amongst others (see Standage, 1998; 2013). The internet is the latest technological manifestation of this communication system that is now a lot quicker and able to carry a greater diversity of information at speed. www., is the most prevalent form of internet today, but it is only one example. Since the introduction of www. in the early 1990s the amount of information that has flowed through the internet, as a percentage of the share of two-way telecommunications, has increased from 1% in 1993, to 51% by 2000, and 97% by 2007 (Hilbert and López, 2011).

The internet, therefore, and other networks, exist as means of increasing the communication of data between two points. In the past, the maintenance of public support, or the potential to erode it, was primarily reliant on direct results on the battlefield, the increased speed of information transfer enables effective real-time news to be deployed directly to citizens. Therefore, the national will of a country can be challenged by directly targeting its people, leading not only to an erosion of the threshold between war and peace but also an erosion of the separation between the battlefield and non-battlefield (Czosseck and Geers, 2009). In short the maxim of *Sun Tzu*, that 'the highest excellence is to subdue the enemy's army without fighting at all' has reached its zenith (Carr, 2000, 79).[11] Western military doctrine, and its basis on Clausewitzian principles,[12] therefore, may no longer be relevant in Fourth Generation Warfare.[13]

[11] It should be noted that western commentators are criticised for not fully understanding the impact of Sun Tzu's work, as they remove analysis from the context of Chinese strategic culture (Yuen, 2014). As such the observation of Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001a, 2) that 'future conflicts may resemble the Oriental game of *Go* more than the Western game of chess' have added poignancy.
[12] As exemplified by NATO in *AJP-01(D)*, and member states such as, the US in *FM 3-0* and the UK in *JDP 0-01*.
[13] Continued attempts to reinvigorate Clausewitz for the modern age are evident. A number of authors directly draw reference to *On* War in the title, for example, *On Future War* (van Creveld, 1991), *On Cyber Warfare* (Cornish et al., 2010), *More on War* (van Creveld, 2017), as well as analysis of Clausewitzian principles in relation to Fourth Generation Warfare (Farmer, 2010; Kinross, 2004; Leonhard, 2000). Furthermore, Rid (2013a) uses a strict Clausewitzian interpretation of warfare, involving violence and instrumentality, to refute the notion of cyber war altogether.

Within this mix of different contextual overarching conceptions for understanding the nature of warfare in the modern age, lies the question of what NATO's role is and how it has been able to achieve its objectives. Attention now turns to identifying the core terms and concepts of the cyber environment.

Clarification of core terms & concepts

The basic facts of how the internet operates, provided above, lead to the assumption that, as in the historical cases, the internet will operate, in the military sphere, as a force multiplier. In other words, it seeks to enhance, primarily, the Clausewitzian principles of economy of effort and concentration of force, as only the requisite forces to undertake a task need be deployed due to enhanced information, whilst other principles also benefit (see Carr, 2000). However, NATO,[14] and other nations such as the United States,[15] now recognise the medium that the internet utilises to transmit its data as the Fifth Domain of warfare, alongside the physical domains of Air, Land, Sea and Space (see Bunker and Heal, 2014). The Fifth Domain is what is referred to as cyberspace, and this chapter now turns to develop conceptual clarity for the term cyberspace, and associated military terminology, specifically cyber-attack and cyber-weapons.

Cyberspace

The term cyberspace is contentious due to the lack of etymological basis for the word .[16] The term, however, has near ubiquitous usage and acceptance as a means of identifying the object under discussion, although what cyberspace is and its constituent parts are, provide a matter of substantive ongoing, and evolving, debate (Balzacq and Cavelty, 2016;

[14] NATO Recognises Cyberspace as a 'Domain of Operations' at Warsaw Summit, 21st July 2016.
[15] *The Economist* (2010) War in the Fifth Domain: Are the Mouse and Keyboard the New Weapons of Conflict? 1st July.
[16] The term cyberspace originated from a fictional science fiction book by William Gibson, *Neuromancer*, published in 1982.

Caton, 2014; Finlay, 2018; Futter, 2018; Hegenbart, 2014; Libicki, 2017; Rid, 2013a). As such a diverse range of debates can be posited from different fields, with different conceptual basis used depending on the nature of the arguments being pursued. For example, geography (Sheldon, 2014; Warf, 2014), computer technology (Warner, 2012; 2015), warfare (Butler, 2015; Cahanin, 2011; Cornish et al., 2010; Czosseck and Geers, 2009; Farwell and Rohozinski, 2012; Gartzke, 2013; Gartzke and Lindsay, 2017; Gompert and Libicki, 2015; Green, 2015; McGraw, 2013), legal implications (Chayes, 2015a; b; Kehler et al., 2017; Schmitt, 2013; 2015; Schmitt and Vihul, 2014), critical infrastructure (Rudner, 2013; Tiirmaa-Klaar, 2016) – especially nuclear (Baylon et al., 2015; Futter, 2015; 2016), crime (Lusthaus, 2012; 2013; Rosemont, 2016; Saunders, 2017; Snyder and Kanich, 2016), - and the effect on insurance (Camillo, 2017), maritime (Tam and Jones, 2018), terrorism (Bernard, 2017; Chen et al., 2014; Gross et al., 2017; Jarvis et al., 2013; Jarvis et al., 2016), national security (Broeders, 2017; Clarke and Knake, 2010; Libicki, 2007; Matania et al., 2017), and policy implications (Chertoff, 2017; He et al., 2016; Nussbaum and Lewis, 2017; Pawlak, 2013; Pawlak and Barmpaliou, 2017; Pawlak and Sheahan, 2014; Sexton, 2016). The examples are by no means exhaustive but provide an insight into the breadth of the debate. There are then further aspects of cyberspace that are specific to international relations between actors, for example, espionage (Inkster, 2015b; Talbot, 2015), attribution challenges (Lindsay, 2015; Lupovici, 2014; Rid and Buchanan, 2015), offensive (Long, 2017), defensive (Ducaru, 2016; Yağlı and Dal, 2014), deterrence (Davis, 2015; Denning, 2015), rules of Engagement (Kehler et al., 2017), and weapons (Bellovin et al., 2017; Peterson, 2013). As before this is mere snapshot of some of the primary challenges facing NATO, and other international actors, in relation to cyberspace.

The substantive problem for a researcher is that without a common conception of cyberspace, each individual argument presented in the examples of the preceding paragraph, is subject to challenge by tweaking the conceptualisation of cyberspace used.

The most prominent example would be the debate between Rid (2012) and Stone (2013) over whether cyber war is likely. Neither disputes that activity is taking place in cyberspace that presents risks and challenges to states, but the difference in presentation of cyberspace, specifically in relation to violence (Rid, 2013b; Turner, 2013), essentially creates a semantic argument. For a case study to analyse NATO's institutional response to the security challenge emanating from cyberspace, a clear conceptualisation, therefore, of cyberspace has to be developed that, not only, accounts for the existing literature, but maintains compatibility with traditional kinetic conceptions, specifically collective defence and deterrence.[17]

The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP-06 contains a definition for neither cyberspace nor cyber-attack in its four hundred and forty-three pages. However, it does define a computer network attack as an 'action taken to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy information resident in a computer and/or computer network, or the computer and/or computer network itself. Note: A computer network attack is a type of cyber attack.'[18] This is a fascinating statement as the note at the end clearly places the technological action of a computer network attack as only being a constituent part of a broader conception of a cyber-attack. Therefore, even without a specific definition NATO's conception of cyberspace can be posited as being not limited to technological elements, and that a cyber-attack is not limited to the involvement of computer equipment.

The conceptual model of cyberspace, illustrated in Figure 5.3, forms the basis for understanding NATO's approach to cyber-security. The model consists of three layers; physical, logical, and social. Each layer built on the foundations established by the previous layer and, as such, the model is hierarchical in nature, in that removing the capacity of the

[17] As discussed in the previous case study.
[18] *AAP-06,* 2014, 2-C-11

preceding layer to perform its designated function, will remove all the layers above it. The Physical Layer contains all the physical infrastructure that exists in the kinetic world that enables a computer network to function, such as, wires, fibre optic cabling, servers, routers and data centres. The Logical Layer consists of networks, both intranets and internets and applications such as a database or word-processor. The Social Layer is where human interaction takes place and components are people themselves, cyber-identities and social networks. The conceptual roots of this model can be traced to Waltz (1998) who developed a model of information warfare,[19] based on the physical system, information structure, and knowledge. There are some variations on this model, such as Clark (2010), who refers to the information layer as opposed to the social layer, Yannakogeorgos (2013), who like Clark prefers the information layer and an additional human layer on top. In order to maintain a central understanding, and one that broadly aligns with NATO member states national cyber policies,[20] the simplicity of a three-layered model, whereby the social layer reflects all elements of human interaction with the system, including knowledge and information, has distinct conceptual validity.

[19] Information warfare is now primarily conceived as part of cyber warfare.
[20] Every NATO member bar Greece has a published cyber strategy.



Figure 5.3. Layered Conception of Cyberspace

Threat Vectors and Cyber-Attack

How cyberspace has been conceived has varied over time and has gradually been expanded from a narrow conception of a technological phenomenon into a much broader conception. Cyberspace, thus, is not just the sending of information via nodes and not limited to a computer. This makes sense when potential threat vectors within cyberspace are considered. For example, if the object of an attack is to remove a particular computer system from operational use then the attack vector could be a computer network attack against the Logical Layer, a kinetic attack against the Physical Layer and the infrastructure that supports the computers operation, or against the Social Layer to present alternative narratives of global events. If any one of these elements is removed then the operational effectiveness of the computer targeted is degraded, or nullified, therefore, each layer may contain vulnerabilities, or strengths, particular to a specific actor at any given time.

Defence, the fundamental concern of NATO, is established to protect against an attack, with specific regard paid to the likely threat vectors (Jabbour and Muccio, 2014, 121). Threat vectors seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the defence and are variable in relation to the specific time, space and situation in which they occur. For example, Country A may have built up defences against Threat X but not against Threat Z, whilst Country B may have an effective defence against both threats. A cyber-attack is a specific example of a threat vector. Thereby, the purpose of cyber-defence is to protect against cyber-attack. The core differentiation between attack and cyber-attack is thus a function of the threat vector. In the case of a cyber-attack the threat originates from cyberspace and the attack must take place within cyberspace. Therefore, for any organisation to implement a cyber-defence policy it is essential that an understanding of cyberspace exists and a realisation that conceptual errors have the potential to constrain action or favour a particular path.

Cyber Weapon

The question of what constitutes a cyber weapon is complex and the subject of intense debate (Rid and McBurney, 2012). Computer code is not inherently a weapon with harmful intent as its primary function. For example, a hammer has a domestic use, however, it can also be used to cause harm and become a weapon. The key distinguishing feature is that of human intent. Identifying the importance of the human element of cyberspace is of critical importance when considering what constitutes a weapon, an attack, or a hostile action, in cyberspace, with significant ramifications for NATO, as it implies that actions in cyberspace are not taking place in political vacuum and can, therefore, be deterred and the potential for arms control exists (Davis, 2015; Limnéll, 2016). A cyber weapon is, thus, conceptualised as an intended deployment of malicious code that has its origin and effect within cyberspace.

It must be noted that the United States, in particular, has enhanced the confusion about

what constitutes a cyber-weapon by rebranding its cyber capabilities, in 2013, as weapon systems.[21] As such the United States Air Force (USAF) deploys the following self-defined weapon systems;[22] Air Force Cyberspace Defense (ACD); Air Force Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment/ Hunter (CVA/H); Air Force Cybersecurity and Control System (CSCS); Air Force Cyber Command Control Mission System (C3MS); Cyberspace Defense Analysis (CDA); Air Force Intranet Control (AFINC). Given that a central function of defence analysis, force posture, and thus, deterrence, is separating capability from intent, the conflation between capabilities and weapons, which require intent in the cyber domain, has significant potential for substandard analysis and miscalculation.

With the conceptual clarity of the central elements of the cyber environment that NATO operates, deters, and defends within identified, attention can now turn to exploring how NATO has developed its cyber posture within the framework of the transformational model of adaptation, institutionalisation, and effectiveness.

Adaptation

As noted above, NATO first adopted a provision for cyber defence at the 2002 Prague Summit when it pledged to 'strengthen our capabilities to defend against cyber attacks'.[23] By the Warsaw Summit, 2016, Jens Stoltenberg acknowledged the potential for an Article V response to a cyber attack as 'they can harm NATO's defence preparedness and affect our armed forces in their work, since all military activities today are based on the transmission of data, and if that does not work, it can be very damaging'.[24] NATO has, therefore,

[21] Fortuna's Corner (2013) Air Force Details 6 Cyber Capabilities that are Now Weapons Systems, 18th April.
[22] Grudo, G (2017) Meet USAF's Most Widely Spread Cyber Weapons System, *Air Force Magazine*, 12th January.
[23] Prague Summit Declaration, 2002, para 4f.
[24] Schiltz, C. (2017) Cyberangriffe können Bündnisfall nach Artikel 5 auslösen, *De Welt*, 19th January.

elevated cyber to an equivalent level of conventional and nuclear threats to the Alliance, and seeks to integrate cyber defence within its collective defence posture.

To proceed with analysis of the adaptation that NATO has undergone in the cyber environment a two-pronged approach will be taken. First, an identification of the evolution of the cyber threat, and whether the nature of the threat has changed. Second, NATO's developments within the broad field of cyber-security. It will, therefore, be possible to conclude as to whether NATO is simply responding to a changing and evolving threat, an exogenous shock, or, at the other end of the spectrum, whether the threat has not changed and NATO, primarily endogenously, has decided to incorporate cyber defence as a core function of collective defence.

The Evolution of the Cyber Threat

Developing a timeline of cyber threat evolution is not a straight forward task. What should be included, what should be left out, what criteria has been used for inclusion, and what is relevant, will vary from author to author depending on the conceptions of attack, and damage, in cyberspace that they are employing and the incidents that support the appropriate hypothesis. The *Center for Strategic and International Studies* maintains a list of 'Significant Cyber Incidents since 2006', which runs to 26 pages,[25] however, the incidents highlighted are questionable. For example, an attempt to link the theft of patient data from a Norwegian hospital, in January 2018,[26] to *Trident Juncture 18* is pushing the boundaries of significant and exacerbating hyperbole.

[25] Available at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/180213_Significant_Cyber_Events_List.pdf?Yrnw.5AEZjDWzNsYnbixw8_6GXMc9YNW [accessed 26 Mar 2019].

[26] Shah, S. (2018) 'Professional' Hack on Norwegian Health Authority Compromises Data of Three Million Patients, *The Inquirer*, 18th January. https://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/3024692/norway-health-south-east-rhf-hacked [accessed 16 Feb 2018].

NATO Review published a cyber timeline,[27] in 2013, and is highly selective with a substantive gap between 1988, the Morris worm, a 2006 hack of NASA, and the 2007 incident in Estonia. Just these first three incidents emphasise the problem, the Morris worm has questionable intent and other than the slowing down of the internet what harm, or damage, has been caused that requires a defence response. The hack of NASA raises questions for the security of government departments, which is still prevalent today as exemplified by the 2017 *WannaCry* incident.[28] The 2007 incident in Estonia saw disruption to some online government services following a dispute, with Russia, over the moving of a war memorial, which resulted in Estonia calling for, as a member of NATO, 'emergency assistance to defend its digital infrastructure against the ongoing attacks' (Joubert, 2012, 2).[29] Just looking at the first three examples from this timeline provide an incident that causes disruption with questionable intent, intrusions into an organisation being included or excluded depending on the country of origin of the attacker, and a probably state sponsored disruption on another state.

Criminal enterprise in cyberspace is another avenue which has potential implications. The first known case of cyber-espionage took place during 1986, when a German national, Markus Hess, broke into the US military network and sold the information to the Soviet Union (Stoll, 1989).[30] Schroeder (2012) provides an exhaustive examination of the techniques employed by the US Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to catch two cyber criminals, Vasily Gorshkov and Alexey Ivanov, during

[27] See https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/Cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm [accessed 16 Feb 2018].
[28] Hall, G. (2017) WannaCry: The Role of Government in Cyber- Intrusions, Fair Observer, 18th May. Available from https://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/wannacry-cybersecurity-uk-news-63110/ [accessed 19 Feb 2019].
[29] The assistance provided fell short of an Article IV or Article V response by NATO despite some commentators classifying the incident as Web War One, see Davis, J. (2007) Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe, *Wired*, 21st August.
[30] Incidentally Stoll was asked to assist in the investigation of Robert Morris Jr., and highlights a series of conversations that were held with his father, Robert Morris Sr., Chief Scientist at the National Computer Security Center.

1999 and 2000, who had sought to extort money from business by utilising sensitive data.[31] Although, such examples of criminality do not appear to be of direct concern to an organisation whose primary motivation is countering expressions of national power in cyberspace, the potential for economic harm and thus influence and manipulation, especially amongst smaller countries enters the equation.[32] Indeed, it is this potential to exert influence that marks the Estonian case as a key moment for NATO, as Hughes (2009) asserts 'it became patently clear to NATO officials that the Alliance lacked both coherent cyber doctrine and comprehensive cyber strategy'.

During 2007, also, a significant event in cyber history occurred with Operation Orchard. On the 6th September the Israeli air force carried out a bombing raid on the Syrian nuclear reactor development site at *Dayr ez-Zor* (see Rid, 2012, 16-17). The Syrian air defence radar at the border with Israel detected no intrusion and the attackers proceeded to their target unnoticed, leading to substantive assessment that a kill switch had been embedded into the computer hardware enabling it to be shut down remotely (Adee, 2008). In this case, the use of cyberspace has acted as an enabler for a traditional kinetic operation.

The Russo-Georgian war, 2008, saw cyber operating in 'synchronization with a conventional military operation' (Rid, 2012, 13). The effect of the disruption to Georgian government websites was the 'limiting [of] the nation's options to distribute their point of view about the ongoing military conflict' despite the 'vital interest in keeping information flowing to both the international public and its own residents' (Tikk et al., 2008, 15-16). As with the Estonia case the primary effect of the cyber operation was the denial of

[31] Gambling sites are a common target for cyber extortion, William Hill, for example, was targeted in 2016, Massey, L. (2016) William Hill Online Services Hit by DDOS Cyber Attacks, *SBC News*, 3rd November.
[32] Economic influence is not only exerted via cyberspace and criminality but also by other pressures, for example negative media impact tourism, as in the case of Montenegro accession to NATO, see Byrne, A. (2017) Montenegro Counts Cost of Becoming NATO's Newest Member, *The Financial Times*, 2nd June.

information. The conflict in Crimea and Ukraine, since 2014, has been subject to similar levels of information denial and, also, information manipulation (Geers, 2015).

Each of the above examples does not met the threshold for warfare in its own right. Rather, they act as a force multiplier that enhances the expression of national power, not just within information but also diplomatically, militarily and economically. The challenge, for NATO, is thus less concerned with the technical aspects of cyber-defence but more concerned with managing the information sphere.

Indeed, the separation between the more technological challenge of cyber defence and the broader appreciation of security within cyberspace has been inherent since consideration became to be given to the potential threats from cyberspace. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1993), in their seminal work *Cyberwar is Coming!* provide an astute separation between cyberwar and netwar. Whereby,

> Netwar refers to information-related conflict at a grand level between nations or societies. It means trying to disrupt, damage or modify what a target population knows or thinks it knows about itself and the world around it. A netwar may focus on public or elite opinion, or both. It may involve public diplomacy measures, propaganda and psychological campaigns, political and cultural subversion, deception of or interference with local media, infiltration of computer networks and databases, and efforts to promote dissident or opposition movements across computer networks. This, designing a strategy for netwar may mean grouping together from a new perspective a number of measures that have been used before but were viewed separately (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1993, 144).

And,

> Cyberwar refers to conducting, and preparing to conduct, military operations according to information-related principles. It means disrupting, if not destroying, information and communications systems, broadly defined to include even military culture, on which an adversary relies in order to know itself: who it is, where it is, what it can do when, why it is fighting, which threats to counter first and so forth. It means trying to know everything about an adversary while keeping the adversary from knowing much about oneself. It means turning the “balance of information and knowledge” in one’s favour, especially if the balance of forces is not. It means using knowledge so that less capital and labour may have to be expended (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1993, 146).

Arquilla & Ronfledt's work is often cited as the conceptual origins of cyberwar, but the concept of netwar is almost completely ignored (Brose, 2015), although there is not a neat divide between the two. This observation is especially pertinent given the two other cases studies in this thesis, COIN in Afghanistan and the resurgence of collective defence post-Crimea, as Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001a, 11) 'the new technologies, however enabling for organizational networking, are not absolutely necessary for a netwar actor' and that 'netwar is not simply a function of "the Net"… it does not take place only in "cyberspace"… and the outcome will normally depend mostly on what happens in the "real world". They argue that the campaigns of the Mongols, *Blitzkrieg*, the Viet Cong, the Soviets in Afghanistan were examples of netwar, and provide an in depth study of the Zapatista movement in Mexico (Ronfeldt et al., 1998).[33]

The assertion in this thesis is that although claims that 'NATO [has] started to show some teeth for combatting real cyber threats' (Hughes, 2009, 4) the appreciation that more than a technical response is lacking. 'The Alliance is hopefully on its way towards creating a comfort zone in cyber defence' (Krause, 2014), may be accurate in regards to cyberwar and cyber defence, though there is no crossover with the broader concept of netwar. The simple fact that Mike Pompeo, then Director of the CIA, expected Russia to influence the mid-term election in the United States in 2018, illustrates the scale of the capability deficiency that NATO has in deterring interference within its members domestic politics.[34] While, NATO and its member states have been rigid and focussed on the technological dimensions of cyberspace operations, and fascinated by the concept of cyberwar, the Russians have taken Arquilla and Ronfeldt's netwar concept and incorporated it into doctrine, culture and organisation as central components for modern warfare. Furthermore,

[33] In short NATO's COIN operation in Afghanistan and the Taliban's resistance would be a netwar under Arquilla and Ronfledt's conception.
[34] Corera, G. (2018) *Russia 'will target US mid-term elections' says CIA Chief,* 29th January.

NATO has reports from various governments in member states that fear that hackers will try to interfere in national election campaigns, thereby undermining democracy.[35] Analysis of how NATO has responded and developed to cyber threats will provide evidence to support the claim that the Alliance has privileged the technical aspects of cyber security over a broader conception.

NATO's Response to Cyber Threat

NATO's response to the cyber threat following its formal recognition as a security challenge at the Prague Summit, 2002, has been varied. The absence of a singular exogenous shock has been important. Unlike, the case studies of COIN and the return to collective defence, the motivation for change has been endogenously driven. The adaption to the threat from cyberspace has not been quick, as was the case of the collective defence response to Russia's annexation of Crimea. It has, however, benefited from the acceptance of non-military solutions and the comprehensive approach that led to the reinvigoration of COIN under McChrystal, to the extent that NATO's operation can be seen as netwar – a conflict in which control of information networks is central (Arquilla, 2007; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001b; Carvalho and da Silva, 2006; Halpin et al., 2006).

The Cyber Defence Program to defend the computer networks of NATO and the creation of the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) at the Prague Summit is not only due to the attacks on NATO infrastructure during *Operation Allied Force*, but also a response to the development of cyberspace strategy in the United States (Boys, 2018). Significant action was lacking until the 2007 Estonia attacks , which increased appreciation of potential political effects of cyber action and led to the endorsement of the first NATO Cyber Defence Policy and the establishment of the Cyber Defence Management Authority

[35] Schlitz, C. (2017) *Cyberangriffe können Bündnisfall nach Artikel 5 auslösen*, De Welt, 19th January.

(CDMA) and the accreditation Cyber Defence Centre as a Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), at the Bucharest Summit, 2008 (Joubert, 2012; Lawson, 2012). Whilst NATO continually recognised the potential for a cyber element in future conflict and crisis management, as evident in the Summit Declarations it was not until the Lisbon Summit that cyber was elevated to a meaningful level.

The Lisbon Summit, 2010, saw the integration of cyber defence into the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), combined with an agreement to revise the cyber defence policy, completed in 2011 (Healey and Jordan, 2014). Once the step of incorporating cyber into the NDPP had been taken it is a surprise that it took until the Warsaw Summit, five years later in 2016, for cyberspace to be recognised as an operational domain. The Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy and the Action Plan agreed at the Wales Summit, 2014, appears to be a missed opportunity to have enhanced the credentials of the Alliance as a purposive institution that seeks to 'shape the environment in which it operates'[36] and help to define the rules of law applicable to cyberspace (Schmitt, 2013). The outcome of the Wales Summit saw a marked increase in member states adoption of cyber security strategies, and an increase in cooperative arrangements. The Wales Summit saw NATO members decide that cyberspace was an issue that needed to be developed and the process of institutionalisation became increasingly important, though the Alliance is far from the comfort zone as argued by Krause (2014).

Institutionalisation

NATO has developed a degree of institutionalisation in developing its cyber strategy. The substantive evidence indicates that NATO has mainly acted in a cooperative manner seeking to facilitate greater member state appreciation of the security implications of

[36] *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept,* 1999.

cyberspace, which has changed since the Warsaw Summit to include a more pro-active role for the Alliance. Therefore, an increase in commonality can be seen, especially since the Wales Summit, and a differentiation of tasks is evident within NATO, though limited in relation to the member states. However, specificity remains challenging as enduring rules are not in evidence within the Alliance. Indeed, NATO by sponsoring the CCDCOE has made an effort to develop the understanding of the relationship between cyberspace and international conduct. As such, it is not possible to posit that the criteria for institutionalisation has been met.

Commonality

NATO is a diverse organisation of twenty-nine allies. Each individual state assigns its own priority to national security objectives on the basis of national risk assessments. Cybersecurity, as in all areas of security, is subject to different priorities in the NATO member states, and, furthermore, these priorities are likely to change over time as the nature of threat evolves. Unlike other areas of security, however, cybersecurity is beset by a recurring problem - the lack of definitional clarity over cyberspace, cyber-attack, and, hence, what exactly the threat, or responses, available are.

Every member state of NATO now has its own national cyber security strategy, with seventeen either instigating, or providing an update to, such a strategy since 2014 and the launch of NATO's Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy at the Wales Summit.[37] The German and Bulgarian strategies are not publically available. Of the twenty-seven strategies that are available only twelve provide an explicit definition of cyberspace. Less than half the Alliance, therefore, has defined the environment that the strategy operates within, which given the contestation around the concept of cyberspace becomes problematic for

[37] CCD COE (2014) *NATO Summit Updates Cyber Defence Policy,* 24th October.

analysis. Specifically, only five countries – Italy,[38] Romania,[39] Slovakia,[40] Spain,[41] and Turkey[42] – explicitly define their understanding of a cyber-attack.

A definitive shift in national cyber strategies is evident, which coincides with the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy of the Wales Summit, 2014. The national cyber strategies largely focus on deterrence and control beyond the realm of technical challenges. For example, France[43] cyber security has evolved to a broader conception, in 2015, away from the narrow focus on the technical aspect of *Information systems defence and security*[44] challenges evident in its 2011 strategy; Baumard (2017) and Vitel and Bliddal (2015) provide detailed analysis of the development of French national cyber strategy. The same transition is evident in the cyber strategies of the Czech Republic,[45] Estonia,[46] Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom.[47]

The United States maintains the oldest national cyber strategy, having not updated its strategy since 2003.[48] The United States has not been inactive. Rather it has, instead, focused on Presidential Executive Orders,[49] international norms promotion,[50] and individual

[38] Presidency of the Council of Ministers (2013) *National Strategic Framework for Cyberspace Security*, December, and, Presidency of the Council of Ministers (2013) *The National Plan for Cyberspace Protection and ICT Security*, December.
[39] *Strategiei de securitate cibernetică a României*, 2013.
[40] *Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic for 2015-2020*.
[41] *National Cyber Security Strategy 2013.*
[42] Ministry of Transport and Maritime Affairs and Communications (2016) *2016-2019 National Cyber Security Strategy*.
[43] *French National Digital Security Strategy*, October 2015.
[44] Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information (2011) *Information Systems and Defence and Security: France's Strategy*, February.
[45] National Security Authority (2015) *National Cyber Security Strategy of the Czech Republic for the Period from 2015 to 2020*.
[46] Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (2014) *Cyber Security Strategy 2014-2017*.
[47] HM Government (2016) *National Cyber-Security Strategy 2016-2021*.
[48] *The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace*, February 2003.
[49] *Executive Order: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity*, 12th February 2013.
[50] *International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World*, May 2011.

departmental strategy development, such as the Department of Defense,[51] as a means of updating its position and doctrine for cyberspace.

Detailed analysis of the twenty-nine NATO members cyber strategies enables them to be grouped into four distinct categories of cyber-attacks, as shown in Figure 5.4.



Figure 5.4 Classification of Cyber-Attacks (Baumard, 2017, 69).

The x-axis covers the range of state sponsorship, operating on a scale from non-sponsored to full-sponsorship with the y-axis the range of political motivation behind the attack, operating on a scale from immediate technical acts to a targeted effect beyond technology (See Baumard, 2017, Ch. 4). Each different classification of attack requires a unique response, and the national cyber security strategies prioritise to mitigate a specific threat depending on the rational choices made. However, the excessive attention towards Critical Infrastructure Protection (CPI) and indulgence of potential threats prone to hyperbole (Inkster, 2015a; Lawson, 2016; Lee and Rid, 2014). has ensured that most national strategies have, especially since the Wales Summit, tended to be found in the upper right

[51] *The Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace*, July 2011, and *The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy*, April 2015.

quadrant. Including the main actors in NATO's cyber-security; France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Indeed, the CCDCOE has facilitated this trend by developing a framework for national cyber security (Klimburg, 2012).

Figure 5.5, illustrates where national cyber strategies are situated, with the categorisation of the x and y axis correlating to the type of potential cyber-attacks, that the strategy is geared towards addressing. As such the x-axis represents the degree to which threats are seen as the responsibility of society to the development of specific coordinated agencies of state – public or private, and the y-axis the level of focus on technical solutions, from a technocratic jurisdictional approach to a embracing all elements of deterrence and control beyond technology (See Baumard, 2017, Ch. 4).



Figure 5.5 Positing National Cyber Security Strategies (Baumard, 2017, 71).

The majority of NATO members have revised their cyber strategy since the Wales Summit. France is indicative of this change and Baumard (2017) demonstrates that France shifted from a Computer Information Security Strategy, in 2008, to a National Cyber Security Strategy, in 2016. The resulting shift ensured a focus on deterrence, as the means of providing cyber-security, as opposed to legislative and judicial response. Thereby, the shift is the responsibility for cyber-security away from the civil and towards the military. The trend towards deterrence in cyberspace as a national priority is reinforced by NATO's focus on enhancing capabilities, though commonality is as the NATO member states have developed cyber security strategies in line with mitigating risk emanating from sponsored attacks with limited attribution that target critical infrastructure. How likely this risk is to materialise is another matter entirely (Lawson, 2013).

Specificity

NATO as an organisation has inherent structural problems with specificity in relation to enhancing cyber-security. In the context of this thesis, specificity refers to the development of specific and enduring rules. NATO acts as a co-ordinator for resources, personnel and hardware – both military and civilian, that member states have made available to the shared command structure of the Alliance, as can be seen, for example, in the Enhanced Forward Presence deployments to the Baltic States. The provision of cyber-security, however, is clouded by the rational choice of individual member states to focus on critical infrastructure protection (CIP), as seen by the definitive shift in national cyber strategies in the previous section, and cyber capabilities. The capacity for operations beyond the narrow focus on CIP is, therefore, limited beyond the exceptional capability of a small number of countries, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, who have concerns over exposure of their national capabilities.

Indeed, whether NATO should have a role beyond protection and defence is a matter of debate.[52] The United Kingdom was first to make offensive cyber capabilities explicitly available to the Alliance,[53] as confirmed by UK Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon on 29th June 2017[54] (see Sexton, 2016). Denmark, in 2018,[55] became the only other member of NATO to have made offensive capability available to the Alliance. Given that NATO formally recognised cyberspace as a domain of operations at the Warsaw Summit, 2016,[56] three main questions arise;

1) What was cyberspace considered to be from its recognition as a security challenge in the Prague Summit, 2002, until its formal recognition of a domain of operations at Warsaw?
2) Given the national development of cyber operations doctrine and capabilities, in the 21st Century, is the timeframe in commitment of offensive resources surprising?
3) Is the development of an offensive cyber capability an ad hoc response or reflect evidence of NATO defining specific, and enduring, rules for the member states in the provision of cyber-security?

The answer to the first question has been covered under the section on NATO's response to the Cyber Threat, under Adaptation, and in short can be summarised as cyber being conceptualised as a force multiplier rather than a domain of operations in its own right. As for the second question, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, Spain, Denmark, and the Netherlands, are at the forefront of the push towards doctrinal development to enable offensive cyber weapons to be deployed, and are 'aiming for agreement by early 2019.'[57] The significance behind this shift cannot be overstated, not as the mainstream traditional focus on the defensive role of the Alliance (see Lewis, 2015;

[52] Emmott, R. (2017) NATO mulls 'offensive defense' with Cyber Warfare Rules, *Reuters*, 30th November.
[53] UK Ambassador to NATO, Sarah MacIntosh, comments delivered at 'What Next for NATO? Perspectives before the Brussels Summit' at the Royal United Services Institute, 10th April 2018.
[54] Ministry of Defence (2017) Defence Secretary Steps Up UK Commitments to NATO, 29th June.
[55] Danish Ministry of Defence (2019) Offensive Cyber Effects.
[56] CCD COE (2016) NATO Recognises Cyberspace as a 'Domain of Operations' at Warsaw Summit, 21st July.
[57] Emmott, R. (2017) NATO mulls 'offensive defense' with Cyber Warfare Rules, *Reuters*, 30th November.

Veenendaal et al., 2016), but rather the shift in the allocation and management of capabilities, specifically how to accommodate member states who do not wish to disclose the full extent of their national capabilities to the Alliance as a whole. As such, the eighteen-month timeframe, from the Warsaw summit recognition as a domain of operations, to the ability to deploy offensive capabilities, seems relatively short to resolve what Colonel Rizwan Ali, who led the team that implemented NATO's new cyber policy and military strategy, describes as 'the most hotly debated and contentious decision during my tenure at NATO'.[58]

The NATO CCD COE, based in Tallinn, has previously tried to assert specificity in cyberspace with the establishment of the *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare*, in March 2013 (Schmitt, 2013), and its subsequent 2.0 version in February 2017 (Schmitt, 2017). However, as a Centre of Excellence the Cooperative Cyber Defence group, does not have a formal place within NATO's command and control structure, and only acts to influence policy development, with no requirements of member states to adopted positions or incorporate the centre's findings – such as the *National Cyber Security: Framework Manual* (Klimburg, 2012). The implementation of an offensive cyber capability, and the rules surrounding it, therefore, represents NATO's first foray into specificity within cyber operations.

The substantive problem, and an answer to the third question posed, is that in order to achieve the stated capability of the Alliance to embark on offensive operations, as a means of mitigating Russian, and Chinese, aggression in cyberspace, NATO has been forced to alter its command and control functions. Specifically, the command and control of capabilities within cyberspace is different to every other domain that NATO operates in, and

[58] Quoted in Ricks, T. (2017) NATO's Little Noticed but Important New Aggressive Stance on Cyber Weapons, *Foreign* Policy, 7th December.

is thereby, either establishing a new blueprint for twenty-first century integrated operations, with significant impact on national caveats, or the new model is different, due to necessity, raising questions as to its enduring nature, hence specificity. In moving away from a policy that sought only to defend NATO's own networks and operate as a force multiplier on an ad hoc basis, to establishing an operational domain, complete with its own Cyber Operations Centre – authorised at the Defence Ministers meeting, 8th November 2017,[59] NATO has had to accommodate member state postures, which largely focus on not sharing cyber capabilities. As a result, the member states will make cyber capabilities available to be used by the Alliance but maintain national command and control. In other words, there is not a NATO cyber capability but rather a facilitation mechanism which member states can seek the assistance of another member state, without knowing, either the Alliance or the member state, exactly what those capabilities entail.[60] Given such a scenario, asserting specificity is problematic in relation to the enduring nature of the rules, albeit the rules do exist in a limited format.

Differentiation

NATO operations in cyberspace involve a diffuse range of organisations within NATO's structure. The different aspects of NATO organisation that have a stake in cyber defence are identified in Figure 5.6. Although the information is provided in a hierarchical format it must be noted that the interaction between the individual NATO agencies is not just vertically integrated, or even horizontally, but much more fluid depending on the situation at hand. For the purpose of illustration, however, the hierarchical nature is maintained. Figure 5.6 is colour coded, whereby black represents political direct, formal command and control function, brown/grey a military strategic advisory capacity, green represents the

[59] Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, 8th November 2017.
[60] Ricks, T. (2017) NATO's Little Noticed but Important New Aggressive Stance on Cyber Weapons, *Foreign* Policy, 7th December.

tactical/operational level, and blue approved NATO organisations that are not formally part of NATO's command and control structure. Each organisation performs its own dedicated function to help deliver the primary goal to defend NATO's own networks and systems.



Figure 5.6. NATO Cyber Organisation – Hierarchical.[61]

By demonstrating the different roles undertaken by NATO institutions the level of differentiation becomes evident. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) provides the political oversight for the development and implementation of cyber policy. Furthermore, it is also the body that decides the level of assistance, or potential triggering of an Article V or Article IV assistance operation, in the event of a cyber-attack on a member state. Whilst, the Cyber Defence Committee (CDC), came into existence in April 2014, as a replacement for the Defence Policy and Planning Committee (Cyber Defence). The remit of the CDC is as the senior advisory body to the NAC, as well as providing consultation with member states, who are developing their own cyber strategies, so that they meet NATO minimum

[61] Derived by author from a number of sources, primarily https:// www,nato.int/cps/en/SID-4526072A-533C7553/natolive/topics_78170.htm, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/183476/NATOs_Cyber_Capabilities.pdf, and https://ccdcoe.org/ accessed 2 April 2018.

standards. Furthermore, the CDC also maintains overall governance for NATO's internal cyber security. Prior to April 2014, this role was undertaken by the Cyber Defence Management Board.

The CDMB coordinates initiatives within NATO, regarding strategic planning and direction involving NATO networks. The CDMB operates under the Emerging Security Challenges Division and, includes representatives from all major stakeholders in cyber security from different NATO organisations, including Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). The CDMB also maintains responsibility for signing Memoranda of Understanding with member states to aid coordination and information exchange, with twenty arrangements signed by 2012 (Healey and van Bochoven, 2011). The CDMB originally provided oversight of the Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA), which was created at the Bucharest Summit 2008 to co-ordinate responses between NATO and national organisations,[62] however, since the 2011 Cyber Policy the CDMA has been subsumed into the CDMB. The greater level of political involvement that the CDMB brings reinforces the acceptance that challenges in cyberspace require significant political consideration. Finally, the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) provides the technical response. NCIRC was launched in 2003, as part of the Cyber Defence Programme initiated at the Prague Summit, 2002, and NCIRC became fully operational in 2005.

Effectiveness

NATO introduced the Cyber Defence Pledge at the Warsaw Summit, 2016.[63] Following on from the Defence Spending Pledge of the Wales Summit, 2014,[64] the use of specific

[62] Grant, I. (2008) NATO Sets up Cyber Defence Management Authority in Brussels, Computer Weekly, 4th April.
[63] Cyber Defence Pledge, 8th July 2016.
[64] Allied Leaders Pledge to Reverse Defence Cuts, Reaffirm Transatlantic Bond, 5th September 2014.

statements- pledges – outside of the main summit declaration, enables focus and clarity to be provided, and agreed upon by consensus, on areas of current interest to the Alliance. As such the Defence Spending Pledge establishes the goal of moving towards two per cent spending, which can then be measured by agreed metrics. The Cyber Defence Pledge operates in the same manner with the establishment of seven goals, a commitment for 'an annual assessment based on agreed metrics',[65] with progress being reviewed at future summits.

The seven goals of the Cyber Defence Pledge are;[66]

> I. Develop the fullest range of capabilities to defend our national infrastructures and networks. This includes: addressing cyber defence at the highest strategic level within our defence related organisations, further integrating cyber defence into operations and extending coverage to deployable networks;
>
> II. Allocate adequate resources nationally to strengthen our cyber defence capabilities;
>
> III. Reinforce the interaction amongst our respective national cyber defence stakeholders to deepen co-operation and the exchange of best practices;
>
> IV. Improve our understanding of cyber threats, including the sharing of information and assessments;
>
> V. Enhance skills and awareness**,** among all defence stakeholders at national level, of fundamental cyber hygiene through to the most sophisticated and robust cyber defences;
>
> VI. Foster cyber education, training and exercising of our forces, and enhance our educational institutions, to build trust and knowledge across the Alliance;
>
> VII. Expedite implementation of agreed cyber defence commitments including for those national systems upon which NATO depends.

At the first Cyber Defence Pledge conference, held in Paris on 15th May 2018, Jens Stoltenberg identified the key roles for the Alliance in cyberspace as; to drive progress

[65] Cyber Defence Pledge, 8th July 2016, para 6.
[66] Cyber Defence Pledge, 8th July 2016, para 5.

across the Alliance; to act as a hub for information sharing, training and expertise; and to protect our networks.[67] The effectiveness of NATO's cyber-security strategy will, thus, be analysed in accordance with the three key tasks of the Alliance[68] utilising the three markers developed in Chapter 2 will be utilised. As such implementation, reflects the ability to address problems and enact policy; compliance, adherence to the agreed rules; and persistence, the ability to survive in a changing environment.

Implementation

The implementation pillar of the transformational model adopted for this thesis argues that, in order to be classified as having a transformative ability, NATO is able to address problems and enact policy within the sphere of cyber-security. As stated in the introduction to the section on effectiveness, applying analysis in line with three key roles outlined by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, at the inaugural Cyber Defence Pledge Conference, May 2018, with consideration to the crossover with the seven goals of the Cyber Defence Pledge agreed at the Warsaw Summit, 2016.

Drive Progress

Driving progress across the Alliance is, at face value, an amorphous objective, due to the lack of clarity as to what would constitute meaningful progress. Arguably, development in any of the seven goals of the Cyber Defence Pledge could be classified as progress, even if only minor. The true benchmark would be meaningful progress, albeit with the authors subjective connation, as such the focus is on goal VII and I from the Cyber Defence Pledge, with two main points arising.

[67] Stoltenberg, J. (2018) Speech at the Cyber Defence Pledge Conference, 15th May.
[68] As identified by Jens Stoltenberg in his address to the Cyber Defence Pledge Conference, 15th May 2018, with reference to the seven goals of the Cyber Defence Pledge and how they align with the three key roles Stoltenberg outlines.

First, objective VII from the Cyber Defence Pledge seeks to 'expedite implementation of agreed cyber defence commitments'.[69] In the run up to the Wales Summit, 2014, and the introduction of the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy the substantive debate in cyber-security was how cyber-warfare could be defined and whether or not an offensive capability was within the remit of NATO (Gartzke, 2013; House of Commons Defence Committee, 2013; Hunker, 2013; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013; Junio, 2013; McGraw, 2013). The Wales Summit marked a substantive change within the Alliance, that saw an explicit statement that action in cyberspace could lead to the triggering of Article V. The position was further enhanced by the Warsaw Summit, 2016, which formally designated cyberspace as domain of warfare alongside land, sea, and air, and was then further enhanced by the 2017 clarification that the Alliance was had accommodated offensive capabilities.

Secondly, objective I of the Cyber Defence pledge establishes the goal to 'develop the fullest range of capabilities… [and] further integrating cyber defence into operations'.[70] The expansion of capabilities to include offensive operations has been mentioned in the previous paragraph so the essential element here is integration. Following the Defence Ministers meeting, 8th November 2017, Jens Stoltenberg announced that 'ministers agreed on the creation of a new Cyber Operations Centre as part of the outline design for the adapted NATO Command Structure.[71] By integrating cyber and conventional military capabilities NATO will be able to 'respond more effectively' to cyber attacks.[72] As such, it is clear that the incorporation of the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy at Wales, the Cyber Defence Pledge at Warsaw, and subsequent agreements have led to an expedited implementation of cyber defence commitments and developed a range of capabilities and

[69] Cyber Defence Pledge, 8th July 2016, para 5.
[70] Cyber Defence Pledge, 8th July 2016, para 5.
[71] Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, 8th November 2017.
[72] Franklin D. Kramer, quoted in Ansley, R. (2017) Here's Why NATO's Cyber Operations Center is a Big Deal, 9th November.

integration into operations. NATO, therefore, has been driving meaningful progress in enhancing cyber capabilities.

Act as a hub for information sharing, training, and expertise

The key role of sharing expertise set out Stoltenberg most closely aligns with objectives III, reinforce interaction to deepen cooperation, V, enhance skills and awareness, and VI, foster cyber education. NATO has promoted information sharing, training, and expertise in cyberspace since the accreditation of the Cyber Defence Centre in Tallinn, 28th October 2008, following a Memorandum of Understanding, 14th May 2008, supported by Estonia, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, and Spain.[73] The Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), the centres formal title, now encompasses twenty NATO members and partners, Austria, Australia, Finland, Japan, and Sweden.[74] *MCM-236-03 MC Concept for Centres of Excellence (COE)*, 4th December 2003, establishes that 'a COE is a nationally or multinationally sponsored entity, which offers recognised expertise and experience to the benefit of the Alliance, especially in support of Transformation… [though] a COE is not part of the NATO Command Structure'.[75] Following the accreditation of the first COE, 1 June 2005, there are now, in 2018, twenty three accredited COE with a further one in the accreditation process. The fact that the CCDCOE was one of the earlier COEs to be accredited implies that promoting cooperation and sharing in cyber-security has been high on NATO's agenda for over a decade.

During this time the CCDCOE has developed the Tallinn Manual (Schmitt, 2013), as well as providing an updated version (Schmitt, 2017), seeking to clarify not whether the

[73] Centre is the First International Military Organization hosted by Estonia, 28th October 2008.
[74] Austria became the first non-NATO contributing partner, 8th May 2014. The United States joined in 2011, with the United Kingdom and France, in 2014 in the run up to the Wales Summit and the launch of the Enhanced Cyber Policy.
[75] NATO COE Catalogue 2019, page 4.

international rule of law should apply to cyberspace but 'how international law applies to cyberspace.'[76] The CCDCOE has since 2012, hosted an annual cyber exercise, *Locked Shields*,[77] which has grown in size each year to become the largest 'live-fire cyber defence exercise in the world'.[78] The centre has also contributed to a range of other NATO cyber exercises, such as, *Cyber Coalition*, 2016, and *Crossed Swords*, 2018.[79] The pivotal role of the CCDCOE in facilitating information sharing, training and expertise is further highlighted by the development of the NATO Cyber Range in Tartu, Estonian, which is able to facilitate exercises that can reflect the dynamic nature of threats emanating from cyberspace.

NATO, however, is not solely reliant on the CCDCOE for the provision of information sharing, training and expertise. The NATO Cyber Industry Partnership (NCIP) was agreed at the Wales Summit, 2014,[80] and seeks to; 'improve cyber defence in NATO's defence supply chain; contributed to the Alliance's efforts in cyber defence education, training and exercise; and to improve sharing of expertise, information and experience of operating under the constant threat of cyber attack, including information on threats and vulnerabilities, e.g. malware information sharing'.[81] Furthermore, the Alliance seeks to provide training and education, in regard to cyber-security at all levels,[82] from entry-level civilian and military personnel at the NATO Communications and Information Academy, opening 2019,[83] operational level training at the NATO School in Oberammergau, and on the political-military strategic level via the NATO Defence College in Rome. Furthermore, the

[76] Rt Hon Jeremy Wright QC, Attorney General of the United Kingdom. *Cyber and International Law*. 23rd May 2018, Chatham House.
[77] International Cyber Defence Exercise Locked Shields 2012 Beings Today, 26th March 2012.
[78] The Largest International Live-Fire Cyber Defence Exercise in the World to be Launched Next Week, 16th April 2018.
[79] CCDCOE (2019) Exercise Crossed Swords 2019 Integrates Cyber into Full Scale of Operations.
[80] NATO launches Industry Cyber Partnership, 18th September 2014.
[81] There are a number of other objectives, only the most pertinent have been quoted in this thesis. For more information on the NCIP see http://www.nicp.nato.int/ [accessed 16 May 2018].
[82] NATO Cyber Defence. Factsheet, February 2018.
[83] NATO Breaks Ground on Portugal IT Academy, 23rd May 2017.

Emerging Security Challenges Division provides support in addressing new challenges, and as such has a Cyber Defence Section. With the training initiatives, the NCIP, and the role of the CCDCOE, NATO has implemented measures to act as a hub for information sharing, training, and expertise.

Protect our networks

Ever since the Prague Summit, 2002, introduced the goal to 'strengthen our capabilities to defend against cyber attacks',[84] NATO has been focussed on protecting its own networks from intrusion. As such, the most relevant Cyber Defence Pledge objectives are; I, develop capability to defend networks; and IV, to improve the understanding of cyber threats. Deterrence is the central element for NATO in protecting its networks, as Stoltenberg stated 'the idea of deterrence is simple. To make the potential costs of and attack too high. And to make the potential gains of an attack too low'.[85] There is a degree of crossover with measures that support the goal of driving progress, but also enhance deterrence. For example, as Stoltenberg emphasised in his speech at the Cyber Defence Pledge Conference, deterrence has been strengthened 'by making cyber a domain… by encouraging Allies to develop their own cyber capabilities… and by agreeing that a cyber-attack can trigger an Article 5 response'.[86]

NATO maintains a posture of strategic ambiguity in relation to the threshold for Article V invocation in response to a cyber-attack. NATO's official position as to the threshold for response is 'we will see. The level of cyber-attack that would provoke a response must remain purposefully vague'.[87] The Tallinn Manual 2.0 provides guidance that the threshold,

[84] Prague Summit Declaration, 2002, para 4f.
[85] Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Cyber Defence Pledge Conference, 15th May 2018.
[86] *Ibid.*
[87] *Ibid.*

under International Law, should be in relation to the effect caused and that this should be comparable to a physical attack (Schmitt, 2017). The UK Attorney General, has further clarified that the UN Charter applies in cyberspace, including the principles of necessity and proportionality, – though crucially no requirement for a symmetric response - and the threshold for an armed attack must be met.[88] In other words, the virtual world is contained within the laws and norms of the real world, which leads to consideration of why the established form of deterrence - the explicit declaration that action B, utilising a known capability, will follow on from action A – is ignored in cyberspace? Or to put it another way, does NATO's deterrence posture actually have relevant meaning in cyberspace? Is it providing a deterrence? It could be argued that given the state-sponsored nature of the WannaCry,[89] the Fancy Bear DNC hacks,[90] US[91] and UK[92] election influencing, to name but a few recent incidents, that the deterrence, and the subsequent potential for a kinetic, ultimately nuclear response, under Article V, provided by NATO is not deemed credible.

Despite the potential issues regarding the strategic ambiguity deterrence posture of NATO, the Alliance has clearly implemented procedures for protecting their networks. Whilst individual NATO commands and organisations have responsibility for their networks, the umbrella organisation tasked with the defence of NATO networks is the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI).[93] The NCI oversees the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), which was established as part of the Prague Summit (Burton, 2015). The NCIRC has continually expanded its capabilities and includes the

[88] Rt Hon Jeremy Wright QC, Attorney General of the United Kingdom. *Cyber and International Law*. 23rd May 2018, Chatham House.
[89] Hall, G. (2017) WannaCry: The Role of Government in Cyber- Intrusions, Fair Observer, 18th May.
[90] Satter, R. (2017) Inside Story: How Russians Hacked the Democrats' Emails, AP, 4th November.
[91] Zengerle, P. and Chiacu, D. (2018) US 2018 Elections 'Under Attack' By Russia: US Intelligence Chief, Reuters, 13th February.
[92] Turner, C. (2018) Russian Twitter 'bots' attempted to Influence Election by Supporting Jeremy Corbyn, Investigation Finds, The Telegraph, 28th April.
[93] The NCIA Website provides further information.

involvement of private companies, such as Leonardo[94] and a partnership between Northrup-Grumman and Finmeccanica.[95]

The analysis in this section has shown that NATO has implemented an extensive array of provisions to meet the key roles of its cyber-security task, as identified by Stoltenberg, and the seven goals of the Cyber Defence Pledge, agreed at the Warsaw Summit. A key component of deterrence, however, is the compliance of member states and this thesis now turns to analyse the degree of compliance in NATO's provision of cyber-security.

Compliance

Providing definitive analysis of the levels of compliance within the three key roles – to drive progress, act as a hub for information sharing and cooperation, and to protect NATO networks – that Stoltenberg identified at the 2018 Cyber Defence Pledge Conference is particularly problematic, especially in relation to the trajectory of any change in behaviour, due to the timeframes involved. Given that only twenty of the twenty-nine members of the Alliance actively support the CCDCOE there would appears to be strength to Burton (2015, 312) assertion that 'some NATO members are clearly more concerned about cyber security than others'.

Unlike the Defence Spending Pledge from the Wales Summit, 2014, and the stated goal of defence expenditure equating to 2% of GDP, across the Alliance, the Cyber Defence Pledge goals are amorphous. As such, cyber expenditure is not a viable metric for measurement, not least due to the lack of transparency over cyber spending of the member nations, or indeed, agreement over what could be delineated as military cyber expenditure.

[94] See http://www.leonardocompany.com/en/-/nato-ncirc-cyber-security and http://www.uk.leonardocompany.com/-/focus-nato-ncirc [accessed 26 Mar 2019].
[95] See http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/Cybersecurity/Documents/Literature/NATO_CIRC.pdf [accessed 26 Mar 2019].

For example, the United Kingdom, which classifies cyber as a Tier 1 threat to national security, set aside £650million as part of *The UK Cyber Security Strategy*, 2011,[96] which had increased to £1.9 billion, under the *National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021*.[97] The overall UK defence budget, for the current fiscal year, up to March 2019, is £47.2 billion,[98] and the figure has been broadly consistent over the timeframe of the two most recent cyber security strategies. According the UK, spending on implementing the cyber security strategy has increased from 1.37% of the Defence Budget to 4%, therefore, cyber remains a relatively small component of the UK's expenditure, despite its classification as a Tier 1 threat to national security. As a comparison, Deloitte, a private company, announced on 8th May 2018 that it is planning to spend $580 million, over three years, on enhancing its cyber-security.[99] Indeed, a report from PwC puts the value of the European cyber security market, in terms of products and services, at $22 billion in 2016 with a growth expectation of 8% per annum to 2018.[100] Given these levels of expenditure, in relation to the example of the United Kingdom, a major player within global cyber-security, questions can be raised as to the compliance of NATO members, the majority of which spend less than the UK, in providing adequate resources to fulfil a cyber security function.

Participation in Alliance activities provides another means of assessing compliance. With the lack of an active deployment, as in the earlier case of Afghanistan, the only viable option is to analyse cyber exercises. In 2014, *Locked Shields* involved around three hundred participants from seventeen nations,[101], which had increased to around one

[96]Cabinet Office (2011) The UK Cyber Security Strategy: Protecting and Promoting the UK in a Digital World, page 5.
[97] HM Government (2016) National Cyber-Security Strategy 2016-2021, page 6.
[98] Figures obtained from https://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/uk_defence_spending_30.html [accessed 26 Mar 2019].
[99] Marriage, M. (2018) Deloitte plans $600m of Cyber Security Spending, The Financial Times, 7th May.
[100] PWC (2017) Cybersecurity: Emerging Market Leaders, January.
[101] Locked Shields 2014 After Action Report.

thousand from thirty nations, by 2018.[102] *Crossed Swords,* which exercised the integration between cyber and kinetic operations across multiple geographic locations for the first time, during February 2018, utilised eighty participants from fifteen countries.[103] *Cyber Coalition*,[104] 2017, drew around seven hundred participants from twenty-five members, not including partners,[105] a relatively small increase on the six hundred participants in the 2014 variant.[106] As a comparison, *Trident Juncture 18*, is expected to utilise around thirty-five thousand troops, seventy ships and one hundred and thirty aircraft, from thirty members and partners.[107] From these things, it can be deduced that, relatively speaking, participation in cyber exercises is not significantly different to NATO's flagship exercise in terms of member state participation. The smaller number of participants can be explained by the requisite expertise required to participate in the cyber exercises, indeed, the potential asymmetry between numbers of participants and overall effect is one of the frequently cited advantages of cyber operations.

In broader terms, the fact that since 2014, every NATO member now has a cyber security strategy is a progressive step in terms of compliance. Independent studies, such as the *Cyber Readiness Index 2.0*,[108] combined with the specific analysis of the cyber readiness of France,[109] Germany,[110], Italy,[111] the Netherlands,[112] the United Kingdom,[113] and the United States,[114] indicates that the broad trend is of progress, albeit at different paces in different

[102] Cowan, G. (2018) Locked Shields 2018 Practices for Large-Scale Cyber Incident, Jane's 360, 29th April
[103] Exercise Crossed Swords 2019 Integrates Cyber into Full Scale of Operations (2019).
[104] Cyber Coalition differs from Locked Shields 'because it challenges both NATO and national agencies in a number of scenarios that increase in complexity'.
[105] NATO's Flagship Cyber Exercise begins in Estonia, 27th November 2017.
[106] 2014 marked the first time that academia and industry representatives were invited as observers. Largest ever NATO cyber exercise gets underway, 18th November 2014.
[107] Patton, M. (2018) Plans for Massive NATO-Norway Exercise Underway, JFC Naples, 1st March.
[108] Cyber Readiness Index 2.0 (2015).
[109] France Cyber Readiness Index Country Profile (2016).
[110] Germany Cyber Readiness Index Country Profile (2016).
[111] Italy Cyber Readiness Index Country Profile (2016).
[112] The Netherlands Cyber Readiness Index Country Profile (2017).
[113] United Kingdom Cyber Readiness Index Country Profile (2016).
[114] United States Cyber Readiness Index Country Profile (2016).

areas, which reflects national priorities. The *Global Cyber Security Index*, 2017,[115] however, provides an alternate perspective, by focusing on legal, technical, organizational, capacity building, and cooperative aspects of cyber security. It highlights the UK, US, Spain, Norway, France, Estonia, and Canada as leading countries, with every other NATO member as maturing, with the exception of Portugal who did not participate in the study. However, a relative decline, in comparison with other nations since the 2015[116] can be asserted, as in 2015 the US was ranked number one, with Canada in second spot, Norway, Estonia, Germany, and the UK also made the top ten. By 2017, however, the US had slipped to second place, behind Singapore, Canada to tenth, Estonia an increase from eight to fifth spot, the other countries had slipped out of the top ten, though France had entered at ninth place. Whilst drawing definitive conclusions on such data is problematic, it does appear indicative of a trend in which development in cyber-security in Europe, is behind the rest of the world.

Persistence

NATO has demonstrated persistence in developing and enhancing its cyber-security role. Since the adoption of cyber-security as a security task for the Alliance at the Prague Summit, 2002, NATO has developed means to enhance cooperation, expertise, and training across the Alliance whilst enhancing network defence capabilities. Although *Operation Allied Force*, 1999, provided the rationale and impetus for the initial incorporation of cyber-security at Prague, the trajectory of development that NATO, and individual member states have undertaken, is a focus largely towards critical infrastructure protection. The Serbian campaign against NATO, however, was an information campaign (see Larsen, 2000). Since Russia's invasion of Crimea, NATO, and member states, have faced a concerted

[115] Global Cybersecurity Index (2017).
[116] Global Cybersecurity Index (2015).

information campaign from Russia (see Giles, 2016). It appears that NATO, and the member states, have been caught up in the 'cyber-Pearl Harbour'[117] hyperbole that has become increasingly prevalent in any commentary around cyberspace.

Thomas (1998) argues that there are superficial similarities between the American and Russian approaches to information operations, in that they both regard psychological operations as a key component of information operations. Thomas, however, goes on to identify that differences between the two countries and their development of information operations exists due to a different military culture, a different range of threats, not least due to geography, and the relative availability of funding, and technical expertise. 'Russia has a long history of propaganda and disinformation operations' (Iasiello, 2017, 51), as such its development in cyberspace has been to incorporate principles that evolved doctrinal, as information security not cyber-security, from 2000[118] to 2016.[119] Russian focus for how to utilise cyberspace in conflict, as identified in a number of reports by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (see Nimmo, 2016; Nissen, 2016; Ogrysko, 2016; Teperik et al., 2018), has been geared towards exploiting a threat vector that NATO, and member states, have moved away from in order to focus on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CPI).

Chapter Summary

Providing assessment of NATO's incorporation of a cyber security task is the most problematic of the three cases studies analysed in this thesis. Due to the potential lack of commonality amongst the Allies a definitive assertion of a transformational approach as being evident is not possible. The Alliance, however, does demonstrate a degree of

[117] Bummiller, E. and Shanker, T. (2012) Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack on U.S., The New York Times, 11th October.
[118] Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 9th September 2000.
[119] Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No 646, 5th December 2016.

commonality between the main contributors to cyber-security within NATO. In the other areas of the transformational model, within institutionalism, adaptation, and effectiveness, the Alliance does meet the established criteria.

The lack of a significant exogenous shock enables an explanation as to why the model can not definitively be demonstrated to be in effect within cyber-security. The relationship between endogenous and exogenous drivers of change, therefore, is more evident in this case study than the preceding two. If a clear exogenous shock is a necessary precondition of enacting transformational change, then the ability of any institution to act purposively must be questioned, as they would simply be responsive to the external environment. Such a statement is troubling as the Alliance is clearly engaged in driving change endogenously.

The root cause of the resolving this dilemma can be resolved. An exogenous shock helps to provide a clear goal, which enhances commonality, and acts as a motivating factor for the allies. As the concept of conflict in cyberspace is still evolving the potential for diminished commonality is enhanced. Furthermore, the focus of national governments towards a technological based focus on protecting critical infrastructure acts as a constraint on the options available to the Alliance to pursue a different posture. As Russia, and indeed China, are operating using different principles and objectives to the current national security objectives of the individual allies, the problem of force posture is further compounded.

In order to maintain a transformative approach to cyber-security the Alliance needs to delineate a clear objective and enact upon it. Then, just as in COIN in Afghanistan, the institutionalisation prowess of the Alliance and effectiveness will provide sufficient to complete the circle of the transformational model and enhance the commonality of the NATO allies.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

> In 2014, Allies agreed to move towards investing 2% of GDP on defence within a decade. They also agreed to invest more in key military capabilities. And to contribute to NATO missions and operations. In other words: more cash, capabilities and contributions.
>
> Jens Stoltenberg, 14th February 2018.[1]

On the 4th April 2019 NATO will be seventy years old. Throughout its history the Alliance has faced a continual raft of challenges, some of which have proven easier to solve than others, some return to the fore, others retreat as the security environment shifts, and some remain unsolved. The thesis has sought to analyse the drivers of change in NATO during the post-Cold War era, specifically in relation to the adoption of new security tasks. Thereby, the thesis, address the debate regarding the viability and role of NATO within the international security environment that has been questioned since the collapse of the Soviet Union. By focusing on the emerging security challenges, in the case studies, the thesis brings makes a theoretically informed empirical contribution to knowledge on the Alliance, as well as institutions more broadly.

To conclude the thesis this chapter proceeds in two main parts. First, a reflection on the research, including limitations of the research. Second, identification of the original contribution to knowledge and benefits the existent literature on the Alliance and third wave institutionalism.

Reflections on Research

The thesis provides a positive assessment of NATO's ability to act as a transformative institution as the security environment alters. NATO's transformation has been analysed via

[1] Defence Ministers Meeting. 14th February 2018 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_151504.htm

a transformation model, which identifies three pillars; adaptation, institutionalisation, and effectiveness. The central enquiry of the thesis has been to analyse the extent to which endogenous factors, resulting from the Alliance's internal actors, offer explanatory power to the transformation of the Alliance, beyond the traditional viewpoint of institutional change requiring an exogenous shock. By making such an argument the thesis has sought to minimise critique of institutional analysis being static and oblivious to the more nuanced, dynamic, processes that exhibit institutional flexibility. The delineation of exogenous and endogenous drivers of change is not objectively clear, as such the role of the Alliance as an endogenous driver of change could be called into question. However, by combing the arguments of March and Olsen (1984) and Koning (2015), NATO is show to be an actor as it exhibits coherence and autonomy, whilst enacting endogenous change based due to the accommodation of member states interests, in the consensus decision-making model of the Alliance.

The thesis summary, therefore, would be that NATO embarks on courses of action that are reliant on endogenous factors, though the extent to which it is possible to argue that the relevant action would have been undertaken without an exogenous shock, is primarily subjective. The individual case studies, which varied the level of exogenous shock emphasise the point. In the case of Afghanistan - 9/11 - and the return of collective defence – Russian annexation of Crimea – the exogenous shock is clear. In the case of COIN in Afghanistan it is clear that NATO engaged in a substantive process of institutional learning, an endogenous practice, though it would not be in the situation to apply this endogenous process without the exogenous shock occurring in the first place. Whilst the Russian annexation of Crimea is an exogenous shock, NATO was already in the process of altering its posture towards Russia, with the events in Crimea acting as an accelerant to the process. Whilst, the Alliance's decision to engage in a cyber-security role, which is absent a clear exogenous shock and supports the argument that institutional change can be the

product of endogenous drivers of change. The mixture of results implies that the validity of the transformational model may not extend beyond the individual case studies. The articulation of endogeneity having a purposive impact on an institution is of note, however, given the preference of the literature for utilising exogenous explanations for institutional change.

The lack of a definitive metric for assessing endogeneity may well rest in the chain of causality, whereby events are caused by other events, which are still predicated on events further in history (Thelen, 2000).[2] If events are determined by past events how does anything begin? In other words, the initial aspect of change occurring cannot be explained by reference solely to exogenous shock in pure theoretical terms. As such, an inherent bias towards an exogenous explanation of change exists, primarily as its easier to rationalise and analyse a defined period of time referent an obvious marker in time, such as the end of the Cold War, 9/11, or Russia's annexation of Crimea. Any conceptualisation of change, therefore, is socially constructed based on time - change begins, the change takes place, and the outcome occurs. The means of measuring change, however, exist outside of our experience of it, reinforcing the positivist approach adopted in this thesis. A diachronic approach and claims of endogeneity, thus, have to be considered as more subjective in analysis than simplistic synchronic explanations of exogenous change. The case studies explored in this thesis, within a diachronic approach by placing the examination of change within the broader Cold War period established in Chapter 1, thereby, provide a mixed assessment of the role of endogenous and exogenous change, within the context of an established institution.

[2] Outside of political science, it is worth noting that Stephen Hawking (2018) makes similar arguments and observations in relation to the origins of the universe.

NATO would not have become embroiled in Afghanistan without the attacks of 9th September 2001. The potential, however, for engagement out-of-area remained prevalent in Alliance thinking, especially after the decision to intervene in Kosovo, 1999. If the case of Afghanistan is used, therefore, as a proxy for an undefined generic out-of-area military operation the findings, relating to exogenous versus endogenous drivers of change, maintain validity. In other words, to engage in transformative change in a military operation, then a clear exogenous shock is a necessary pre-condition. Endogenous change may well be enhanced, and indeed expected to occur, though it is the exogenous shock that remains the precursor for transformative change.

The Russian annexation of Crimea, provides an exogenous shock equivalent to 9/11 and the findings are comparable to the COIN case study. NATO, however, had already begun a process of reinforcing the collective defence provision of the Alliance prior to the Russian actions in Crimea and Ukraine. Primarily this was a response to increased Russian belligerence - as seen in Georgia, 2008 - towards its neighbours, as well as perceptions that the focal point of unity for the Alliance had been diminished by engaging in global operations. In other words, the decision to deploy the Alliance in Afghanistan had an effect on the collective defence provision, in Europe, of the Alliance. As such, even if the changes underway at the time of Russia's annexation of Crimea are considered as evidence of endogenous change, they are related directly to the exogenous shock of 9/11 and the subsequent actions of the Alliance.

Perhaps, the most interesting case study is cyber-security, as no clear exogenous shock is present, only an amorphous change in how society, generally, conducts its business, whether in terms of military or civilian applications of technology. The conception, and utility, of cyberspace is still evolving today, and likely to continue for a substantial period of time too. As such, definitive conclusions of the transformative nature of NATO's

involvement in cyber-security are essentially subjective. Though, the means of asserting endogeneity, established in the theoretical approach, offer a causal endorsement.

Limitations

Two limitations occur in relation to this thesis, both of which are inherent in any study of institutions. First, secrecy, which is especially prevalent in military institutions. Second, consideration of the wider literature on the case studies, especially when undertaking research in areas of ongoing concern.

The thesis, by design, has relied on publicly available primary source material. As such, not every document that could have been beneficial to the study has been available for analysis. Specifically, *MC400/1*, *MC400/2*, and *MC400/3* would have added depth to the comments regarding military policy in Afghanistan, though it should be noted that the contents of the documents, in general terms, can be ascertained, and is referred to in Chapter 3. The secrecy behind the cyber security policy is more puzzling, not least as the executive summary of the 2011 version is publicly available, but also when national strategies are widely available and NATO accredited organisations, the CCD COE, publish guidelines for producing cyber strategies exist.

The three case studies have received substantive analysis in the literature, both in terms of specific analysis and general discussion of relevant theoretical underpinnings. As such, any study would struggle to adequately represent the full spectrum of views and commentary. NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan formally concluded at the end of 2014, and therefore, represents a historical event. Albeit, one that still attracts a healthy degree of literature due to the unique context of the conflict, the first coalition counter-insurgency campaign in history and also one conducted outside of the significant area of interest of a unique military

Alliance that had engaged its collective defence principle for the first time in its history. The resurgence of Russia in the consideration of European security and the development of cyber-security as a security concern, however, represent ongoing and developing security issues, with an ever-expanding literature. The salient aspects of the debate have been represented throughout this thesis, though it remains possible that the thesis could be overtaken by events in the future, which remains especially true if a clear exogenous shock occurs in cyber-security.

Contribution to Knowledge

The thesis makes two main contributions to knowledge, based on the theoretically driven empirical analysis provided by the case studies. First, by blending together different literatures on institutional change and developing a transformational model clarity is gained theoretically. Furthermore, linguistic clarity is gained by placing adaptation as a process of transformation, as opposed to the widespread interchangeable use of the two words evident in the literature. The institutionalisation and effectiveness pillars of the transformational model, employed in the case studies, demonstrates the applicability of rational choice institutionalism as a means for understanding the Alliance and institutional change. Commonality, in particular, evidences the constraining nature of an institution on the individual utility maximisation characteristics of the allies, whilst implementation enhances claims of the rationality of the allies, and the Alliance as a whole, as agreed process is followed through. Whilst, persistence emphasises the endogeneity of the Alliance particularly in relation to lessons learned programmes that have been implemented. Thereby, the view of NATO as a purposive institution that is able to enact change and has meaning is enhanced by the theoretical model in this thesis, which may in turn offer explanatory power to the continued existence of the Alliance.

Chapter 2, examines the relationship between the different schools of thought and understanding change and the thesis upholds the criticisms of realism with regard to the continued existence of the Alliance. Despite arguing that the Alliance was doomed to fail at the end of the cold war, realists now argue that such an eventuality that will transpire and that it has merely been delayed (Mearsheimer, 2014). Whilst it is undoubtedly true that at some stage in the future NATO will cease to exist, to claim that it will not exist at some undefined point and that when it does is a victory for the realist viewpoint lacks credibility as it is devoid of any significant causal explanation. Furthermore, the Alliance has thrived in the post-Cold war era and is likely to have sufficient institutional flexibility to accommodate new security challenges as they develop in the future.

The empirical analysis provided in the three case studies is used, within this thesis, to support the theoretical position employed. However, the data used enhances knowledge in its own right and has broader applicability beyond the institutionalist framework in which it is employed in the thesis. NATO is still involved in Afghanistan, albeit in a different role to the COIN campaign analysed in this thesis. Ahead of the Warsaw Summit, July 2018, an increase in troop commitments was announced, indicating the continued commitment of the Alliance to preserving security in Afghanistan and developing the ANS.[3] In December 2018, however, the Trump administration announced an abrupt shift in policy withdrawing seven thousand troops from the country.[4] The security situation is likely to continue to evolve and whilst the conflict may well be 'Unwinnable' (Farrell, 2017) the empirical evidence utilised in this thesis to further understanding of institutional change is likely to remain applicable to analysis of the security environment.

[3] The UK announced an additional deployment of 440 troops bringing the total UK deployment to 1,100 by early 2019, see Brooke-Holland, L. (2018) Troops in Afghanistan: July 2018 Update. **Briefing Paper No 08292**. London, House of Commons Library.

[4] Gibbons-Neff, Thomas and Mashal, N. (2018) U.S. to Withdraw About 7,000 Troops From Afghanistan, *The New York Times*, 20th December.

The return of collective defence is an evolving security situation that presents a mixed picture of relationship between Russia, NATO and its member states. For example, despite the respective withdrawals of the United States and Russia from the INF Treaty, and the regressive steps of new ballistic missile capabilities, and indeed ballistic missile defences, the NATO-Russia Council remains a forum for dialogue and has meet on a number of occasions since the 2014 annexation of Crimea.[5] By highlighting change in the different strands of the transformation model this thesis has demonstrated that NATO has moved beyond its muscle memory and can not simply rely on Cold War strategy, doctrine, and policy to overcome the challenge posed by Russia in the era of hybrid warfare. The case, therefore, provides evidence of NATO's ability to respond to an emergent security situation, and respond rapidly, to new challenges as they arise. Thereby, understanding the process by which the Alliance has changed focus in light of an emergent threat has applicability to furthering understanding behind future developments not only in the relationships with Russia, but also future potentially adversaries. China would be the most problematic future adversary for the Alliance to deal with, if Beijing chooses, or is forced due to their own rationality, to take on a more global role.

Cyber-security has the most under-developed existent literature of the three case studies, especially in relation to NATO. Whilst a plethora of articles and comment on the subject exists, the overt focus on conceptualisation hinders meaningful progress of enhancing understanding. Theory is definitely behind practice in this regard, which is a challenge regardless of theoretical position. The empirical evidence which illustrates the changes made to national security strategies and how these translate into the options that NATO is able to pursue should help to raise awareness that the different aspects of threats faced

[5] The most recent meeting was on 25th January 2019. Although the Council was initial suspended it met on three occasions in both 2016 and 2017, and twice in 2018.

merit different considerations. Too much focus has been placed on the 'cyber pearl harbour' scenario and the protection of critical infrastructure, which has led to the under-representation of the present threats to stability on the home front of NATO members.

NATO will face undetermined challenges in the future and it is hard to speculate as to what these may be. One of emergent security interest that has close parallels with the cyber-security case study, and is highly likely to be of significance to NATO, is the development of space as an operational domain of warfare (Creedon, 2012; Livingstone and Lewis, 2016; Metcalf, 2018; Valeri, 2013). The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has already reported on the potential for space, as a domain of warfare, to operate as a force multiplier and impact on Alliance operations and notions of defence.[6] Interestingly, the conception of space as a force multiplier is the same as the original conception of how cyberspace would be employed in military operations, before it became widely acknowledge to warrant consideration as a domain of warfare in its own right. Applying the theoretical model used in this thesis to the emergence of space as a security interest for the Alliance is likely to be beneficial to understanding NATO and may offer further scope for exploring the relationship between endogenous and exogenous drivers of change.

[6] See Moon, M. (2017) "The Space Domain and Allied Defence". **162 DSCFC 17 E rev.1 fin**. Brussels, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, page 8.

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